McCain urges U.S. to lead effort for airstrikes on Syria

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15 responses to “McCain urges U.S. to lead effort for airstrikes on Syria”

1. 

   American Infidels

   March 6, 2012

   his speech.. not to dis this website, just due to the importance of the speech..

   After a year of bloodshed, the crisis in Syria has reached a decisive
   moment. It is estimated that more than 7,500 lives have been lost. The United
   Nations has declared that Syrian security forces are guilty of crimes against
   humanity, including the indiscriminate shelling of civilians, the execution of
   defectors, and the widespread torture of prisoners. Bashar Al-Assad is now
   doing to Homs what his father did to Hama. Aerial photographs procured by Human
   Rights Watch show a city that has been laid to waste by Assad’s tanks and
   artillery. A British photographer who was wounded and evacuated from the city
   described it as “a medieval siege and slaughter.” The kinds of mass atrocities
   that NATO intervened in Libya to prevent in Benghazi are now a reality in Homs.
   Indeed, Syria today is the scene of some of the worst state-sponsored violence
   since Milosevic’s war crimes in the Balkans, or Russia’s annihilation of the
   Chechen city of Grozny.

   What is all the more astonishing is that Assad’s killing spree has continued
   despite severe and escalating international pressure against him. His regime is
   almost completely isolated. It has been expelled from the Arab League, rebuked
   by the United Nations General Assembly, excoriated by the U.N. Human Rights
   Council, and abandoned by nearly every country that once maintained diplomatic
   relations with it. At the same time, Assad’s regime is facing a punishing array
   of economic sanctions by the United States, the European Union, the Arab
   League, and others—measures that have targeted the assets of Assad and his
   henchmen, cut off the Central Bank and other financial institutions, grounded
   Syria’s cargo flights, and restricted the regime’s ability to sell oil. This
   has been an impressive international effort, and the Administration deserves a
   lot of credit for helping to orchestrate it.

   The problem is, the bloodletting continues. Despite a year’s worth of
   diplomacy backed by sanctions, Assad and his top lieutenants show no signs of
   giving up and taking the path into foreign exile. To the contrary, they appear
   to be accelerating their fight to the finish. And they are doing so with the
   shameless support of foreign governments, especially in Russia, China, and
   Iran. A steady supply of weapons, ammunition, and other assistance is flowing
   to Assad from Moscow and Tehran, and as The Washington Post
   reported yesterday, Iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely
   active in Syria, helping to direct and sharpen the regime’s brutality. The
   Security Council is totally shut down as an avenue for increased pressure, and
   the recently convened Friends of Syria contact group, while a good step in
   principle, produced mostly rhetoric but precious little action when it met last
   month in Tunisia. Unfortunately, with each passing day, the international
   response to Assad’s atrocities is being overtaken by events on the ground in
   Syria.

   Some countries are finally beginning to acknowledge this reality, as well as
   its implications. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are calling for arming opposition
   forces in Syria. The newly-elected Kuwaiti parliament has called on their
   government to do the same. Last week, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO,
   Admiral James Stavridis, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that
   providing arms to opposition forces in Syria could help them shift the balance
   of power against Assad. Most importantly, Syrians themselves are increasingly
   calling for international military involvement. The opposition Syrian National
   Council recently announced that it is establishing a military bureau to channel
   weapons and other assistance to the Free Syrian Army and armed groups inside
   the country. Other members of the Council are demanding a more robust
   intervention.

   To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the efficacy of military
   options in Syria, and equally legitimate concerns about their risks and
   uncertainties. It is understandable that the Administration is reluctant to
   move beyond diplomacy and sanctions. Unfortunately, this policy is increasingly
   disconnected from the dire conditions on the ground in Syria, which has become
   a full-blown state of armed conflict. In the face of this new reality, the
   Administration’s approach to Syria is starting to look more like a hope than a
   strategy. So, too, does their continued insistence that Assad’s fall is
   “inevitable.” Tell that to the people of Homs. Tell that to the people of
   Idlib, or Hama, or the other cities that Assad’s forces are now moving against.
   Nothing in this world is pre-determined. And claims about the inevitability of
   events can often be a convenient way to abdicate responsibility.

   But even if we do assume that Assad will ultimately fall, that may still
   take a really long time. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services
   Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said that if
   the status quo persists, Assad could hang on for months, possibly longer. And
   that was before Homs fell. So just to be clear: Even under the best-case
   scenario for the current policy, the cost of success will likely be months of continued
   bloodshed and thousands of additional lives lost. Is this morally acceptable to
   us? I believe it should not be.

   In addition to the moral and humanitarian interests at stake in Syria, what
   is just as compelling, if not more so, are the strategic and geopolitical
   interests. Put simply, the United States has a clear national security interest
   in stopping the violence in Syria and forcing Assad to leave power. In this
   way, Syria is very different than Libya: The stakes are far higher,
   both for America and some of our closest allies.

