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Nasrallah: STL evidence is worthless

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Hezbollah leader sayyed Hassan Nasrallah says evidence held by U.N. investigators implicating the group in the death of a former Lebanese prime minister is worthless.

The Netherlands-based tribunal investigating the 2005 killing of Rafik Hariri is expected to issue indictments on Dec 2 according to the Lebanese embassy in Netherlands

The court has kept silent on possible suspects but several media reports including a May 2008 report by Der Spiegel said the court will indict Hezbollah members based mainly on the analysis of mobile phone calls in the run-up to the assassination.

He said Israel has infiltrated Lebanon’s mobile telecommunications network and manipulated its phone calls.

“The results of this technological domination and infiltration are eavesdropping, getting access to messages, getting subscribers’ data which helps Israel know where the person is and tracking him wherever , ” he said

He added :” Israel can clone any cellular’s SIM card and is thus able to make any phone call or send any message. The data will thus show that a certain person used the cellular phone when in fact an Israeli did. This can be done to your SIM card without your knowledge. The Israelis can [alter data] in a way where it shows that you are in a certain place when you are not…The Israelis can manipulate the time and place [in issues] pertaining to the person who holds [a certain] cellular phone. The most dangerous thing is that the Israeli can [create] a clone line to certain cellular phones.

He continued: ” It has been proven that the Israeli can manipulate data. The telecommunications sector is dominated by Israel, as was revealed by Telecom minister Charbel nahas

If some people do not want to thank the Telecommunications Ministry because they do not like [Nahhas], then it is up to them. This shows that they are kids and [that they are] hateful. There is a great achievement that every citizen should thank [the telecommunications ministry] for.

Nasrallah said he is confident the indictments will be based on such evidence but said it is worthless.

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14 responses to “Nasrallah: STL evidence is worthless”

  1. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    Secret US Embassy Cables
    Wikileaks began on Sunday November 28th publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain. The documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US Government foreign activities.
    The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February this year, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. 15,652 of the cables are classified Secret.
    The embassy cables will be released in stages over the next few months. The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to do otherwise would not do this material justice.
    The cables show the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in “client states”; backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for US corporations; and the measures US diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.
    This document release reveals the contradictions between the US’s public persona and what it says behind closed doors – and shows that if citizens in a democracy want their governments to reflect their wishes, they should ask to see what’s going on behind the scenes.
    Every American schoolchild is taught that George Washington – the country’s first President – could not tell a lie. If the administrations of his successors lived up to the same principle, today’s document flood would be a mere embarrassment. Instead, the US Government has been warning governments — even the most corrupt — around the world about the coming leaks and is bracing itself for the exposures.
    The full set consists of 251,287 documents, comprising 261,276,536 words (seven times the size of “The Iraq War Logs”, the world’s previously largest classified information release).
    The cables cover from 28th December 1966 to 28th February 2010 and originate from 274 embassies, consulates and diplomatic missions.
    How to explore the data
    Search for events that you remember that happened for example in your country. You can browse by date or search for an origin near you.
    Pick out interesting events and tell others about them. Use twitter, reddit, mail whatever suits your audience best.
    For twitter or other social networking services please use the #cablegate or unique reference ID (e.g.#66BUENOSAIRES2481) as hash tags.
    Key figures:
    • 15, 652 secret
    • 101,748 confidential
    • 133,887 unclassified
    • Iraq most discussed country – 15,365 (Cables coming from Iraq – 6,677)
    • Ankara, Turkey had most cables coming from it – 7,918
    • From Secretary of State office – 8,017

    According to the US State Departments labeling system, the most frequent subjects discussed are:
    • External political relations – 145,451
    • Internal government affairs – 122,896
    • Human rights – 55,211
    • Economic Conditions – 49,044
    • Terrorists and terrorism – 28,801
    • UN security council – 6,532
    Graphics of the cablegate dataset
    • Cables by origin and classification
    • Cables by Subject
    • Cables by Country
    • Cables by Organization
    • Cables by Program
    • Cables by Topic
    cablegate.wikileaks.org

  2. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    Secret US Embassy Cables
    Wikileaks began on Sunday November 28th publishing 251,287 leaked United States embassy cables, the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain. The documents will give people around the world an unprecedented insight into US Government foreign activities.
    The cables, which date from 1966 up until the end of February this year, contain confidential communications between 274 embassies in countries throughout the world and the State Department in Washington DC. 15,652 of the cables are classified Secret.
    The embassy cables will be released in stages over the next few months. The subject matter of these cables is of such importance, and the geographical spread so broad, that to do otherwise would not do this material justice.
    The cables show the extent of US spying on its allies and the UN; turning a blind eye to corruption and human rights abuse in “client states”; backroom deals with supposedly neutral countries; lobbying for US corporations; and the measures US diplomats take to advance those who have access to them.
    This document release reveals the contradictions between the US’s public persona and what it says behind closed doors – and shows that if citizens in a democracy want their governments to reflect their wishes, they should ask to see what’s going on behind the scenes.
    Every American schoolchild is taught that George Washington – the country’s first President – could not tell a lie. If the administrations of his successors lived up to the same principle, today’s document flood would be a mere embarrassment. Instead, the US Government has been warning governments — even the most corrupt — around the world about the coming leaks and is bracing itself for the exposures.
    The full set consists of 251,287 documents, comprising 261,276,536 words (seven times the size of “The Iraq War Logs”, the world’s previously largest classified information release).
    The cables cover from 28th December 1966 to 28th February 2010 and originate from 274 embassies, consulates and diplomatic missions.
    How to explore the data
    Search for events that you remember that happened for example in your country. You can browse by date or search for an origin near you.
    Pick out interesting events and tell others about them. Use twitter, reddit, mail whatever suits your audience best.
    For twitter or other social networking services please use the #cablegate or unique reference ID (e.g.#66BUENOSAIRES2481) as hash tags.
    Key figures:
    • 15, 652 secret
    • 101,748 confidential
    • 133,887 unclassified
    • Iraq most discussed country – 15,365 (Cables coming from Iraq – 6,677)
    • Ankara, Turkey had most cables coming from it – 7,918
    • From Secretary of State office – 8,017

    According to the US State Departments labeling system, the most frequent subjects discussed are:
    • External political relations – 145,451
    • Internal government affairs – 122,896
    • Human rights – 55,211
    • Economic Conditions – 49,044
    • Terrorists and terrorism – 28,801
    • UN security council – 6,532
    Graphics of the cablegate dataset
    • Cables by origin and classification
    • Cables by Subject
    • Cables by Country
    • Cables by Organization
    • Cables by Program
    • Cables by Topic
    cablegate.wikileaks.org

  3. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #2482/01 3200855
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 160855Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4213
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WSHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002482

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NEA FOR A/S FELTMAN; NSC FO DAN SHAPIRO; OSD FOR USD-P
    FLOURNOY
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
    IS
    SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
    SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
    Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
    defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
    (MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
    Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
    Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
    Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
    Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
    U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel’s Qualitative
    Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
    defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
    going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
    deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
    surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
    to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
    threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its “axis”
    with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
    skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas’s future, given
    his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
    Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
    freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
    restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
    about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
    discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
    SUMMARY

    ——————-
    Bilateral Relations
    ——————-

    ¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow’s trip to Israel came as a number of
    high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
    issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
    Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
    Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
    Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
    arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
    Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD’s visit
    also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
    Israel’s QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
    Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.

    ¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel’s assessment of
    recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
    expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
    optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
    acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
    itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
    Israel’s security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
    often clash with broader American security interests in the
    region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
    of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
    stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
    MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as “the
    effective process plus the right mitigations.” While not
    explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
    does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
    favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
    process that incorporates “intimate dialogue.” DG Buchris
    thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
    he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
    upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
    that the technical working group discussions would be
    launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
    Israeli participation on this issue.

    ————————
    Iran Remains Top of Mind
    ————————

    ¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that
    Iran’s nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
    the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
    the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
    and HAMAS.

    ¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment
    of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
    for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

    rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take
    Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
    years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
    would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
    within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
    firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
    raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
    explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
    capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
    supporting “HAMAStan” in Gaza and “Hezbollahstan” in Lebanon.
    Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
    to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
    assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
    less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
    nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
    region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
    should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials
    about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
    proposal and Iran’s recent equivocation on the agreement.
    Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
    agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
    sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
    to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
    followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
    full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
    work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
    the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
    for Iran if it legitimized in the world’s eyes Iran’s right
    to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
    officials expressed surprise about Iran’s apparent reversal
    on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
    negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
    Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
    that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
    nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
    response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
    still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
    bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran’s
    response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
    be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
    been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
    he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
    and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
    likely begin pursuing the pressure track.

    ¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran’s
    support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
    there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
    Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
    all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
    emphasized Iran’s role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
    that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
    He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
    Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
    delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
    satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
    Minister Netanyahu’s “secret” visit to Moscow and President
    Obama’s engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
    Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
    sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians’ signals
    on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
    about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
    Qom facility.

    ——————-
    West Bank and Gaza
    ——————-

    ¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the
    subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
    widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
    political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
    assessment of Abbas’s future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
    stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
    past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
    facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
    Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
    this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
    considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
    world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take

    difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk
    away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
    could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
    that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
    immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
    need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues —
    specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
    optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
    improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
    further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
    footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
    advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
    sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
    little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.

    ¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political
    discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
    Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
    that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
    and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
    PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
    responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
    incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
    correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
    authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
    Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
    effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
    Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
    stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
    IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
    developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
    the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
    operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
    stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
    force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
    result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
    relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
    Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
    unacceptable, and would result in the loss of “strategic
    depth” for Israel.

    ¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to
    soley focus on the short-term “here and now,” but rathr to
    envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
    Bank could have for Israel’s secrity situation in the
    future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
    of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
    coud serve as a “magnet” and help solve the Gaza problem.
    He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
    information operations campaign to better communicate with
    the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
    the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
    the territories, but reinforced Israel’s core belief that
    HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
    might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
    with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel’s
    concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
    trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
    previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
    reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
    other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
    reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
    Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
    Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
    Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
    undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
    Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel’s
    biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
    peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
    promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation —
    concepts that are never realized — are only resulting in a
    climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
    Gilad mentioned that Egypt’s role in pushing reconciliation
    is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
    expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
    junctures.

    ¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris
    emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
    steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS’s
    deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
    the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
    before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
    Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and

    Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was
    necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
    Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
    Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
    investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
    considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.

    ——————–
    Anxiety Over Turkey
    ——————–

    ¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over
    the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
    of Israel’s participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
    exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
    relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan’s
    views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
    been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
    Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
    understandable as Turkey’s EU accession prospects look
    increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
    with both regions to succeed.

    ¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to
    contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
    they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
    his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
    Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
    noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
    Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
    recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
    pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
    a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks’ agenda
    was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
    to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
    political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
    term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
    military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
    importance.

    ¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
    might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
    explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
    and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
    will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
    mediator. He also commented that Erdogan’s ideological views
    may lead him to focus on Turkey’s Islamic neighbors, but he
    is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey’s
    ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
    patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
    to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
    the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
    Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
    emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.

    —————————-
    Quiet on the Northern Border
    —————————-

    ¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the “quiet”
    nature of its northern border — something they attribute to
    the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
    CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
    Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
    cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
    many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
    within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
    LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
    Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
    nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
    officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
    zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
    with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
    directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.

    ¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over
    developments within Hezbollah — specifically, its
    relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
    this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
    of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
    Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
    Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
    were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel’s

    calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for
    Israeli policymakers then becomes: “to strike or not to
    strike.”

    —————–
    Optimism on Syria
    —————–

    ¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence
    assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
    security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
    away from Iran’s orbit. He explained that President Assad
    used his “negative assets,” namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
    make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
    the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
    the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
    relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
    asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
    likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
    could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
    acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
    stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
    Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
    support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah’s and
    Iran’s flexibility would be significantly reduced.

    ——————————-
    Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
    ——————————-

    ¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a
    complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
    the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
    continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
    stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
    represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
    was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
    Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
    Egypt and Israel’s “frozen peace” and that neither side knows
    anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
    military visit for Egypt was in 1991.

    ¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt’s
    counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
    Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
    gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
    stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
    disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
    continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
    assistance along borders with Egypt.

    ——————————————— —————
    Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra – Strengthening the Relationship
    ——————————————— —————

    ¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General
    Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
    stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
    operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
    technological advancements have made the system much more
    viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
    or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
    additional USG support to help fund additional production of
    Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
    North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
    upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
    (Arrow-3 and David’s Sling, respectively). In an earlier
    meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
    adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
    infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
    electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
    such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
    Israel and, therefore, every effort to
    stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
    be taken.

    ¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
    IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
    asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
    defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz’s initial
    impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
    the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
    had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
    Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent

    developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile
    defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
    persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
    cooperation, but stated that Russia’s realization that the
    new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
    than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
    ask many questions about the system.

    ——-
    Summary
    ——-

    ¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow’s interlocutors carried a
    consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel’s
    greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
    the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
    relative calm on all Israel’s borders does not obscure the
    fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
    and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
    Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
    suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
    calm to end one day.

    ¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
    CUNNINGHAM

    1. Hannibal Avatar
      Hannibal

      WOW dude where did you get that from? If you read between the lines you may see a pattern of an imminent attack. Scary…

      1. PROPHET.T Avatar
        PROPHET.T

        WAIT UNTIL YOU SEE THE REST, THEY WON’T POST THE LINK,LOL
        VZCZCXRO1504
        OO RUEHROV
        DE RUEHTV #2502/01 3221434
        ZNY SSSSS ZZH
        O 181434Z NOV 09
        FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
        TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4262
        INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
        RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
        RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
        RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
        S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002502

        SIPDIS

        E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
        TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG IR SA LE IS
        SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)

        Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

        ¶1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military
        Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security
        issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed
        support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but
        doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian
        behavior — Iran will use the engagement process as an
        opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
        Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew
        Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not “open
        ended”; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event
        engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors
        continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the
        Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated
        U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S
        Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans
        to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the
        near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive
        Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms
        transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies
        of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the
        Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons
        learned regarding confronting terrorists in
        civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved
        counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers
        to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can
        and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S.
        delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
        expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen.
        This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the
        JPMG. End summary.

        ¶2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

        — Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director
        General
        — Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military
        Chief
        — Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense
        Attache to the United States
        — Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York
        — Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs
        — COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5
        — Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau
        — Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

        Main U.S. Participants:

        — Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
        Political-Military Affairs
        — James Hursch, Director, DTSA
        — Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy
        Assistant Secretary of Defense
        — Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff
        — Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA
        — Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian
        and Jordanian Affairs, NSC
        — Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian
        Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
        — COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv
        — Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy
        — Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

        Plenary
        ——-

        ¶3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the
        plenary, stating this was “perhaps the most important JPMG to
        date.” He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and
        expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop
        Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will “impact the
        stability of the world,” Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described
        this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in
        the political-military dialogue between the United States and
        Israel. He said the United States wants to “re-energize” the
        JPMG, with the goal to “bring back strategic elements” into
        the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of
        mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

        Iran
        —-

        ¶4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a
        strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President
        Obama’s statement made during a visit to Israel prior to
        becoming president that the United States would not tolerate
        a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described
        current dialogue with Iran as the “most sensitive stage” and
        Iran’s “last chance.” He said Iran remains determined to

        TEL AVIV 00002502 002 OF 004

        reach the “nuclear option,” which he described as
        “intolerable.” He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad
        opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran “only needs one bomb for
        Israel,” implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel
        regardless of its leadership.

