UAE, Bahrain , Israel peace accord: Without the Palestinians, true peace is unlikely

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The much-vaunted announcement that Bahrain will normalize relations with Israel, hot on the heels of the United Arab Emirates, has been greeted with excitement in Western foreign policy circles. But true stability in the region is a long way off.

Bahrain Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa  ( L) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 2nd left, President Donald Trump, C and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan ink the at accord at the White House, Tuesday, Sept. 15, 2020, in Washington, DC

By H. A. HELLYER

Over the course of the past month, two Arab Gulf states have declared their intentions to normalize relations with the state of Israel, making them the fourth and fifth to do so (after Egypt, Jordan, and temporarily Mauritania) since Israel’s establishment in what was then Mandatory Palestine in 1948. Much of the Western policy and media establishment, both in London and particularly in Washington DC, reacted very excitably to the news. There’s even a suggestion that U.S. President Donald Trump deserves a Nobel Peace Prize for midwifing the move.

Supporters of the deal argue that the Arab states’ declarations have overturned the historically held notion that a stable Arab world, in which Israel is fully accepted, would only occur after finding a solution to the Palestine question. But this new narrative overlooks a crucial set of issues that will not disappear, even if they may seem distant to those watching from thousands of miles away. Within the region, the siege of the Gaza Strip, the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and the denial of a solution to the refugee issue remain an open wound for the Arab public.

WHAT NORMALIZATION REALLY MEANS

Normalization with the Arab world has evaded Israelis for decades. The establishment of the state of Israel resulted in hundreds of thousands of Palestinians being dispossessed, and Palestinian, Syrian, and Egyptian territories were militarily occupied by Israel in contravention of international law. Within those territories, IsraeliPalestinian, and international human rights organizations have long objected to Israeli forces repeatedly violating human rights conventions. This happens in territories that the overwhelming majority of the international community—and international law—recognize as illegally occupied by Israel. Discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel is an additional issue entirely.

H. A. Hellyer

Dr. H.A. Hellyer is a senior associate fellow and scholar at the Royal United Services Institute in London and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on politics, international relations, security, and religion in the West and the Arab world.

For decades, successive Arab governments in the region have, nevertheless, committed to the normalization of relations with Israel—provided that Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and facilitates a just and legal solution to the Palestinian refugee question. Hence the Arab Peace Initiative, drawn up by Saudi Arabia in 2002, which has the unanimous support of all members of the Arab League. Yet still the longest military occupation in the world continues, and the ensuing refugee problem endures. Indeed, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees has been in continual operation since 1949.

What seems to have excited so many over these latest announcements from the UAE and Bahrain is that the sequence for normalization is being overturned. No longer, it seems, must normalization come after withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the achievement of a just peace with the Palestinians. Normalization can happen first—so goes the narrative—and then, perhaps, Israel will withdraw thereafter. The “perhaps” is important, because there is no guarantee stipulated in any of these agreements that Israel will not annex Palestinian territories. The road to regional stability will go through more normalization efforts such as these, and, so it is suggested, the international community can expect further normalization going forward.

But all of this misses the full meaning of normalization. Normalization is not simply the establishment of official diplomatic relations between states. That is only a part of the normalization of officialdom. If that were the case, then Israel has already somewhat normalized in the past with many Arab states. Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia have all previously had commercial offices in Israel. Doha even hosted an Israeli trade office for a time, with resident Israeli diplomatic representation. But no one could realistically claim any of this was full normalization. By and large, none of these forays lasted—and while they did last, no people-to-people normalization took place.

Normalization is not simply a top-level exchange of officials; rather, it’s a public-to-public engagement. Decades after the Egyptian peace accords, people-to-people normalization does not exist, and relations remain quite cold on a cultural level. The same is true for the Jordanian peace accords, signed in 1994. In the aftermath of the declaration of the Bahraini steps toward normalization, there were protests in Manama against the government’s move, alongside public declarations by Bahraini politicians and civil society. Even prior to that, there were denouncements across the Gulf by opponents to normalization, describing it as betrayal.