   This regime in Syria serves as the main forward operating base of the Iranian
   regime in the heart of the Arab world. It has supported Palestinian terrorist
   groups and funneled arms of all kinds, including tens of thousands of rockets,
   to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It remains a committed enemy of Israel. It has large
   stockpiles of chemical weapons and materials and has sought to develop a
   nuclear weapons capability. It was the primary gateway for the countless
   foreign fighters who infiltrated into Iraq and killed our troops. Assad and his
   lieutenants have the blood of hundreds of Americans on their hands. Many in
   Washington fear that what comes after Assad might be worse. How could it be any
   worse than this?

   The end of the Assad regime would sever Hezbollah’s lifeline to Iran,
   eliminate a long-standing threat to Israel, bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty and
   independence, and inflict a strategic defeat on the Iranian regime. It would be
   a geopolitical success of the first order. More than all of the compelling
   moral and humanitarian reasons, this is why Assad cannot be allowed to succeed
   and remain in power: We have a clear national security interest in his defeat.
   And that alone should incline us to tolerate a large degree of risk in order to
   see that this goal is achieved.

   Increasingly, the question for U.S. policy is not whether foreign forces
   will intervene militarily in Syria. We can be confident that Syria’s neighbors
   will do so eventually, if they have not already. Some kind of intervention will
   happen, with us or without us. So the real question for U.S. policy is whether
   we will participate in this next phase of the conflict in Syria, and thereby
   increase our ability to shape an outcome that is beneficial to the Syrian
   people, and to us. I believe we must.

   The President has characterized the prevention of mass atrocities as, quote,
   “a core national security interest.” He has made it the objective of the United
   States that the killing in Syria must stop, and that Assad must go. He has
   committed the prestige and credibility of our nation to that goal, and it is
   the right goal. However, it is not clear that the present policy can succeed. If
   Assad manages to cling to power—or even if he manages to sustain his slaughter
   for months to come, with all of the human and geopolitical costs that
   entails—it would be a strategic and moral defeat for the United States. We
   cannot, we must not, allow this to happen.

   For this reason, the time has come for a new policy. As we continue to
   isolate Assad diplomatically and economically, we should work with our closest
   friends and allies to support opposition groups inside Syria, both political
   and military, to help them organize themselves into a more cohesive and
   effective force that can put an end to the bloodshed and force Assad and his
   loyalists to leave power. Rather than closing off the prospects for some kind
   of a negotiated transition that is acceptable to the Syrian opposition, foreign
   military intervention is now the necessary factor to reinforce this option.
   Assad needs to know that he will not win.

   What opposition groups in Syria need most urgently is relief from Assad’s
   tank and artillery sieges in the many cities that are still contested. Homs is
   lost for now, but Idlib, and Hama, and Qusayr, and Deraa, and other cities in
   Syria could still be saved. But time is running out. Assad’s forces are on the
   march. Providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army and other
   opposition groups is necessary, but at this late hour, that alone will not be
   sufficient to stop the slaughter and save innocent lives. The only realistic
   way to do so is with foreign airpower.

   Therefore, at the request of the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian
   Army, and Local Coordinating Committees inside the country, the United States
   should lead an international effort to protect key population centers in Syria,
   especially in the north, through airstrikes on Assad’s forces. To be clear:
   This will require the United States to suppress enemy air defenses in at least
   part of the country.

   The ultimate goal of airstrikes should be to establish and defend safe
   havens in Syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces can organize
   and plan their political and military activities against Assad. These safe
   havens could serve as platforms for the delivery of humanitarian and military
   assistance—including weapons and ammunition, body armor and other personal
   protective equipment, tactical intelligence, secure communications equipment,
   food and water, and medical supplies. These safe havens could also help the
   Free Syrian Army and other armed groups in Syria to train and organize
   themselves into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with the
   assistance of foreign partners.

   The benefit for the United States in helping to lead this effort directly is
   that it would allow us to better empower those Syrian groups that share our
   interests—those groups that reject Al Qaeda and the Iranian regime, and commit
   to the goal of an inclusive democratic transition, as called for by the Syrian
   National Council. If we stand on the sidelines, others will try to pick
   winners, and this will not always be to our liking or in our interest. This
   does that mean the United States should go it alone. We should not. We should
   seek the active involvement of key Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia, U.A.E.,
   Jordan, and Qatar—and willing allies in the E.U. and NATO, the most important
   of which in this case is Turkey.

   There will be no U.N. Security Council mandate for such an operation. Russia
   and China took that option off the table long ago. But let’s not forget: NATO
   took military action to save Kosovo in 1999 without formal U.N. authorization.
   There is no reason why the Arab League, or NATO, or a leading coalition within
   the Friends of Syria contact group, or all of them speaking in unison, could
   not provide a similar international mandate for military measures to save Syria
   today.

   Could such a mandate be gotten? I believe it could be. Foreign capitals
   across the world are looking to the United States to lead, especially now that
   the situation in Syria has become an armed conflict. But what they see is an
   Administration still hedging its bets—on the one hand, insisting that Assad’s
   fall is inevitable, but on the other, unwilling even to threaten more assertive
   actions that could make it so.

   The rhetoric out of NATO has been much more self-defeating. Far from making
   it clear to Assad that all options are on the table, key alliance leaders are
   going out of their way to publicly take options off the table. Last
   week, the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said that the
   alliance has not even discussed the possibility of NATO action in Syria—saying,
   quote, “I don’t envision such a role for the alliance.” The following day, the
   Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, testified to the Senate
   Armed Services Committee that NATO has done no contingency planning—none—for
   potential military operations in Syria.