        ¶5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares
        Israel’s concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons
        program. He said that the United States is beginning with
        engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher
        measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that
        engagement was not “open ended” — the United States needs to
        see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks.
        He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not
        respond to engagement, then the United States will move
        toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl
        reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to “run
        out the clock,” and noted that engagement also serves to
        build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy
        Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the
        United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans
        on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

        ¶6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands
        that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue
        to “play for time” and avoid sanctions while pursuing its
        strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability.
        From Mossad’s perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran
        will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so
        that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological
        capability to build a nuclear weapon — essentially reducing
        the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad
        said Iran’s main crisis is in the political sphere — the
        current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but
        does not face significant risk as its security apparatus
        remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic
        leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down
        the domestic political environment — Khamenei realizes the
        frustration demonstrated following the elections has not
        disappeared. BG Smith asked if Khamenei’s death might change
        the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to
        suggest a change in Khamenei’s health, while those
        surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

        ¶7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional
        hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and
        Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is
        very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to
        its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort
        to split Syria from Iran’s influence, and is working hard to
        deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl
        argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent
        years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent
        Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a
        weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility
        in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the
        Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the
        region and in Europe.

        Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria
        ———————–

        ¶8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by “Hizballahstan” and
        “Hamastan,” noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran
        cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from
        Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while
        ballistic missiles — although not new — remain Israel’s
        most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to
        target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon
        Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political
        deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah’s growing military
        capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4)
        Lebanon’s susceptibility to outside influences, including
        Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved
        US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views.
        Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
        deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance,
        and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling.
        Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican
        Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and
        UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending
        Gen. Graziano’s tour for an additional six months.

        ¶9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI’s desire for
        specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to
        invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future
        for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and
        support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to
        Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as
        a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

        TEL AVIV 00002502 003 OF 004

        with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF’s current weakness.
        He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on
        hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also
        argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus
        depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United
        States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that
        more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling.
        Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon
        without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense
        of Hizballah if attacked by Israel — thus, a strengthened
        LAF hurts Israel.

        QME
        —

        ¶10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad
        suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a “codename” for
        potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys
        peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
        United Arab Emirates — but the future is uncertain, and each
        of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued.
        U.S. weapons — “the best in the world” — level the playing
        field by reducing the need for training — and could
        ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S
        Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency — while
        there may be differences between Israel and the United States
        in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that
        there are no surprises, he said.

        Peace Process
        ————-

        ¶11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a
        “pillar” of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and
        President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to
        peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of
        negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian
        leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza
        despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal
        with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation
        efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA
        having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security
        and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to
        improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described
        Palestinian security forces as the “good guys.” NEA/IPA
        Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell
        continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation
        efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

        Goldstone Report
        —————-

        ¶12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel’s immediate neighbors within
        the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has
        checked “all the details” of the report, and have concluded
        that the report’s accusations are “baseless.” Buchris said
        the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to
        protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone
        calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the
        effort to prevent civilian casualties — “no other country
        has taken such steps,” Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro
        highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report’s referral
        to the UN Security Council, noting the report’s biased
        mandate.

        ¶13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas
        violated the ceasefire or “tahdiya,” which many Israelis felt
        was “humiliating” and left Defense Minister Barak open to
        criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a
        success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF
        showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want
        to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives
        and lessons learned on strategic communication to more
        effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas.
        NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar
        noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and
        asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional
        efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect
        any further damage from the report.

        Egypt/Counter-Smuggling
        ———————–

        ¶14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab
        neighbors — including specifically Egypt — for supporting
        the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process.
        Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation
        with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop
        smuggling into Gaza “completely,” and questioned whether
        Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad

        TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004

        stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on
        counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that
        Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military
        confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military
        officers visit Israel.

        ¶15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to
        strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism,
        peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United
        States is working with Egypt to improve regional security
        efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf
        States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to
        improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while
        bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council
        (GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted
        U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following
        the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF’s participation. A/S
        Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the
        message that Turkey must improve its relationship with
        Israel.

        ¶16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the
        counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He
        cited the importance of working with Israel’s neighbors —
        including especially Egypt and Turkey — to prevent Iranian
        weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should
        be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude — and
        possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash
        flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were
        important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation
        and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national
        security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels
        since the beginning of 2009.

        ¶17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political
        sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and
        humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border
        crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits
        on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger
        asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the
        GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers — goods such as
        cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military
        applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative
        business for all involved, including the Egyptian government,
        and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase
        arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S.
        economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He
        noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms
        transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence;
        additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure
        greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping
        companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro
        said he would take that back to Washington for further
        consideration.

        Iraq/Yemen
        ———-

        ¶18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000
        U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000
        soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop
        withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of
        establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a
        sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and
        DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi
        military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition
        the military to a force that can defend its borders, and
        align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

        ¶19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al
        Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He
        said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from
        heading toward an “Afghanistan-type scenario” with general
        lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG Smith noted
        that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to
        fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is
        actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in
        Sudan — this should be encouraged and expanded.

        ¶20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.

        CUNNINGHAM

        1. PROPHET.T Avatar
          PROPHET.T

          HERE IS ANOTHER ONE. SENIOR’S.LOL
          VZCZCXYZ0000
          PP RUEHWEB

          DE RUEHLB #0818/01 2011455
          ZNY CCCCC ZZH
          P 201455Z JUL 09
          FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
          TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
          INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
          RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3468
          RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3995
          RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
          RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
          RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
          C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000818

          SIPDIS

          DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
          ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
          P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
          DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
          PARIS FOR JMILLER
          USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
          NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
          DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
          OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

          E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
          TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MASS MARR MOPPS LE SY IR
          PK, AF
          SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS: PUSH SYRIA TO GET
          BACK IN ARAB FOLD

          Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

          SUMMARY
          ——–

          ¶1. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora told visiting
          Commander General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General
          David Petraeus and the Ambassador June 30 that he was “quite
          satisfied” with the outcome of Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary
          elections. Siniora said that the Lebanese had voted for the
          state and its institutions and confirmed that Lebanon could
          practice its democracy without outside interference — if
          given the opportunity. He also thanked the United States for
          sustained military assistance. General Petraeus
          congratulated Lebanon on the peaceful conduct of the
          elections and expressed hope that a cabinet would be formed
          soon. Siniora continued that Lebanon was encouraged by and
          supportive of President Obama’s efforts to reach a
          comprehensive Middle East Peace, but cautioned that
          Palestinian resettlement should not come at the expense of
          Lebanon. Siniora encouraged the U.S. to push Syria to
          respect the sovereignty of other states (namely Lebanon) as a
          way to bring Syria back into the Arab fold, rather than
          continuing to align itself with Iran. General Petraeus hoped
          that the obvious cracks in the Iranian system (illustrated by
          the demonstrations that followed the Iranian elections) would
          distract Iran from malign ambitions in the region. He also
          briefed Siniora on U.S. military assistance in Pakistan and
          Afghanistan. End summary.

          ¶2. (SBU) Meeting General Petraeus at his downtown Beirut
          residence, Siniora was accompanied by his senior advisor Rola
          Noureddine. General Petraeus and the Ambassador were
          accompanied by Colonel Bjarne (Michael) Iverson, Executive
          Officer; Colonel Mike Bell, Director – Commander’s
          Initiatives Group; Sadi Othman, Cultural Advisor and
          Translator; Ali Khedery, Advisor; Lieutenant Colonel Dave
          Wilson, Lebanon Desk Officer, Embassy Defense Attache
          Lieutenant Colonel James Lantz, Office of Defense Cooperation
          Chief Colonel Joshua Berisford and an Embassy notetaker.

          LEBANON: A “MODEL”
          FOR THE REGION
          —————–

          ¶3. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed the
          one-day visit of the Commanding General of U.S. Central
          Command (CENTCOM) General David Petraeus to Beirut on June
          ¶30. Siniora expressed his thanks for sustained U.S. military
          assistance to Lebanon and asserted that U.S. security
          assistance had contributed to the positive outcome of the
          June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections. Siniora said he was
          “quite satisfied” that the majority March 14 coalition had
          shown that its majority was decisive and not “fictitious,” as
          it had been described by others after the previous elections
          in 2005. He described the electoral outcome as vote for the
          state and its institutions. Siniora said that although
          Lebanon was not the most important country in the world and
          despite minor irregularities in the conduct of the elections,
          Lebanon had shown that it could be a model of diversity and
          democracy — without outside interference — in the region.

