Photo illustration -Iran’s rulers point their weapons at foreign enemies, while the crisis threatening their survival is reflected at home.
Iran Is Fighting Two Wars—But the Regime’s Greatest Enemy May Be Itself
The United States and Israel are attacking Iran from the outside. But inflation, shortages, public exhaustion and the growing power of the Revolutionary Guards may determine the regime’s future from within.
By: Ali Hussein, Political Analyst , Opinion
Iran is fighting two wars.
The first is visible to the entire world: a military confrontation with the United States and Israel involving missiles, airstrikes, oil tankers, sanctions and control of the Strait of Hormuz.
The second is unfolding inside Iran. It is a struggle over the survival of the economy, the patience of the Iranian people and the identity of the Islamic Republic itself.
The external war may be more spectacular, but the internal one may ultimately prove more dangerous to the regime.
During his visit to India, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian acknowledged the severity of the situation.
“Iran has been subjected to heavy sanctions in recent years; this pressure has reached a critical and dangerous stage in recent months following the military aggression by the United States and Israel,” he said, adding that the world was passing through a period of unprecedented complexity.
Pezeshkian is correct that sanctions and military attacks have intensified Iran’s suffering. The United States and Israel cannot escape responsibility for the destruction caused by war.
But sanctions and bombs alone did not create Iran’s crisis. They struck a country already weakened by decades of economic mismanagement, corruption, repression, international isolation and the diversion of national resources toward missiles, militias and foreign adventures.
Iran’s leaders built a formidable regional war machine while neglecting the prosperity of their own people.
An economy approaching the breaking point
The International Monetary Fund projects that Iran’s economy will contract by 5.4 percent in 2026, while consumer-price inflation will reach approximately 68.9 percent.
The rial has lost much of its value. Oil revenues and access to foreign currency are shrinking. Imports are becoming more difficult, while the cost of food and other necessities continues to rise.
Iran possesses some of the world’s largest oil and natural-gas reserves, yet Iranians are reportedly standing in gasoline lines. Truckers and taxi drivers have staged work stoppages as fuel quotas and subsidies are reduced.
This is more than an economic contradiction. It is an indictment of the regime’s priorities.
For ordinary Iranians, the important question is no longer whether their country can threaten shipping in Hormuz, supply the Houthis in Yemen or preserve what remains of its so-called axis of resistance.
Their questions are much more immediate: Can we afford food? Will we have electricity? Will water reach our homes? Will our children find jobs? Is there any future for them inside Iran?
A government can blame foreign enemies for hardship, and sometimes with justification. But it cannot indefinitely ask its population to sacrifice everything while refusing to reconsider the policies producing isolation and war.
Is Iran still an Islamic Republic?
The internal crisis is not limited to economics. Iran is also undergoing a fundamental transformation in the distribution of power.
It still has a president, parliament, judiciary, clerical institutions and constitution. But the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps increasingly appears to control the decisions that matter most.
Reuters reported that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei remains formally at the summit of the system, but largely legitimizes decisions reached by Iran’s military and security leadership. The IRGC and its allies now dominate military strategy and critical political decisions concerning the war, Hormuz, the nuclear program and negotiations with Washington.
Pezeshkian may represent Iran at international gatherings and describe the country’s economic suffering. But can he end the military confrontation? Can he order a change in nuclear policy? Can he stop the IRGC from supporting regional proxies? Can he accept a diplomatic compromise opposed by the commanders?
If he cannot, then Iran’s president is being left with responsibility without authority.
The Islamic Republic is gradually becoming an IRGC republic: a security state in which the clerical and civilian institutions provide legitimacy and administrative support while the commanders exercise real power.
This development may help the regime survive the immediate crisis because the IRGC possesses weapons, intelligence networks, economic assets and the Basij militia. But it could also become the regime’s greatest weakness.
When one institution controls national security, foreign policy, major sectors of the economy and domestic repression, it also becomes responsible for every failure.
Will the regime collapse?
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has predicted that the Iranian regime is nearing collapse. He may eventually be proven correct, but predictions of imminent collapse should be treated cautiously.
The Islamic Republic has survived war, sanctions, assassinations, mass demonstrations and repeated economic crises. The IRGC remains armed and organized, while Iran’s opposition remains fragmented and lacks an agreed leadership or transition plan.
External attacks can also produce an unintended result: Iranians who oppose the regime may nevertheless rally around their country when it is attacked. Nationalism should never be confused with support for the rulers.
For these reasons, the regime may not collapse suddenly. Several other outcomes are possible.
The first—and perhaps most likely in the short term—is greater militarization. The IRGC will use the war to justify tighter controls, more arrests, further restrictions on information and harsher treatment of dissent. Iran may retain the title of an Islamic Republic while becoming an increasingly open military-security dictatorship.
The second possibility is a forced compromise. If the economic pressure becomes unbearable and the regime fears nationwide unrest, parts of the leadership may seek an agreement that reopens oil exports and trade. Such a compromise would not necessarily represent moderation. It could simply be a tactical retreat designed to preserve the system.
The third possibility is fragmentation within the ruling establishment. If senior commanders, clerics, businessmen and civilian officials begin blaming one another for military defeats and economic collapse, the appearance of unity could quickly disappear. Authoritarian systems often look strongest immediately before their internal divisions become visible.
The fourth—and most dangerous—possibility is a violent confrontation between the regime and the population. Hunger, fuel shortages, unpaid wages and political repression could bring workers, students, women, merchants and ethnic minorities into the streets at the same time.
The decisive moment would come if members of the security forces refused to fire on demonstrators—or if parts of the regular military decided that they served Iran rather than the IRGC.
The fifth possibility is genuine political transformation. Iran could begin moving away from clerical and military rule toward a government that seeks normal relations with its neighbors, respects its people and uses the country’s enormous natural and human resources for national development.
This would be the best outcome, but it cannot be imposed successfully by Israel or the United States. Iran’s future ultimately belongs to the Iranian people.
The regime’s greatest enemy may be itself
Economic pressure alone does not guarantee revolution. Military defeat alone does not guarantee regime change. Even widespread anger does not guarantee that a divided opposition can create a stable alternative.
But when military pressure, economic collapse, political paralysis and public exhaustion converge, events can become unpredictable.
The greatest threat to the Islamic Republic may therefore not be Netanyahu, Trump or another round of airstrikes.
It may be the moment when millions of Iranians conclude that their government has sacrificed their prosperity, security and future to preserve the power of the Revolutionary Guards and an ideology that has brought Iran permanent confrontation.
Iran’s rulers may survive the external war.
Whether they can survive the internal one is now a far more difficult question.