   That is not how NATO approached Bosnia. Or Kosovo. Or Libya. Is it now the
   policy of NATO—or the United States, for that matter—to tell the perpetrators
   of mass atrocities, in Syria or elsewhere, that they can go on killing innocent
   civilians by the hundreds or thousands, and the greatest alliance in history
   will not even bother to conduct any planning about how we might stop them? Is
   that NATO’s policy now? Is that our policy? Because that is the
   practical effect of this kind of rhetoric. It gives Assad and his foreign
   allies a green light for greater brutality.

   Not surprisingly, many countries, especially Syria’s neighbors, are also
   hedging their bets on the outcome in Syria. They think Assad will go, but they
   are not yet prepared to put all of their chips on that bet—even less so now
   that Assad’s forces have broken Homs and seem to be gaining momentum. There is
   only one nation that can alter this dynamic, and that is us. The President must
   state unequivocally that under no circumstances will Assad be allowed to finish
   what he has started, that there is no future in which Assad and his lieutenants
   will remain in control of Syria, and that the United States is prepared to use
   the full weight of our airpower to make it so. It is only when we have clearly
   and completely committed ourselves that we can expect other countries to do the
   same. Only then would we see what is really possible in winning international
   support to stop the killing in Syria.

   Are there dangers, and risks, and uncertainties in this approach?
   Absolutely. There are no ideal options in Syria. All of them contain
   significant risk. Many people will be quick to raise concerns about the course
   of action I am proposing. Many of these concerns have merit, but none so much
   that they should keep us from acting.

   For example, we continue to hear it said that we should not assist the
   opposition in Syria militarily because we don’t know who these people are.
   Secretary of State Hillary Clinton repeated this argument just last week,
   adding that we could end up helping Al Qaeda or Hamas. It is possible the
   Administration does not know much about the armed opposition in Syria, but how
   much effort have they really made to find out—to meet and engage these people
   directly? Not much, it appears.

   Instead, much of the best information we have about the armed resistance in
   Syria is thanks to courageous journalists, some of whom have given their lives
   to tell the story of the Syrian people. One of those journalists is a reporter
   working for Al Jazeera named Nir Rosen, who spent months in the country,
   including much time with the armed opposition. Here is how he describes them in
   a recent interview:

   The regime and its supporters describe the opposition, especially the armed
   opposition, as Salafis, Jihadists, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, al-Qaeda and
   terrorists. This is not true, but it’s worth noting that all the fighters I
   met … were Sunni Muslims, and most were pious. They fight for a multitude
   of reasons: for their friends, for their neighborhoods, for their villages, for
   their province, for revenge, for self-defense, for dignity, for their brethren
   in other parts of the country who are also fighting. They do not read religious
   literature or listen to sermons. Their views on Islam are consistent with the
   general attitudes of Syrian Sunni society, which is conservative and religious.

   Because there are many small groups in the armed opposition, it is difficult
   to describe their ideology in general terms. The Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood
   ideologies are not important in Syria and do not play a significant role in the
   revolution. But most Syrian Sunnis taking part in the uprising are themselves
   devout.

   He could just as well have been describing average citizens in Egypt, or
   Libya, or Tunisia, or other nations in the region. So we should be a little
   more careful before we embrace the Assad regime’s propaganda about the
   opposition in Syria. We certainly should not let these misconceptions cause us
   to keep the armed resistance in Syria at arms length, because that is just
   self-defeating. And I can assure you that Al Qaeda is not pursuing the same
   policy. They are eager to try to hijack the Syrian revolution, just as they
   have tried to hijack the Arab Spring movements in Egypt, and Tunisia, and
   Libya, and elsewhere. They are trying, but so far, they are failing. The people
   of these countries are broadly rejecting everything Al Qaeda stands for. They
   are not eager to trade secular tyranny for theocratic tyranny.

   The other reason Al Qaeda is failing in Tunisia, and Egypt, and Libya is
   because the community of nations, especially the United States, has supported
   them. We are giving them a better alternative. The surest way for Al Qaeda to
   gain a foothold in Syria is for us to turn our backs on those brave Syrians who
   are fighting to defend themselves. After all, Sunni Iraqis were willing to ally
   with Al Qaeda when they felt desperate enough. But when America gave them a
   better alternative, they turned their guns on Al Qaeda. Why should it be
   different in Syria?

   Another objection to providing military assistance to the Syrian opposition
   is that the conflict has become a sectarian civil war, and our intervention
   would enable the Sunni majority to take a bloody and indiscriminate revenge
   against the Alawite minority. This is a serious and legitimate concern, and it
   is only growing worse the longer the conflict goes on. As we saw in Iraq, or
   Lebanon before it, time favors the hard-liners in a conflict like this. The
   suffering of Sunnis at the hands of Assad only stokes the temptation for
   revenge, which in turn only deepens fears among the Alawites, and strengthens
   their incentive to keep fighting. For this reason alone, it is all the more
   compelling to find a way to end the bloodshed as soon as possible.