          ¶4. (C) General Petraeus congratulated Siniora on winning his
          own electoral campaign and the Lebanese people for conducting
          peaceful elections. In addition, he expressed hope that the
          new cabinet would be formed soon. Siniora predicted the
          government formation would likely “take some time” because of
          debate about “blocking third” veto power for the opposition.

          MIDDLE EAST PEACE:
          NOT AT THE EXPENSE
          OF LEBANON
          ——————

          ¶5. (C) Siniora said that Lebanon was encouraged by and

          supportive of President Obama’s commitment to achieving a
          comprehensive Middle East Peace. He said the U.S.
          administration’s recognition of the centrality of the
          Israeli-Palestinian conflict was an opportunity to push the
          Arab Peace Initiative forward and to finally achieve a
          resolution. The Israelis, however, were being uncooperative,
          he accused. In his June 14 speech, Israeli PM Benjamin
          Netanyahu had said “yes” to a two-state solution with but
          added “a thousand no’s,” Siniora analyzed. The ultimate fate
          of Palestinian refugees, could not come at the expense of
          Lebanon, Siniora cautioned. (Note: Lebanon has 12 Palestinian
          rfugee camps. The GOL maintains that the Palestinins
          should have the “right of return” and is agaist permanent
          resettlement (“tawteen”) in Lebanon. End note.)

          SYRIA
          —–

          ¶6. (C) Syria, Siniora said, has geopolitical significance.
          He said Lebanon desired a mutually respectful relationship
          with Syria and lauded the establishment of diplomatic
          relations between Lebanon and Syria as a good first step.
          However, other issues, such as border delineation and the
          presence of PFLP-GC military camps, supported by Syria, on
          the border, remain. Siniora commented on the signs of
          increased U.S. engagement with Syria, but he advised the
          United States to be careful not to give any rewards to Syria
          without Syria taking action first. Most importantly, the
          U.S. should not allow Syria — or other states in the region
          — to use Lebanon as a platform or battleground; engagement
          with Syria should not come at the expense of Lebanon, Siniora
          said.

          ¶7. (C) General Petraeus assured Siniora that the U.S.
          administration understood Lebanon’s concerns. He told
          Siniora that Syrian President Bashar Asad had invited him to
          visit several times, but the time was not yet appropriate.
          Syria, he added, continues to allow Al Qaeda-affiliated
          facilitation networks to operate from its territory and allow
          the transit of suicide bombers into Iraq. General Petraeus
          added that the U.S. would like to see Syria return to the
          Arab world and develop closer ties to the western world,
          rather than continue to align itself with Iran.

          IRAN
          —-

          ¶8. (C) On Iran, General Petraeus said that the crisis
          following Iran’s June 12 presidential election had revealed
          significant cracks in the Iranian system. He said the
          announced outcome of the election and subsequent
          demonstrations showed that the “urban street” and the “young
          street” were not supportive of Iranian Supreme Leader
          Ayatollah Khamenei. Candidly, the U.S. would like these
          events to distract Iran for awhile from its other ambitions,
          such as pursuing its nuclear program, General Petraeus said.
          Although, it was too early to determine whether the current
          crisis had any significant impact on Iran’s ability to
          support Hamas, Hizballah, or limit its ability to train and
          support foreign fighters in Iraq, he added. Siniora agreed
          that there were definite cracks in the Iranian system and the
          internal divisions should be exploited. However, Siniora
          warned against Israel taking any military action against Iran
          saying such action would only make the regional situation
          worse.

          ¶9. (C) General Petraeus responded that it was not the U.S.
          desire to see outside force used against Iran. Nonetheless,
          he observed, there was a phenomenon in the Gulf states where
          leaders were worried someone would strike Iran’s nuclear
          weapons program, while also worrying that someone would not.
          Iran, he continued, had become CENTCOM’s best recruiting
          tool, and the number of partnerships and U.S. military
          assistance agreements with Arab partners in the Gulf had
          increased significantly.

          PAKISTAN AND
          AFGHANISTAN
          ————

          ¶10. (C) Turning to other international developments, Siniora
          said he had heard a rumor that Pakistan was ready to sell
          some of its nuclear stock to other countries. General
          Petraeus responded that this was almost certainly a rumor,
          but he refused to discount the possibility that Gulf states
          may “start shopping” if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon
          capability. He added that during his recent visit to
          Pakistan, it was clear that for the first time the Pakistani
          military viewed the Taliban and other extremist groups as an
          existential threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani people,
          General Petraeus continued, were hugely supportive of its
          military’s efforts to fight against this extremist threat.
          There were some early signs of some success from Pakistani
          operations.

          ¶11. (C) In Afghanistan, the U.S. was increasing its troop
          levels by 38,000 from the beginning of 2009 and doubling the
          number of its helicopters, General Petraeus said. The war in
          Afghanistan would be tough, and not easily won. One key will
          be the ability of the Afghan government to “step up” to
          provide governance and be seen to serve the people in areas
          that have been cleared by Coalition and Afghan forces..
          Afghanistan’s presidential election was scheduled for August
          20, General Petraeus added. It was likely, but not
          guaranteed that current Afghan President Hamid Karzai would
          win, he predicted.

          ¶12. (U) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has cleared this
          message.
          SISON

    2. Hannibal Avatar
      Hannibal

      WOW dude where did you get that from? If you read between the lines you may see a pattern of an imminent attack. Scary…

  4. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTV #2482/01 3200855
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 160855Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4213
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WSHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002482

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NEA FOR A/S FELTMAN; NSC FO DAN SHAPIRO; OSD FOR USD-P
    FLOURNOY
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PTER KWBG EG SY IR SA LE TU
    IS
    SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VERSHBOW MEETS WITH
    SENIOR ISRAELI DEFENSE OFFICIALS

    Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

    This is a re-transmission of USDAO TEL AVIV 3188.

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 1 and 2, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs, Ambassador
    Alexander Vershbow, met with a number of senior Israeli
    defense officials in Israel including: Ministry of Defense
    (MOD) Director General (DG) Pinchas Buchris; Head of MOD
    Political Military Bureau Amos Gilad; Assistant Chief of
    Defense Major General (MG) Benny Gantz; and Head of MOD
    Intelligence Analysis Production Brigadier General Yossi
    Baidatz. The Israelis expressed positive views on continued
    U.S.-Israel cooperation particularly on Israel’s Qualitative
    Military Edge (QME) and the ongoing Juniper Cobra missile
    defense exercise. Israeli officials explained that they were
    going through an unprecedented period of calm due to the
    deterrent effect of Operation CAST LEAD, but that below the
    surface were a number of significant dangers. They continued
    to emphasize that Iran represents the greatest strategic
    threat to the region, both its nuclear program and its “axis”
    with Syria, Hezbollah, and HAMAS. They also expressed
    skepticism about Palestinian President Abbas’s future, given
    his weakened position as a result of his handling of the
    Goldstone Report and his inability to get the full settlement
    freeze he had pushed for; they questioned his ability to
    restart peace negotiations. Israeli officials were concerned
    about the deteriorating Turkey-Israel relationship and
    discussed threats emanating from both Syria and Lebanon. END
    SUMMARY

    ——————-
    Bilateral Relations
    ——————-

    ¶2. (S) ASD Vershbow’s trip to Israel came as a number of
    high-level Israeli and American officials were meeting on key
    issues. On October 31, Secretary of State Clinton arrived in
    Jerusalem for talks on the peace process with Prime Minister
    Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minster
    Lieberman. In addition, EUCOM Commander Admiral Stavridis
    arrived in Israel on November 1 to observe the Juniper
    Cobra-10 ballistic missile defense exercise. The ASD’s visit
    also came in the wake of recent high-level discussions on
    Israel’s QME in Washington, and the October 21 meeting of the
    Joint Politico-Military Group in Tel Aviv.