On the ground in the Arab world, the opposition to normalization vividly continues. When U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Sudan, for example, and tried to tie support for Sudan’s transition from dictatorship to normalizing relations with Israel, Sudan’s transitional leaders firmly rejected the idea. They were aware that in a Sudan where public opinion now genuinely mattered, the newly empowered Sudanese population would punish any such move. It is a lesson that all should take note of: the deepening of democratic norms in the region makes it all the more necessary for Israel to respect international law in engaging with the Palestinians, if normalization really is desired. 

OVERCOMING ISRAEL’S NORMALIZATION PARADOX – PALESTINIANS ARE NOT AN OPTIONAL EXTRA

It is true that in 2020, the Palestinian cause is no longer a primary rallying point in most Arab states. The turmoil of the past decade has meant that Arab populations are far more occupied with tumult at home. The Arab revolutionary uprisings of 2011 and their aftermath unleased scores of different complications. But even against that backdrop, it is important to remember that those uprisings often flew the Palestinian flag in protests. That signified the centrality of the symbolism of the Palestinian cause, connecting it to the Arab revolutionary demand for genuine autonomy and empowerment after colonial and postcolonial regimes.

Israel continues to desire full normalization in the region, but paradoxically, it seeks to do so in ways that make true normalization a veritable impossibility. The evidence that we can gather from all moves toward normalization with Israel in the Arab world over the past four decades makes it clear: announcing partial or full diplomatic relations with Arab states does not result in acceptance by Arab populations, unless accompanied by grassroots buy-in, which is inextricably connected to the question of Palestine.

Indeed, even as Israel proclaims diplomatic success in the Gulf, the reaction across Arab public platforms, be it on social media or media outlets, has drawn attention to Israel’s increased sense of impunity in dealing with Palestinians on the ground. In the past month, there has been a major spike in the demolition of Palestinian homes by Israeli forces and Israeli military incursions into Palestinian territory. Israel has made it clear that it does not feel treaty-bound to stop annexing Palestinian territory in the future, let alone withdraw from occupied territories. A true normalization with the Arab public is unlikely to follow such moves—on the contrary.

The most realistic path to full normalization for Israel does not require its government to set up diplomatic outposts in cities far away from Tel Aviv, but rather, to come to an equitable and just settlement with the people of Palestine, from Gaza to Jerusalem to Ramallah. The non-resolution of this historic conflict only perpetuates its festering trauma. As such, true normalization is likely to elude Israel for quite some time to come, regardless of how much excitement ensues now. In the end, the normalization of Israel in the region can only come through an acceptance on the ground by the wider Arab public, including the people of Palestine—irrespective of fanfare from the Trump administration.

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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25 responses to “UAE, Bahrain , Israel peace accord: Without the Palestinians, true peace is unlikely”

  1. I agree with the author , true stability in the region is a long way off and a comprehensive Arab Israeli peace deal should be the ultimate aim , for true and real peace in the region .The Palestinian leadership needs to get its act together to help accelerate this process.
    At the same time we shouldn’t blame UAE or Bahrain for the deals, which I consider more like convenience deals than peace accords . I blame Iran for such deals . UAE and Bahrain have been having security problems with Iran for many years . After all Iran still occupies 3 UAE islands in the Gulf and threatens it on regular basis . Iran also continues to bully Bahrain and several Iranian terror cells have been identified during the last few years . This UAE , Bahrain deal should therefore be considered a deal against Iran more than a deal with Israel .As long as Iran with its proxies continues to bully the countries in the region , it should expect more such deals in the near future and will end up being surrounded by Israel for thousands of miles in the Gulf . Iran should know by now it is gradually but surely displacing Israel as the number one enemy of the Arabs and unless it changes its behavior it is going to find itself completely surrounded by Israel

    1. Arzna, clean your brain. Not FaLIEstinian but Orabistinian. Are you illiterate? Are you capable to learn?

  2. Es gibt kein Normalität mehr Avatar
    Es gibt kein Normalität mehr

    The UAE, Bahrain and Israel peace accord is not a true peace.
    True stability in the region is a long way off.
    Without the Palestinians Arabs there is no peace in the region.