   Furthermore, the risks of sectarian conflict will exist in Syria whether we
   get more involved or not. And we will at least have some ability to try to
   mitigate these risks if we work to assist the armed opposition now. That will
   at least help us to know them better, and to establish some trust and exercise
   some influence with them, because we took their side when they needed it most.
   We should not overstate the potential influence we could gain with opposition
   groups inside Syria, but it will only diminish the longer we wait to offer them
   meaningful support. And what we can say for certain is that we will have no
   influence whatsoever with these people if they feel we abandoned them. This is
   a real moral dilemma, but we cannot allow the opposition in Syria to be crushed
   at present while we worry about the future.

   We also hear it said, including by the Administration, that we should not
   contribute to the militarization of the conflict. If only Russia and Iran
   shared that sentiment. Instead, they are shamelessly fueling Assad’s killing
   machine. We need to deal with reality as it is, not as we wish it to be—and the
   reality in Syria today is largely a one-sided fight where the aggressors are
   not lacking for military means and zeal.

   Indeed, Assad appears to be fully committed to crushing the opposition at
   all costs. Iran and Russia appear to be fully committed to helping him do it.
   The many Syrians who have taken up arms to defend themselves and their
   communities appear to be fully committed to acquiring the necessary weapons to
   resist Assad. And leading Arab states appear increasingly committed to
   providing those weapons. The only ones who seem overly concerned about a
   militarization of the conflict are the United States and some of our allies.
   The time has come to ask a different question: Who do we want to win in
   Syria—our friends or our enemies?

   There are always plenty of reasons not to do something, and we can list them
   clearly in the case of Syria. We know the opposition is divided. We know the
   armed resistance inside the country lacks cohesion or command and control. We
   know that some elements of the opposition may sympathize with violent extremist
   ideologies or harbor dark thoughts of sectarian revenge. We know that many of
   Syria’s immediate neighbors remain cautious about taking overly provocative
   actions that could undermine Assad. And we know the American people are weary
   of conflict—justifiably so—and would rather focus on domestic problems.

   These are realities, but while we are compelled to acknowledge them, we are
   not condemned to accept them forever. With resolve, principled leadership, and
   wise policy, we can shape better realities. That is what the Syrian people have
   done.

   By no rational calculation should this uprising against Assad still be going
   on. The Syrian people are outmatched. They are outgunned. They are lacking for
   food, and water, and other basic needs. They are confronting a regime whose
   disregard for human dignity and capacity for sheer savagery is limitless. For
   an entire year, the Syrian people have faced death, and those unspeakable
   things worse than death, and still they have not given up. Still they take to
   the streets to protest peacefully for justice. Still they carry on their fight.
   And they do so on behalf of many of the same universal values we share, and
   many of the same interests as well.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do. They
   have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible in Syria.
   They have earned our respect, and now they need our support to finish what they
   started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and shame on us if we fail to
   help them.

   ey carry on their fight.
   And they do so on behalf of many of the same universal values we share, and
   many of the same interests as well.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do. They
   have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible in Syria.
   They have earned our respect, and now they need our support to finish what they
   started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and shame on us if we fail to
   help them.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do.
   They have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible
   in Syria. They have earned our respect, and now they need our support
   to finish what they started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and
   shame on us if we fail to help them.

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   1. 

      5thDrawer

      March 6, 2012

      Thank you I.A. …. Necessary to see a whole text on occasion. Especially when it speaks to the truth.

      With the exception of the ‘little people’ who take in the refugees, Official Lebanon stands in shame on this.

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      1. 

         American Infidels

         March 7, 2012

         you are most welcome,anytime

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         1. 

            master09

            March 7, 2012

            We have one issue, if USA leads a strike on Syria the world will say ,,ah they are after the resources eg. OIL. , even if the Syrian people are asking for help. Damned if you do Damned if you don’t. The funny thing no body is saying much on China, Russia or Iran why they don’t want any action….?
            can it be self interest no not them, but we shall do what we always do……..Blame the Jews and The YANKS……..   Good article, I A

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            1. 

               American Infidels

               March 8, 2012

               Actually I think if we can smash the air defenses, the helicopters,tanks and artillery,I think you can handle the rest..Oil isn’t even a question, look at Iraq and Libya, we signed less contracts with them than anyone else, and we did all the work.

               Personally, I think it would be a completely fair trade take down Assad in exchange for letting us destroy the missile capability and all the chemical weapons..

               When we come just protect yourselves and stay out of the way safe and let us handle it..Even more when he is gone, dont go the way of Africa and turn radical..Lebanon’s system would be good, minus the Hezbollah interlopers.And get the Kurds behind you, let them have some land attached to their zone in Iraq.they will help if you offer it to them..

               And I know you dont like Israel, but accept any aid they can provide, think of the Syrian people 1st, thats what is most important.

               As far as China and Russia, they are getting slammed here and around the world in the media for doing this, you and I know that Russia just stole their election and the people are in the streets now.And china, well they just kill without question.

               I want intervention from the air by us and afterwards peace keepers from Muslim countries only, with a few advisors maybe.Just dump the WMD’s.. they have to go with Assad and his legacy.
2. 

   Iran Aware

   March 6, 2012

   his speech.. not to dis this website, just due to the importance of the speech..