    ¶3. (S) On QME, ASD Vershbow asked for Israel’s assessment of
    recent discussions, and across the board, Israeli officials
    expressed gratitude for U.S. efforts on this front and voiced
    optimism on the steps moving forward. Amos Gilad
    acknowledged the sometimes difficult position the U.S. finds
    itself in given its global interests, and conceded that
    Israel’s security focus is so narrow that its QME concerns
    often clash with broader American security interests in the
    region. Israeli officials acknowledged the impressive nature
    of the QME dialogue mechanisms recently established, but
    stated that the results of the process are what truly matter.
    MG Benny Gantz defined successful QME relations as “the
    effective process plus the right mitigations.” While not
    explicitly saying it, Gantz seemed to acknowledge that Israel
    does not expect that all QME decisions will break in its
    favor, but that Israel only expects a fair and equitable
    process that incorporates “intimate dialogue.” DG Buchris
    thanked Versbhow for the recent success of the JPMG and said
    he looks forward to convening the first meeting of the agreed
    upon working groups by the end of November. Vershbow stated
    that the technical working group discussions would be
    launched soon, and that he was looking forward to future
    Israeli participation on this issue.

    ————————
    Iran Remains Top of Mind
    ————————

    ¶4. (S) Israeli officials continue to uniformly emphasize that
    Iran’s nuclear program and regional hegemonic ambitions are
    the greatest strategic threats to Israel. They view Iran as
    the center of a radical axis that includes Syria, Hezbollah
    and HAMAS.

    ¶5. (S//NF) Israel continues to offer a worst-case assessment
    of the Iranian nuclear program, emphasizing that the window
    for stopping the program (by military means if necessary) is

    rapidly closing. General Baidatz argued that it would take
    Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half
    years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran
    would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal
    within six months. (COMMENT: It is unclear if the Israelis
    firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to
    raise greater urgency from the United States). Amos Gilad
    explained his view of the repercussions of an Iranian nuclear
    capability stating that it would give Iran a free hand in
    supporting “HAMAStan” in Gaza and “Hezbollahstan” in Lebanon.
    Gilad also argued that Saudi Arabia would definitely react
    to a nuclear Iran by obtaining a weapon (with Pakistani
    assistance) and Egypt would almost certainly follow. He was
    less sure about whether Turkey would respond by pursuing a
    nuclear weapon. Regardless, the security situation in the
    region surrounding Israel would be dramatically altered
    should Iran acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶6. (S//NF) ASD Vershbow queried various Israeli officials
    about their view of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
    proposal and Iran’s recent equivocation on the agreement.
    Israeli officials uniformly expressed support for the
    agreement but made clear that by itself it was not
    sufficient. They stated that it was only one stop on the way
    to containing the Iranian nuclear program and that it must be
    followed by a freeze-for-freeze agreement and eventually the
    full suspension of uranium enrichment, as well as the end of
    work on the newly disclosed site at Qom. They warned that
    the TRR agreement by itself could serve as a major victory
    for Iran if it legitimized in the world’s eyes Iran’s right
    to enrich uranium on its own soil. None of the Israeli
    officials expressed surprise about Iran’s apparent reversal
    on the TRR agreement, as they viewed this as typical Iranian
    negotiating style and part of an Iranian strategy of delay.
    Amos Gilad stated that Iran would never agree to anything
    that contradicted its overall strategic goal of achieving a
    nuclear weapons capability.

    ¶7. (S) When queried about how the U.S. views the Iranian
    response, ASD Vershbow explained that the United States was
    still seeking greater clarity on what was the real Iranian
    bottom line. We may need time to ascertain whether Iran’s
    response was in fact a serious walk-back or whether it would
    be willing to abide by the initial TRR agreement that had
    been agreed to in principle in Geneva on October 1. However,
    he also emphasized that American patience is not unlimited
    and that if the TRR agreement did collapse, the U.S. would
    likely begin pursuing the pressure track.

    ¶8. (S//NF) Israel was also highly concerned about Iran’s
    support for proxies, with General Baidatz emphasizing that
    there are multiple bases in Iran where IRGC, Quds Force,
    Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives
    all train together and share knowledge. MG Gantz also
    emphasized Iran’s role as a weapons supplier to Syria and
    that Syria actively facilitated arms transfers to Hezbollah.
    He expressed concern about Iranian shipments of weapons via
    Sudan to Egypt and into Gaza. On the Russian delay in
    delivery of the S-300 (SA-20) to Iran, Gilad voiced
    satisfaction with the train of events, acknowledging Prime
    Minister Netanyahu’s “secret” visit to Moscow and President
    Obama’s engagement with Medvedev had both played a role.
    Gilad was worried about Russian readiness to support tough
    sanctions on Iran. ASD Vershbow said the Russians’ signals
    on sanctions were mixed, but they seemed genuinely concerned
    about recent Iranian missile tests and the revelation of the
    Qom facility.

    ——————-
    West Bank and Gaza
    ——————-

    ¶9. (S) Of particular interest throughout the meetings was the
    subject of the Palestinian political situation. It was
    widely agreed that President Abbas is currently in a weakened
    political state, and Israeli officials generally cast a dour
    assessment of Abbas’s future. In one exchange, Amos Gilad
    stated his opinion that Abbas will not survive politically
    past the year 2011. Gilad further stated that Abbas is
    facing unprecedented criticism within the Palestinian
    Authority over his handling of the Goldstone report, and that
    this, coupled with a stubborn HAMAS, has weakened Abbas
    considerably. The Israelis said the perception in the Arab
    world was that the U.S. had encouraged Abbas to take

    difficult positions on Goldstone and settlements only to walk
    away from him. ASD Vershbow queried Gilad over measures that
    could be taken to bolster Abbas. Gilad responded by stating
    that Israeli-Palestinian peace discussions need to be resumed
    immediately, but without preconditions, and that both parties
    need to seek further cooperation on a range of issues —
    specifically on the security sector front. Gilad expressed
    optimism over the current atmosphere in the West Bank, citing
    improvements in the security and economic spheres, and
    further stated that the reduced Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
    footprint in the West Bank has made conditions ripe for
    advancing the relationship. Gilad closed, however, on a
    sourer note by stating that the Government of Israel has
    little faith in the Palestinian negotiating team.

    ¶10. (S) ASD Vershbow transitioned off the political
    discussion to focus on the Palestinian Authority Security
    Force (PASF). Specifically, Vershbow highlighted the concern
    that Palestinian forces were seen as lacking real authority,
    and therefore asked for steps that could be taken to give the
    PASF more visible control of security. Israeli officials
    responded by citing the decreased number of direct- action
    incursions, checkpoints and patrols, and seemingly drew a
    correlation between reduced IDF activity and increased PASF
    authority (COMMENT: Despite Israeli assurances, U.S. and
    Palestinian officials continue to highlight the corrosive
    effect of regular Israeli incursions). MG Gantz cited
    Palestinian security sector reform as a major accomplishment,
    stating that on-the-ground coordination between the PASF and
    IDF units has improved dramatically. Despite these positive
    developments though, Israeli officials repeatedly underscored
    the importance of retaining the right to disrupt terrorist
    operations in the West Bank and Gaza. Additionally, they
    stated that if Israel allowed a weak and untrained security
    force to take over in the West Bank in the short term, the
    result will be deterioration of the Israel-Jordan
    relationship over the long term. The prospect of poor
    Israeli-Jordanian relations, according to Amos Gilad, is
    unacceptable, and would result in the loss of “strategic
    depth” for Israel.