    Another obstacle to a true peace is the Iranian hegemony over Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

    As long as Iran with its proxies continues bullying the countries in the region, there is no future for region. As Arzna says unless Iran changes its behavior it is going to find itself completely surrounded by Israel.

    1. Are you educated in Lubyanka, idi*t?

  3. BS. After some years none will remember chosen kgbstinians flastelienians etc.
    This doctor just feel Liberal Fundamentalism Cash Flow and depend on it
    I will keep eye on you, corrupted doctor H. A. HELLYER

  4. Exposure: Syrian prime minister was a double agent helping Israel

    1. In the summer of 1945, French officials in Syria and Lebanon hated no one more than Jameel Mardam. According to French intelligence, Mardam, the prime minister of Syria, which was under the French mandate, worked for the British

      1. They were informed that the prime minister had been recruited by Brigadier General Sir Ilthid Nicholl Clayton, head of MI6 in the Middle East, and Nuri Said, Iraqi prime minister. Mardam agreed to a plan to unite Syria with Iraq and Transjordan under the rule of the Hashemite dynasty immediately after the departure of the French. Great Britain, which controlled Iraq and Transjordan, dreamed of getting Damascus under its rule. For participation in the “Greater Syria” plan, Mardam received huge money and a promise that he would continue to rule Syria under the rule of the Hashemite monarch

        1. This information was just the beginning of a dramatic and previously unknown episode that shaped the entire Middle East as we know it. It so happened that the French decided to use the situation for their own purposes and began to blackmail Mardam. They threatened to publish the documents they had and pass on all the information to his political opponents. Ultimately, Mardam resigned in August 1945, after consulting his British handlers, who knew nothing of the blackmail and that he had become a double agent. At a time when the region’s future was hanging by a thread, Mardam provided invaluable information to the French about the intentions of British intelligence services in the Middle East

          1. But the story doesn’t end there. Recent research in French and Israeli archives, as well as a study of documents from the Syrian government, show that the Syrian prime minister actually received instructions from a curator from the Zionist movement, along with French intelligence services. The information that was transmitted from his submission to David Ben-Gurion was crucial for the development of the strategy of the Zionist movement in the period before the creation of the state

          2. Cooperation with the Zionists began in October 1945, when the French faced a new problem. Mardam was appointed Syrian ambassador to Egypt and the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, but the French found it difficult to use him there without arousing suspicion. It was decided to hire Eliyahu Sasson to transmit information from Mardam

          3. Sasson, who at the time was head of the Arab branch of the political department of the Prison, was commissioned by Ben-Gurion in February 1945 to coordinate interaction with French intelligence. Sasson was of Syrian descent, he personally knew Mardam and met him in 1937, when the latter was prime minister. The French, who were well acquainted with Sasson and appreciated his operational capabilities, began to cooperate with him in the fight against Mardam

          4. Documents show that on November 12, 1945, Sasson met with Mardam in Cairo. They met again six days later when Mardam visited Jerusalem at the head of a League of Arab States delegation to organize a Palestinian representation in the Arab League. Following these meetings, Ben-Gurion met with Sasson, and a diary entry dated November 22 contains a detailed account of all of Sasson’s conversations with Mardam. This is one of the few instances in which Mardam can be directly identified as Ben-Gurion’s intelligence source. In subsequent years, both the French and Sasson hid in every way the fact that Mardam was the source of information, so as not to expose him

          5. Since July 1945, Ben-Gurion has been preparing for the possibility of an attack by Arab states if the Jewish state declares its independence. But the information from Mardam caused him much more concern than the likelihood of an Arab attack. Ben-Gurion learned that the British were going to declare the “Haganah” a terrorist organization and demand its disarmament, after which they wanted to give the green light to the implementation of the Greater Syria plan, according to which a small Jewish autonomy would be created in mandated Palestine without any status of an independent state.