   After a year of bloodshed, the crisis in Syria has reached a decisive
   moment. It is estimated that more than 7,500 lives have been lost. The United
   Nations has declared that Syrian security forces are guilty of crimes against
   humanity, including the indiscriminate shelling of civilians, the execution of
   defectors, and the widespread torture of prisoners. Bashar Al-Assad is now
   doing to Homs what his father did to Hama. Aerial photographs procured by Human
   Rights Watch show a city that has been laid to waste by Assad’s tanks and
   artillery. A British photographer who was wounded and evacuated from the city
   described it as “a medieval siege and slaughter.” The kinds of mass atrocities
   that NATO intervened in Libya to prevent in Benghazi are now a reality in Homs.
   Indeed, Syria today is the scene of some of the worst state-sponsored violence
   since Milosevic’s war crimes in the Balkans, or Russia’s annihilation of the
   Chechen city of Grozny.

   What is all the more astonishing is that Assad’s killing spree has continued
   despite severe and escalating international pressure against him. His regime is
   almost completely isolated. It has been expelled from the Arab League, rebuked
   by the United Nations General Assembly, excoriated by the U.N. Human Rights
   Council, and abandoned by nearly every country that once maintained diplomatic
   relations with it. At the same time, Assad’s regime is facing a punishing array
   of economic sanctions by the United States, the European Union, the Arab
   League, and others—measures that have targeted the assets of Assad and his
   henchmen, cut off the Central Bank and other financial institutions, grounded
   Syria’s cargo flights, and restricted the regime’s ability to sell oil. This
   has been an impressive international effort, and the Administration deserves a
   lot of credit for helping to orchestrate it.

   The problem is, the bloodletting continues. Despite a year’s worth of
   diplomacy backed by sanctions, Assad and his top lieutenants show no signs of
   giving up and taking the path into foreign exile. To the contrary, they appear
   to be accelerating their fight to the finish. And they are doing so with the
   shameless support of foreign governments, especially in Russia, China, and
   Iran. A steady supply of weapons, ammunition, and other assistance is flowing
   to Assad from Moscow and Tehran, and as The Washington Post
   reported yesterday, Iranian military and intelligence operatives are likely
   active in Syria, helping to direct and sharpen the regime’s brutality. The
   Security Council is totally shut down as an avenue for increased pressure, and
   the recently convened Friends of Syria contact group, while a good step in
   principle, produced mostly rhetoric but precious little action when it met last
   month in Tunisia. Unfortunately, with each passing day, the international
   response to Assad’s atrocities is being overtaken by events on the ground in
   Syria.

   Some countries are finally beginning to acknowledge this reality, as well as
   its implications. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are calling for arming opposition
   forces in Syria. The newly-elected Kuwaiti parliament has called on their
   government to do the same. Last week, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO,
   Admiral James Stavridis, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that
   providing arms to opposition forces in Syria could help them shift the balance
   of power against Assad. Most importantly, Syrians themselves are increasingly
   calling for international military involvement. The opposition Syrian National
   Council recently announced that it is establishing a military bureau to channel
   weapons and other assistance to the Free Syrian Army and armed groups inside
   the country. Other members of the Council are demanding a more robust
   intervention.

   To be sure, there are legitimate questions about the efficacy of military
   options in Syria, and equally legitimate concerns about their risks and
   uncertainties. It is understandable that the Administration is reluctant to
   move beyond diplomacy and sanctions. Unfortunately, this policy is increasingly
   disconnected from the dire conditions on the ground in Syria, which has become
   a full-blown state of armed conflict. In the face of this new reality, the
   Administration’s approach to Syria is starting to look more like a hope than a
   strategy. So, too, does their continued insistence that Assad’s fall is
   “inevitable.” Tell that to the people of Homs. Tell that to the people of
   Idlib, or Hama, or the other cities that Assad’s forces are now moving against.
   Nothing in this world is pre-determined. And claims about the inevitability of
   events can often be a convenient way to abdicate responsibility.

   But even if we do assume that Assad will ultimately fall, that may still
   take a really long time. In recent testimony to the Senate Armed Services
   Committee, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, said that if
   the status quo persists, Assad could hang on for months, possibly longer. And
   that was before Homs fell. So just to be clear: Even under the best-case
   scenario for the current policy, the cost of success will likely be months of continued
   bloodshed and thousands of additional lives lost. Is this morally acceptable to
   us? I believe it should not be.

   In addition to the moral and humanitarian interests at stake in Syria, what
   is just as compelling, if not more so, are the strategic and geopolitical
   interests. Put simply, the United States has a clear national security interest
   in stopping the violence in Syria and forcing Assad to leave power. In this
   way, Syria is very different than Libya: The stakes are far higher,
   both for America and some of our closest allies.

   This regime in Syria serves as the main forward operating base of the Iranian
   regime in the heart of the Arab world. It has supported Palestinian terrorist
   groups and funneled arms of all kinds, including tens of thousands of rockets,
   to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It remains a committed enemy of Israel. It has large
   stockpiles of chemical weapons and materials and has sought to develop a
   nuclear weapons capability. It was the primary gateway for the countless
   foreign fighters who infiltrated into Iraq and killed our troops. Assad and his
   lieutenants have the blood of hundreds of Americans on their hands. Many in
   Washington fear that what comes after Assad might be worse. How could it be any
   worse than this?