    ¶11. (S) ASD Vershbow urged his Israeli counterparts not to
    soley focus on the short-term “here and now,” but rathr to
    envision the possible benefits that a strongand viable West
    Bank could have for Israel’s secrity situation in the
    future. Vershbow used thi point to springboard to the issue
    of HAMAS and aza, asking whether success in the West Bank
    coud serve as a “magnet” and help solve the Gaza problem.
    He asked if Israel had made any headway in tems of an
    information operations campaign to better communicate with
    the people of Gaza. Israeli officials offered very little in
    the way of a communications strategy or long-term vision for
    the territories, but reinforced Israel’s core belief that
    HAMAS has only sinister motives, and that any attempt Fatah
    might make to improve its standing in Gaza would only be met
    with HAMAS opposition. General Baidatz articulated Israel’s
    concern by highlighting recent intelligence that HAMAS is
    trying to acquire from Iran (and potentially test-fired the
    previous weekend) the 60 km-range Fajr-5 rocket that could
    reach Tel Aviv. These actions, according to Baidatz and
    other officials, make any discussion of Palestinian
    reconciliation both premature and unrealistic. Ambassador
    Vershbow sought further clarification on this point, querying
    Israeli officials over the level of public support for HAMAS.
    Specifically, the ASD asked if there was any way to
    undermine support for HAMAS vis-a-vis the peace process.
    Amos Gilad responded simply by saying that one of Israel’s
    biggest concerns is the atmosphere created by disjointed
    peace talks. Specifically, Gilad stated that political
    promises of peace, unification, and reconciliation —
    concepts that are never realized — are only resulting in a
    climate of uncertainty that is unhealthy. On this matter,
    Gilad mentioned that Egypt’s role in pushing reconciliation
    is not helpful and often counterproductive, but that he
    expects Egypt to continue floating the idea at future
    junctures.

    ¶12. (C) In bringing up the Goldstone Report, DG Buchris
    emphasized that the Government of Israel took extraordinary
    steps to mitigate civilian casualties, despite HAMAS’s
    deliberate use of civilians as human shields. He stated that
    the IDF made over 300,000 phone calls to alert civilians
    before bombing legitimate military targets. He also compared
    Israeli operations in Gaza to U.S. operations in Iraq and

    Afghanistan and stated that Israel would do whatever was
    necessary to protect its population. In response, ASD
    Vershbow recalled U.S. support for Israel in handling of the
    Goldstone report, and offered to share U.S. experience in
    investigating incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan as the GOI
    considered whether to conduct an additional investigation.

    ——————–
    Anxiety Over Turkey
    ——————–

    ¶13. (S) Israeli officials also expressed growing anxiety over
    the Turkey-Israel relationship after the Turkish cancellation
    of Israel’s participation in the ANATOLIAN EAGLE joint
    exercise. They expressed their belief that the strategic
    relationship with Turkey is critical, but that PM Erdogan’s
    views have increasingly penetrated into the military and have
    been part of the reason for the deterioration in relations as
    Turkey looks East rather than West. Gilad believes this is
    understandable as Turkey’s EU accession prospects look
    increasingly doubtful, and they must balance their relations
    with both regions to succeed.

    ¶14. (S) Baidatz stated that the Turks have an agenda to
    contain any Kurdish influence in Iraq and that to achieve it
    they need to improve their relations with Iran and Syria. In
    his view, the worst possible outcome would be a new
    Turkey-Iran-Syria-Iraq axis in the Middle East. Gilad also
    noted that Turkey wanted to improve its relationships with
    Iran and asserted that it had made some very aggressive plans
    recently to support HAMAS. However, he had a less
    pessimistic view than Baidatz, stating that Turkey had played
    a positive role in Iraq and that generally the Turks’ agenda
    was for a stable Iraq that would be commercially beneficial
    to Turkey. Gilad stated that he was skeptical of any
    political rapprochement between Israel and Turkey in the near
    term, but that Israel would continue to foster the
    military-to-military relationship because of its strategic
    importance.

    ¶15. (C) Gilad also queried ASD Vershbow about what Israel
    might do to improve its relationship with Turkey. Vershbow
    explained that Turkey wants to be influential in the region
    and that if it jeopardizes its relationship with Israel, it
    will undermine its status and its leverage as an evenhanded
    mediator. He also commented that Erdogan’s ideological views
    may lead him to focus on Turkey’s Islamic neighbors, but he
    is also a realist who will not want to jeopardize Turkey’s
    ties to the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and Israel should be
    patient with Turkey and stay engaged, encouraging the Turks
    to play a constructive role in the region. He stated that at
    the upcoming bilateral defense talks between the U.S. and
    Turkey in December, he and Under Secretary Flournoy would
    emphasize the need to improve Israel-Turkey relations.

    —————————-
    Quiet on the Northern Border
    —————————-

    ¶16. (S) Israeli officials remain pleased with the “quiet”
    nature of its northern border — something they attribute to
    the deterrent effect Israel has built up following OPERATION
    CAST LEAD and the 2006 war in Lebano. However, according to
    Israeli officials, it i a foregone conclusion that strong
    cooperation eists between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    and ezbollah. The level of cooperation far exceeds wht
    many assume is simply the day-to-day problem of corruption
    within the ranks. On the contrary, Israel believes that
    LAF/Hezbollah cooperation is a matter of national policy.
    Amos Gilad attributed this dynamic to elements of
    nationalism, stating that Lebanese government and military
    officials choose not to confront Hezbollah out of patriotic
    zeal. Moreover, according to Gilad, any information shared
    with the United Nations Interim Force-Lebanon (UNIFIL) goes
    directly to Hezbollah by way of the LAF.

    ¶17. (S) Israeli officials have major concerns over
    developments within Hezbollah — specifically, its
    relationship with Syria and Iran. General Baidatz spoke of
    this relationship and drew attention to the existing supply
    of Fateh-110 long-range missile that Iran sent to Syria.
    Israeli officials believe these missiles are destined for
    Hezbollah. According to Baidatz and others, if the delivery
    were to occur, this would significantly alter Israel’s

    calculus. Under such a scenario, the looming question for
    Israeli policymakers then becomes: “to strike or not to
    strike.”

    —————–
    Optimism on Syria
    —————–

    ¶18. (S) General Baidatz offered an Israeli intelligence
    assessment that if Syria were able to achieve peace with
    security and obtain greater U.S. involvement, it may pull
    away from Iran’s orbit. He explained that President Assad
    used his “negative assets,” namely Hezbollah and HAMAS, to
    make himself relevant and that ultimately Assad wants it all:
    the Golan Heights; peace with Israel; better relations with
    the U.S.; a strong relationship with Iran; and a continued
    relationship with Hezbollah. Ultimately, Gen Baidatz
    asserted that if Assad had to choose one thing, it would
    likely be peace with Israel. ASD Vershbow asked if Hezbollah
    could be sustained without Syrian support. Baidatz
    acknowledged the difficulty in answering this question, but
    stated his belief that it would be a gradual process before
    Hezbollah could completely wean itself from the Syrian
    support apparatus and that, ultimately, both Hezbollah’s and
    Iran’s flexibility would be significantly reduced.

    ——————————-
    Mil-to-Mil Relations with Egypt
    ——————————-

    ¶19. (C) Amos Gilad commented that he would like to see a
    complete peace with Egypt, but noted there was very little in
    the way of Egyptian-Israeli military relations and that Egypt
    continued to train its military for war with Israel. Gilad
    stated that Egypt was not likely to attack Israel and did not
    represent a short-term threat, but that at the very least it
    was necessary to have modest contact between Egyptian and
    Israeli officers. He expressed frustration by describing
    Egypt and Israel’s “frozen peace” and that neither side knows
    anything about the other. He noted that the last high-level
    military visit for Egypt was in 1991.

    ¶20. (S//NF) Israeli officials agreed that Egypt’s
    counter-smuggling efforts have improved, particularly since
    Operation CAST LEAD in January. However, they stated that
    gaps still exist and that Egypt needs to focus its efforts on
    stopping Bedouin smuggling in the Sinai. Gilad said he was
    disillusioned with the technical monitoring solution; tunnels
    continue and smuggling is increasing even with U.S.
    assistance along borders with Egypt.

    ——————————————— —————
    Iron Dome and Juniper Cobra – Strengthening the Relationship
    ——————————————— —————

    ¶21. (S) On Iron Dome, DG Buchris (Assisted by retired General
    Nagel) briefed ASD Vershbow on the latest developments,
    stating that Iron Dome is planned to have an initial
    operating capability by the spring of 2010, and that
    technological advancements have made the system much more
    viable defending against short range rocket attacks from Gaza
    or Southern Lebanon. Buchris also emphasized the need for
    additional USG support to help fund additional production of
    Iron Dome to protect the civilian population in both the
    North and the South. Buchris also noted progress on the
    upper- and medium-tier ballistic missile defense systems
    (Arrow-3 and David’s Sling, respectively). In an earlier
    meeting, MG Gantz quantified the importance of fielding
    adequate missile defense systems by citing critical Israeli
    infrastructure such as Ben Gurion Airport and the Ashkelon
    electricity plant. Suffering the loss or damage of places
    such as these, according to Gantz, would be a major blow to
    Israel and, therefore, every effort to
    stand up a capable missile and rocket defense shield should
    be taken.