            Apparently, it was Mardam who told the Zionists that there is a “mole” in the leadership of the Sokhnut, which transfers to the British everything that happened behind the closed doors of the Zionist leadership, including the minutes of the most secret meetings

          6. According to information transmitted by Mardam, Arab rulers, fearing Soviet intervention, decided to help the British in the event of a full-scale war in the Middle East between the Soviet Union and the West. While London’s policy was to stall for time, rebuild its economy and put relations with the United States on a solid footing

          7. With regard to the Paliestinian question, during the discussion in the Council of the League of Orab States, concern was expressed about the continued immigration of Jews to Palestine, which will allow the Haganah to deploy an army of approximately 80,000 people. The Orabs said they “could never catch up with them in military training and organization, even if the British helped.” Accordingly, Orab leaders wanted the British army to remain in Palestine.

          8. In the end, the plan for Greater Syria was thwarted by the Saudi monarch Ibn Saud, who saw this as a threat to his kingdom. He enlisted the backing of US President Harry Truman and the State Department, which put a lot of pressure on London. On July 14, 1946, the British government was forced to declare that it did not support the Greater Syria project. However, the British military and secret services in the Middle East continued their efforts to create a Hashemite Greater Syria as part of a regional defensive alliance against the Soviet threat.

          9. Subsequent actions by the British military and secret services confirmed Mardam’s information. On June 29, 1946, during the “Operation Agatha” – or “Black Saturday” in Hebrew – units of the British army arrested the leaders of the Sokhnut, in particular the head of the Foreign Policy Department Moshe Sharet, and confiscated documents at the Sokhnut headquarters in Jerusalem. The British raided many kibbutzims in search of illegal weapons. The true goal of the operation was to disarm the Haganah and replace its “extremist leadership”, primarily Ben-Gurion, with more moderate figures.

          10. This operation largely failed, as the Haganah leadership had been notified of everything two months before it began. Ben-Gurion escaped arrest as he was in Paris at the time. The British also tried to find evidence of French support for the Zionist movement, so Eliyahu Sasson’s documents were first seized during a raid on the Jewish headquarters. But they found nothing to indicate this

          11. In December 1946, Clayton forced Syrian President Shukri al-Quatli to remove Prime Minister Saadallah al-Jabiri for his part in disrupting the Greater Syria plan and replace him with Jamil Mardam. The move was aimed at ensuring that Mardam could secure a parliamentary majority for this plan. But Mardam began to distance himself from the British, although MI6 continued to view him as a reliable agent, although he showed an increasing willingness to cooperate with the French. Indirect confirmation of this is contained in government documents in Syria. For example, Mardam warned his ambassador in London about the intrigues of “our British friends, who are warning us about French attempts to stir up protest among the Druze and Bedouin tribes in the Syrian desert against the government in Damascus.”

          12. The return of Mardam to Damascus from Cairo allowed the French to rule it directly, without the mediation of Sasson. In the summer of 1946, France established diplomatic relations with Syria and opened a consulate in Damascus, in which intelligence agents operated under diplomatic cover and could meet with Mardam without arousing suspicion.

          13. After the defeat of the Orab states in the 1948 war, hurricane winds swept through the old regimes in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. Jamil Mardam was one of the victims of these shocks. In December, after an acute crisis in Syria, he was again forced to step down as prime minister. He spent the last years of his life in Cairo, where he died in 1960. Until now, cooperation with the French and Zionists remains an unknown chapter in his life.

          14. In February 1947, Ben-Gurion met in London with British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and praised Mardam as a moderate Arab leader. Perhaps, if circumstances allowed, Ben-Gurion’s comments about the Syrian prime minister could have been much warmer

            (Meir Zamir)

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