   The end of the Assad regime would sever Hezbollah’s lifeline to Iran,
   eliminate a long-standing threat to Israel, bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty and
   independence, and inflict a strategic defeat on the Iranian regime. It would be
   a geopolitical success of the first order. More than all of the compelling
   moral and humanitarian reasons, this is why Assad cannot be allowed to succeed
   and remain in power: We have a clear national security interest in his defeat.
   And that alone should incline us to tolerate a large degree of risk in order to
   see that this goal is achieved.

   Increasingly, the question for U.S. policy is not whether foreign forces
   will intervene militarily in Syria. We can be confident that Syria’s neighbors
   will do so eventually, if they have not already. Some kind of intervention will
   happen, with us or without us. So the real question for U.S. policy is whether
   we will participate in this next phase of the conflict in Syria, and thereby
   increase our ability to shape an outcome that is beneficial to the Syrian
   people, and to us. I believe we must.

   The President has characterized the prevention of mass atrocities as, quote,
   “a core national security interest.” He has made it the objective of the United
   States that the killing in Syria must stop, and that Assad must go. He has
   committed the prestige and credibility of our nation to that goal, and it is
   the right goal. However, it is not clear that the present policy can succeed. If
   Assad manages to cling to power—or even if he manages to sustain his slaughter
   for months to come, with all of the human and geopolitical costs that
   entails—it would be a strategic and moral defeat for the United States. We
   cannot, we must not, allow this to happen.

   For this reason, the time has come for a new policy. As we continue to
   isolate Assad diplomatically and economically, we should work with our closest
   friends and allies to support opposition groups inside Syria, both political
   and military, to help them organize themselves into a more cohesive and
   effective force that can put an end to the bloodshed and force Assad and his
   loyalists to leave power. Rather than closing off the prospects for some kind
   of a negotiated transition that is acceptable to the Syrian opposition, foreign
   military intervention is now the necessary factor to reinforce this option.
   Assad needs to know that he will not win.

   What opposition groups in Syria need most urgently is relief from Assad’s
   tank and artillery sieges in the many cities that are still contested. Homs is
   lost for now, but Idlib, and Hama, and Qusayr, and Deraa, and other cities in
   Syria could still be saved. But time is running out. Assad’s forces are on the
   march. Providing military assistance to the Free Syrian Army and other
   opposition groups is necessary, but at this late hour, that alone will not be
   sufficient to stop the slaughter and save innocent lives. The only realistic
   way to do so is with foreign airpower.

   Therefore, at the request of the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian
   Army, and Local Coordinating Committees inside the country, the United States
   should lead an international effort to protect key population centers in Syria,
   especially in the north, through airstrikes on Assad’s forces. To be clear:
   This will require the United States to suppress enemy air defenses in at least
   part of the country.

   The ultimate goal of airstrikes should be to establish and defend safe
   havens in Syria, especially in the north, in which opposition forces can organize
   and plan their political and military activities against Assad. These safe
   havens could serve as platforms for the delivery of humanitarian and military
   assistance—including weapons and ammunition, body armor and other personal
   protective equipment, tactical intelligence, secure communications equipment,
   food and water, and medical supplies. These safe havens could also help the
   Free Syrian Army and other armed groups in Syria to train and organize
   themselves into more cohesive and effective military forces, likely with the
   assistance of foreign partners.

   The benefit for the United States in helping to lead this effort directly is
   that it would allow us to better empower those Syrian groups that share our
   interests—those groups that reject Al Qaeda and the Iranian regime, and commit
   to the goal of an inclusive democratic transition, as called for by the Syrian
   National Council. If we stand on the sidelines, others will try to pick
   winners, and this will not always be to our liking or in our interest. This
   does that mean the United States should go it alone. We should not. We should
   seek the active involvement of key Arab partners such as Saudi Arabia, U.A.E.,
   Jordan, and Qatar—and willing allies in the E.U. and NATO, the most important
   of which in this case is Turkey.

   There will be no U.N. Security Council mandate for such an operation. Russia
   and China took that option off the table long ago. But let’s not forget: NATO
   took military action to save Kosovo in 1999 without formal U.N. authorization.
   There is no reason why the Arab League, or NATO, or a leading coalition within
   the Friends of Syria contact group, or all of them speaking in unison, could
   not provide a similar international mandate for military measures to save Syria
   today.

   Could such a mandate be gotten? I believe it could be. Foreign capitals
   across the world are looking to the United States to lead, especially now that
   the situation in Syria has become an armed conflict. But what they see is an
   Administration still hedging its bets—on the one hand, insisting that Assad’s
   fall is inevitable, but on the other, unwilling even to threaten more assertive
   actions that could make it so.

   The rhetoric out of NATO has been much more self-defeating. Far from making
   it clear to Assad that all options are on the table, key alliance leaders are
   going out of their way to publicly take options off the table. Last
   week, the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said that the
   alliance has not even discussed the possibility of NATO action in Syria—saying,
   quote, “I don’t envision such a role for the alliance.” The following day, the
   Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, testified to the Senate
   Armed Services Committee that NATO has done no contingency planning—none—for
   potential military operations in Syria.