    ¶22. (S) After Gantz highlighted three areas of focus for the
    IDF (deterring conventional threats, responding nimbly to
    asymmetric threats, and developing an integrated missile
    defense system), ASD Vershbow asked for Gantz’s initial
    impression of the Juniper Cobra-10 exercise. Gantz stressed
    the importance of this exercise, and stated that so far it
    had been a success. ASD Vershbow stated that the timing of
    Juniper Cobra was somewhat fortuitous, given the recent

    developments with Iran. On the larger issue of missile
    defense, ASD Vershbow stressed U.S. efforts to try and
    persuade Russia to become more involved in missile defense
    cooperation, but stated that Russia’s realization that the
    new U.S. missile defense approach in Europe is more effective
    than the previous one is causing the Russian leadership to
    ask many questions about the system.

    ——-
    Summary
    ——-

    ¶23. (S) All of ASD Vershbow’s interlocutors carried a
    consistent message emphasizing that: Iran remains Israel’s
    greatest threat; recent events have weakened President Abbas;
    the PASF have performed well in the West Bank; and the
    relative calm on all Israel’s borders does not obscure the
    fact that Israeli intelligence is seeing significant activity
    and planning by Iranian surrogates, namely HAMAS and
    Hezbollah, with facilitation from Syria. These threats
    suggest that Israel must remain vigilant and prepared for the
    calm to end one day.

    ¶24. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this message.
    CUNNINGHAM

    1. Hannibal Avatar
      Hannibal

      WOW dude where did you get that from? If you read between the lines you may see a pattern of an imminent attack. Scary…

      1. PROPHET.T Avatar
        PROPHET.T

        WAIT UNTIL YOU SEE THE REST, THEY WON’T POST THE LINK,LOL

        1. PROPHET.T Avatar
          PROPHET.T

          HERE IS ANOTHER ONE. SENIOR’S.LOL
          VZCZCXYZ0000
          PP RUEHWEB

          DE RUEHLB #0818/01 2011455
          ZNY CCCCC ZZH
          P 201455Z JUL 09
          FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
          TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
          INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
          RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3468
          RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3995
          RHMCSUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
          RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
          RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
          C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 000818

          SIPDIS

          DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
          ALSO FOR IO A/S BRIMMER
          P FOR DRUSSELL, RRANGASWAMY
          DRL/NESA FOR WHITMAN, BARGHOUT
          PARIS FOR JMILLER
          USUN FOR WOLFF/GERMAIN/SCHEDLBAUER
          NSC FOR SHAPIRO, MCDERMOTT
          DOD/OSD FOR FLOURNOY/KAHL/DALTON
          OVP FOR HMUSTAFA

          E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019
          TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MASS MARR MOPPS LE SY IR
          PK, AF
          SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA TO PETRAEUS: PUSH SYRIA TO GET
          BACK IN ARAB FOLD

          Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

          SUMMARY
          ——–

          ¶1. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora told visiting
          Commander General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) General
          David Petraeus and the Ambassador June 30 that he was “quite
          satisfied” with the outcome of Lebanon’s June 7 parliamentary
          elections. Siniora said that the Lebanese had voted for the
          state and its institutions and confirmed that Lebanon could
          practice its democracy without outside interference — if
          given the opportunity. He also thanked the United States for
          sustained military assistance. General Petraeus
          congratulated Lebanon on the peaceful conduct of the
          elections and expressed hope that a cabinet would be formed
          soon. Siniora continued that Lebanon was encouraged by and
          supportive of President Obama’s efforts to reach a
          comprehensive Middle East Peace, but cautioned that
          Palestinian resettlement should not come at the expense of
          Lebanon. Siniora encouraged the U.S. to push Syria to
          respect the sovereignty of other states (namely Lebanon) as a
          way to bring Syria back into the Arab fold, rather than
          continuing to align itself with Iran. General Petraeus hoped
          that the obvious cracks in the Iranian system (illustrated by
          the demonstrations that followed the Iranian elections) would
          distract Iran from malign ambitions in the region. He also
          briefed Siniora on U.S. military assistance in Pakistan and
          Afghanistan. End summary.

          ¶2. (SBU) Meeting General Petraeus at his downtown Beirut
          residence, Siniora was accompanied by his senior advisor Rola
          Noureddine. General Petraeus and the Ambassador were
          accompanied by Colonel Bjarne (Michael) Iverson, Executive
          Officer; Colonel Mike Bell, Director – Commander’s
          Initiatives Group; Sadi Othman, Cultural Advisor and
          Translator; Ali Khedery, Advisor; Lieutenant Colonel Dave
          Wilson, Lebanon Desk Officer, Embassy Defense Attache
          Lieutenant Colonel James Lantz, Office of Defense Cooperation
          Chief Colonel Joshua Berisford and an Embassy notetaker.

          LEBANON: A “MODEL”
          FOR THE REGION
          —————–

          ¶3. (C) Caretaker Prime Minister Fouad Siniora welcomed the
          one-day visit of the Commanding General of U.S. Central
          Command (CENTCOM) General David Petraeus to Beirut on June
          ¶30. Siniora expressed his thanks for sustained U.S. military
          assistance to Lebanon and asserted that U.S. security
          assistance had contributed to the positive outcome of the
          June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections. Siniora said he was
          “quite satisfied” that the majority March 14 coalition had
          shown that its majority was decisive and not “fictitious,” as
          it had been described by others after the previous elections
          in 2005. He described the electoral outcome as vote for the
          state and its institutions. Siniora said that although
          Lebanon was not the most important country in the world and
          despite minor irregularities in the conduct of the elections,
          Lebanon had shown that it could be a model of diversity and
          democracy — without outside interference — in the region.

          ¶4. (C) General Petraeus congratulated Siniora on winning his
          own electoral campaign and the Lebanese people for conducting
          peaceful elections. In addition, he expressed hope that the
          new cabinet would be formed soon. Siniora predicted the
          government formation would likely “take some time” because of
          debate about “blocking third” veto power for the opposition.

          MIDDLE EAST PEACE:
          NOT AT THE EXPENSE
          OF LEBANON
          ——————

          ¶5. (C) Siniora said that Lebanon was encouraged by and

          supportive of President Obama’s commitment to achieving a
          comprehensive Middle East Peace. He said the U.S.
          administration’s recognition of the centrality of the
          Israeli-Palestinian conflict was an opportunity to push the
          Arab Peace Initiative forward and to finally achieve a
          resolution. The Israelis, however, were being uncooperative,
          he accused. In his June 14 speech, Israeli PM Benjamin
          Netanyahu had said “yes” to a two-state solution with but
          added “a thousand no’s,” Siniora analyzed. The ultimate fate
          of Palestinian refugees, could not come at the expense of
          Lebanon, Siniora cautioned. (Note: Lebanon has 12 Palestinian
          rfugee camps. The GOL maintains that the Palestinins
          should have the “right of return” and is agaist permanent
          resettlement (“tawteen”) in Lebanon. End note.)

          SYRIA
          —–

          ¶6. (C) Syria, Siniora said, has geopolitical significance.
          He said Lebanon desired a mutually respectful relationship
          with Syria and lauded the establishment of diplomatic
          relations between Lebanon and Syria as a good first step.
          However, other issues, such as border delineation and the
          presence of PFLP-GC military camps, supported by Syria, on
          the border, remain. Siniora commented on the signs of
          increased U.S. engagement with Syria, but he advised the
          United States to be careful not to give any rewards to Syria
          without Syria taking action first. Most importantly, the
          U.S. should not allow Syria — or other states in the region
          — to use Lebanon as a platform or battleground; engagement
          with Syria should not come at the expense of Lebanon, Siniora
          said.