   That is not how NATO approached Bosnia. Or Kosovo. Or Libya. Is it now the
   policy of NATO—or the United States, for that matter—to tell the perpetrators
   of mass atrocities, in Syria or elsewhere, that they can go on killing innocent
   civilians by the hundreds or thousands, and the greatest alliance in history
   will not even bother to conduct any planning about how we might stop them? Is
   that NATO’s policy now? Is that our policy? Because that is the
   practical effect of this kind of rhetoric. It gives Assad and his foreign
   allies a green light for greater brutality.

   Not surprisingly, many countries, especially Syria’s neighbors, are also
   hedging their bets on the outcome in Syria. They think Assad will go, but they
   are not yet prepared to put all of their chips on that bet—even less so now
   that Assad’s forces have broken Homs and seem to be gaining momentum. There is
   only one nation that can alter this dynamic, and that is us. The President must
   state unequivocally that under no circumstances will Assad be allowed to finish
   what he has started, that there is no future in which Assad and his lieutenants
   will remain in control of Syria, and that the United States is prepared to use
   the full weight of our airpower to make it so. It is only when we have clearly
   and completely committed ourselves that we can expect other countries to do the
   same. Only then would we see what is really possible in winning international
   support to stop the killing in Syria.

   Are there dangers, and risks, and uncertainties in this approach?
   Absolutely. There are no ideal options in Syria. All of them contain
   significant risk. Many people will be quick to raise concerns about the course
   of action I am proposing. Many of these concerns have merit, but none so much
   that they should keep us from acting.

   For example, we continue to hear it said that we should not assist the
   opposition in Syria militarily because we don’t know who these people are.
   Secretary of State Hillary Clinton repeated this argument just last week,
   adding that we could end up helping Al Qaeda or Hamas. It is possible the
   Administration does not know much about the armed opposition in Syria, but how
   much effort have they really made to find out—to meet and engage these people
   directly? Not much, it appears.

   Instead, much of the best information we have about the armed resistance in
   Syria is thanks to courageous journalists, some of whom have given their lives
   to tell the story of the Syrian people. One of those journalists is a reporter
   working for Al Jazeera named Nir Rosen, who spent months in the country,
   including much time with the armed opposition. Here is how he describes them in
   a recent interview:

   The regime and its supporters describe the opposition, especially the armed
   opposition, as Salafis, Jihadists, Muslim Brotherhood supporters, al-Qaeda and
   terrorists. This is not true, but it’s worth noting that all the fighters I
   met … were Sunni Muslims, and most were pious. They fight for a multitude
   of reasons: for their friends, for their neighborhoods, for their villages, for
   their province, for revenge, for self-defense, for dignity, for their brethren
   in other parts of the country who are also fighting. They do not read religious
   literature or listen to sermons. Their views on Islam are consistent with the
   general attitudes of Syrian Sunni society, which is conservative and religious.

   Because there are many small groups in the armed opposition, it is difficult
   to describe their ideology in general terms. The Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood
   ideologies are not important in Syria and do not play a significant role in the
   revolution. But most Syrian Sunnis taking part in the uprising are themselves
   devout.

   He could just as well have been describing average citizens in Egypt, or
   Libya, or Tunisia, or other nations in the region. So we should be a little
   more careful before we embrace the Assad regime’s propaganda about the
   opposition in Syria. We certainly should not let these misconceptions cause us
   to keep the armed resistance in Syria at arms length, because that is just
   self-defeating. And I can assure you that Al Qaeda is not pursuing the same
   policy. They are eager to try to hijack the Syrian revolution, just as they
   have tried to hijack the Arab Spring movements in Egypt, and Tunisia, and
   Libya, and elsewhere. They are trying, but so far, they are failing. The people
   of these countries are broadly rejecting everything Al Qaeda stands for. They
   are not eager to trade secular tyranny for theocratic tyranny.

   The other reason Al Qaeda is failing in Tunisia, and Egypt, and Libya is
   because the community of nations, especially the United States, has supported
   them. We are giving them a better alternative. The surest way for Al Qaeda to
   gain a foothold in Syria is for us to turn our backs on those brave Syrians who
   are fighting to defend themselves. After all, Sunni Iraqis were willing to ally
   with Al Qaeda when they felt desperate enough. But when America gave them a
   better alternative, they turned their guns on Al Qaeda. Why should it be
   different in Syria?

   Another objection to providing military assistance to the Syrian opposition
   is that the conflict has become a sectarian civil war, and our intervention
   would enable the Sunni majority to take a bloody and indiscriminate revenge
   against the Alawite minority. This is a serious and legitimate concern, and it
   is only growing worse the longer the conflict goes on. As we saw in Iraq, or
   Lebanon before it, time favors the hard-liners in a conflict like this. The
   suffering of Sunnis at the hands of Assad only stokes the temptation for
   revenge, which in turn only deepens fears among the Alawites, and strengthens
   their incentive to keep fighting. For this reason alone, it is all the more
   compelling to find a way to end the bloodshed as soon as possible.

   Furthermore, the risks of sectarian conflict will exist in Syria whether we
   get more involved or not. And we will at least have some ability to try to
   mitigate these risks if we work to assist the armed opposition now. That will
   at least help us to know them better, and to establish some trust and exercise
   some influence with them, because we took their side when they needed it most.
   We should not overstate the potential influence we could gain with opposition
   groups inside Syria, but it will only diminish the longer we wait to offer them
   meaningful support. And what we can say for certain is that we will have no
   influence whatsoever with these people if they feel we abandoned them. This is
   a real moral dilemma, but we cannot allow the opposition in Syria to be crushed
   at present while we worry about the future.

   We also hear it said, including by the Administration, that we should not
   contribute to the militarization of the conflict. If only Russia and Iran
   shared that sentiment. Instead, they are shamelessly fueling Assad’s killing
   machine. We need to deal with reality as it is, not as we wish it to be—and the
   reality in Syria today is largely a one-sided fight where the aggressors are
   not lacking for military means and zeal.

   Indeed, Assad appears to be fully committed to crushing the opposition at
   all costs. Iran and Russia appear to be fully committed to helping him do it.
   The many Syrians who have taken up arms to defend themselves and their
   communities appear to be fully committed to acquiring the necessary weapons to
   resist Assad. And leading Arab states appear increasingly committed to
   providing those weapons. The only ones who seem overly concerned about a
   militarization of the conflict are the United States and some of our allies.
   The time has come to ask a different question: Who do we want to win in
   Syria—our friends or our enemies?

   There are always plenty of reasons not to do something, and we can list them
   clearly in the case of Syria. We know the opposition is divided. We know the
   armed resistance inside the country lacks cohesion or command and control. We
   know that some elements of the opposition may sympathize with violent extremist
   ideologies or harbor dark thoughts of sectarian revenge. We know that many of
   Syria’s immediate neighbors remain cautious about taking overly provocative
   actions that could undermine Assad. And we know the American people are weary
   of conflict—justifiably so—and would rather focus on domestic problems.

   These are realities, but while we are compelled to acknowledge them, we are
   not condemned to accept them forever. With resolve, principled leadership, and
   wise policy, we can shape better realities. That is what the Syrian people have
   done.

   By no rational calculation should this uprising against Assad still be going
   on. The Syrian people are outmatched. They are outgunned. They are lacking for
   food, and water, and other basic needs. They are confronting a regime whose
   disregard for human dignity and capacity for sheer savagery is limitless. For
   an entire year, the Syrian people have faced death, and those unspeakable
   things worse than death, and still they have not given up. Still they take to
   the streets to protest peacefully for justice. Still they carry on their fight.
   And they do so on behalf of many of the same universal values we share, and
   many of the same interests as well.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do. They
   have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible in Syria.
   They have earned our respect, and now they need our support to finish what they
   started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and shame on us if we fail to
   help them.

   ey carry on their fight.
   And they do so on behalf of many of the same universal values we share, and
   many of the same interests as well.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do. They
   have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible in Syria.
   They have earned our respect, and now they need our support to finish what they
   started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and shame on us if we fail to
   help them.

   These people are our allies. They want many of the same things we do.
   They have expanded the boundaries of what everyone thought was possible
   in Syria. They have earned our respect, and now they need our support
   to finish what they started. The Syrian people deserve to succeed, and
   shame on us if we fail to help them.

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   1. 

      Anonymous

      March 6, 2012

      Thank you I.A. …. Necessary to see a whole text on occasion. Especially when it speaks to the truth.

      With the exception of the people who take in the refugees, Official Lebanon stands in shame on this.

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      1. 

         Iran Aware

         March 7, 2012

         you are most welcome,anytime

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         1. 

            Anonymous

            March 7, 2012

            We have one issue, if USA leads a strike on Syria the world will say ,,ah they are after the resources eg. OIL. , even if the Syrian people are asking for help. Damned if you do Damned if you don’t. The funny thing no body is saying much on China, Russia or Iran why they don’t want any action….?
            can it be self interest no not them, but we shall do what we always do……..Blame the Jews and The YANKS……..            

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            1. 

               Iran Aware

               March 7, 2012

               Actually I think if we can smash the air defenses, the helicopters,tanks and artillery,I think you can handle the rest..Oil isn’t even a question, look at Iraq and Libya, we signed less contracts with them than anyone else, and we did all the work.

               Personally, I think it would be a completely fair trade take down Assad in exchange for letting us destroy the missile capability and all the chemical weapons..

               When we come just protect yourselves and stay out of the way safe and let us handle it..Even more when he is gone, dont go the way of Africa and turn radical..Lebanon’s system would be good, minus the Hezbollah interlopers.And get the Kurds behind you, let them have some land attached to their zone in Iraq.they will help if you offer it to them..

               And I know you dont like Israel, but accept any aid they can provide, think of the Syrian people 1st, thats what is most important.

               As far as China and Russia, they are getting slammed here and around the world in the media for doing this, you and I know that Russia just stole their election and the people are in the streets now.And china, well they just kill without question.

               I want intervention from the air by us and afterwards peace keepers from Muslim countries only, with a few advisors maybe.Just dump the WMD’s.. they have to go with Assad and his legacy.