          ¶7. (C) General Petraeus assured Siniora that the U.S.
          administration understood Lebanon’s concerns. He told
          Siniora that Syrian President Bashar Asad had invited him to
          visit several times, but the time was not yet appropriate.
          Syria, he added, continues to allow Al Qaeda-affiliated
          facilitation networks to operate from its territory and allow
          the transit of suicide bombers into Iraq. General Petraeus
          added that the U.S. would like to see Syria return to the
          Arab world and develop closer ties to the western world,
          rather than continue to align itself with Iran.

          IRAN
          —-

          ¶8. (C) On Iran, General Petraeus said that the crisis
          following Iran’s June 12 presidential election had revealed
          significant cracks in the Iranian system. He said the
          announced outcome of the election and subsequent
          demonstrations showed that the “urban street” and the “young
          street” were not supportive of Iranian Supreme Leader
          Ayatollah Khamenei. Candidly, the U.S. would like these
          events to distract Iran for awhile from its other ambitions,
          such as pursuing its nuclear program, General Petraeus said.
          Although, it was too early to determine whether the current
          crisis had any significant impact on Iran’s ability to
          support Hamas, Hizballah, or limit its ability to train and
          support foreign fighters in Iraq, he added. Siniora agreed
          that there were definite cracks in the Iranian system and the
          internal divisions should be exploited. However, Siniora
          warned against Israel taking any military action against Iran
          saying such action would only make the regional situation
          worse.

          ¶9. (C) General Petraeus responded that it was not the U.S.
          desire to see outside force used against Iran. Nonetheless,
          he observed, there was a phenomenon in the Gulf states where
          leaders were worried someone would strike Iran’s nuclear
          weapons program, while also worrying that someone would not.
          Iran, he continued, had become CENTCOM’s best recruiting
          tool, and the number of partnerships and U.S. military
          assistance agreements with Arab partners in the Gulf had
          increased significantly.

          PAKISTAN AND
          AFGHANISTAN
          ————

          ¶10. (C) Turning to other international developments, Siniora
          said he had heard a rumor that Pakistan was ready to sell
          some of its nuclear stock to other countries. General
          Petraeus responded that this was almost certainly a rumor,
          but he refused to discount the possibility that Gulf states
          may “start shopping” if Iran acquired a nuclear weapon
          capability. He added that during his recent visit to
          Pakistan, it was clear that for the first time the Pakistani
          military viewed the Taliban and other extremist groups as an
          existential threat to Pakistan. The Pakistani people,
          General Petraeus continued, were hugely supportive of its
          military’s efforts to fight against this extremist threat.
          There were some early signs of some success from Pakistani
          operations.

          ¶11. (C) In Afghanistan, the U.S. was increasing its troop
          levels by 38,000 from the beginning of 2009 and doubling the
          number of its helicopters, General Petraeus said. The war in
          Afghanistan would be tough, and not easily won. One key will
          be the ability of the Afghan government to “step up” to
          provide governance and be seen to serve the people in areas
          that have been cleared by Coalition and Afghan forces..
          Afghanistan’s presidential election was scheduled for August
          20, General Petraeus added. It was likely, but not
          guaranteed that current Afghan President Hamid Karzai would
          win, he predicted.

          ¶12. (U) CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus has cleared this
          message.
          SISON

  5. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    VZCZCXRO7076
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHRH #0181/01 0281550
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9987
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4849
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4355
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
    SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN’S
    NUCLEAR PLANS

    Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE
    REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron
    Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
    Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
    Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
    Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
    joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
    Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed
    exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
    on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if
    Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
    Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
    the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
    deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded
    that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
    Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a
    reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of
    what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
    mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
    weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His
    concern that the United States will negotiate a “grand
    bargain” with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
    concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
    comment.

    ¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador
    Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
    turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, “On this issue, what
    concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
    policy on enrichment.” Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
    dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
    Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
    Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
    an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
    that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
    shores, across open water.

    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only “Sure, I
    agree!” before Prince continued, “The location is so
    dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!” He
    urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
    north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
    Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
    reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
    any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more
    troubling, he said, is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
    He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
    other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
    the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
    the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

    ¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran’s desire to enrich
    uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
    by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran’s
    desire to establish its “supremacy” in the region. Prince
    Turki interjected: “And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
    in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
    desalination, but not with enrichment.” He said that the
    prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
    about their motivations for doing so: “they do not need it!”

    ¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that “some experts in Russia
    believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years.”
    Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
    has “put forward initiatives” with Iran. Russia hopes to
    discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
    and he said that an “important delegation” would be coming to
    Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
    leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
    would be welcomed, stressing that “we must work together to
    get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
    Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
    nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence,
    that is why I raise this with you.” Amb. Gibinvish pledged
    that “we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult
    partners.” At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
    Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince
    Turki said “Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
    with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any

    RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

    negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the
    interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
    We should be told — in advance! — of what you plan to say.”

  6. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    VZCZCXRO7076
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHRH #0181/01 0281550
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 281550Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9987
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4849
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4355
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
    SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN’S
    NUCLEAR PLANS

    Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE
    REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron
    Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
    Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
    Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
    Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
    joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
    Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed
    exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
    on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if
    Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
    Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
    the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
    deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded
    that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
    Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a
    reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of
    what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
    mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
    weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His
    concern that the United States will negotiate a “grand
    bargain” with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
    concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
    comment.

    ¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador
    Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
    turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, “On this issue, what
    concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
    policy on enrichment.” Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
    dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
    Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
    Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
    an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
    that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
    shores, across open water.

    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only “Sure, I
    agree!” before Prince continued, “The location is so
    dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!” He
    urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
    north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
    Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
    reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
    any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more
    troubling, he said, is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
    He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
    other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
    the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
    the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

    ¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran’s desire to enrich
    uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
    by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran’s
    desire to establish its “supremacy” in the region. Prince
    Turki interjected: “And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
    in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
    desalination, but not with enrichment.” He said that the
    prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
    about their motivations for doing so: “they do not need it!”

    ¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that “some experts in Russia
    believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years.”
    Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
    has “put forward initiatives” with Iran. Russia hopes to
    discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
    and he said that an “important delegation” would be coming to
    Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
    leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
    would be welcomed, stressing that “we must work together to
    get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
    Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
    nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence,
    that is why I raise this with you.” Amb. Gibinvish pledged
    that “we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult
    partners.” At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
    Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince
    Turki said “Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
    with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any

    RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

    negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the
    interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
    We should be told — in advance! — of what you plan to say.”

  7. PROPHET.T Avatar
    PROPHET.T

    VZCZCXRO7076
    OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
    DE RUEHRH #0181/01 0281550
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 281550Z JAN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9987
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4849
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4355
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
    SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN’S
    NUCLEAR PLANS

    Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE
    REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron
    Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
    Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
    Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
    Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
    joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
    Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed
    exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
    on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if
    Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
    Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
    the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
    deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded
    that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
    Iran.

    ¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a
    reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of
    what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
    mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
    weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His
    concern that the United States will negotiate a “grand
    bargain” with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
    concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
    comment.

    ¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador
    Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
    turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, “On this issue, what
    concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
    policy on enrichment.” Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
    dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
    Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
    Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
    an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
    that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
    shores, across open water.

    ¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only “Sure, I
    agree!” before Prince continued, “The location is so
    dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!” He
    urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
    north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
    Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
    reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
    any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more
    troubling, he said, is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
    He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
    other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
    the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
    the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

    ¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran’s desire to enrich
    uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
    by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran’s
    desire to establish its “supremacy” in the region. Prince
    Turki interjected: “And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
    in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
    desalination, but not with enrichment.” He said that the
    prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
    about their motivations for doing so: “they do not need it!”

    ¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that “some experts in Russia
    believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years.”
    Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
    has “put forward initiatives” with Iran. Russia hopes to
    discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
    and he said that an “important delegation” would be coming to
    Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
    leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
    would be welcomed, stressing that “we must work together to
    get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
    Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
    nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence,
    that is why I raise this with you.” Amb. Gibinvish pledged
    that “we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult
    partners.” At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
    Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince
    Turki said “Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
    with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any

    RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

    negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the
    interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
    We should be told — in advance! — of what you plan to say.”

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