Photo illustration – Iran and its regional proxies are creating a chain of pressure from the Strait of Hormuz through Bab el-Mandeb to the Suez Canal—threatening navigation across the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and Mediterranean.
The Houthi advance toward Bab el-Mandeb, drone attacks launched from Iraq against Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline and the unexplained strike at Egypt’s Damietta port reveal a widening threat to every alternative energy route.
By: Ya Libnan Editorial Board, Opinion
The world is watching Iran’s pressure on the Strait of Hormuz. It should also be watching what is happening hundreds of miles to the west.
Iran does not need to close the Suez Canal itself. It only needs its armed partners to demonstrate that every pipeline, port and ship leading to Suez can be attacked.
That danger is no longer theoretical.
Iran-backed Houthi forces have captured the Yemeni port of Mokha, approximately 50 miles from Bab el-Mandeb. They have also reached Perim—also known as Mayun—an island located inside the narrow strait connecting the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea.
These are not ordinary territorial gains in Yemen’s long civil war. They place an Iranian-backed armed movement beside one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s East–West pipeline—the kingdom’s principal alternative to the Strait of Hormuz—was temporarily shut following drone attacks launched from Iraqi territory, where powerful Iran-backed militias operate.
And on July 29, an unidentified drone struck the U.S.-owned gas-storage vessel Energos Winter at Egypt’s Mediterranean port of Damietta. The resulting fire spread to a second gas vessel, Gaslog Salem.
No organization claimed responsibility for the Damietta attack, and no conclusive public evidence has identified the attacker. Iran denied involvement. It would therefore be irresponsible to accuse Hezbollah, an Iraqi militia, the Houthis or Iran itself without proof.
But it would be equally irresponsible to ignore the strategic message.
Damietta is located near the Mediterranean entrance to the Suez Canal. The attack demonstrated that even the northern end of the alternative route around Hormuz could be reached.
Consider the emerging pattern.
Iran pressures shipping through Hormuz. Saudi Arabia moves more oil through its East–West pipeline to the Red Sea. Drones launched from Iraq attack that pipeline. The Houthis advance toward Bab el-Mandeb and threaten Red Sea shipping. An unidentified drone strikes vessels at Damietta near the Mediterranean end of Suez.
We cannot yet prove that every attack was centrally ordered by Tehran. But every attack advances the same strategic objective: making each alternative to Hormuz more dangerous.
Coincidence becomes increasingly difficult to accept when every escape route is threatened in sequence.
Bab el-Mandeb is becoming another Hormuz
Iran has shown that it can use geography to pressure the global economy. The Houthis are now attempting to create similar leverage at Bab el-Mandeb.
Control of Mokha and Perim does not automatically give the Houthis complete control of the strait. International naval forces remain capable of operating there. But these positions could provide bases for missiles, drones, mines, surveillance equipment and small-boat attacks.
The Houthis do not have to sink every ship or formally announce the closure of the waterway. They only have to make passage sufficiently dangerous that shipping companies and insurers withdraw.
That is how a relatively small armed movement can impose enormous costs upon the world.
The danger extends far beyond Saudi Arabia. Europe depends upon trade and energy supplies moving through the Red Sea and Suez. Egypt depends heavily upon Suez Canal revenue. Asian exporters depend upon this shorter route to European markets.
Any sustained disruption forces ships around the Cape of Good Hope, adding transportation time, fuel consumption, insurance costs and inflation.
Create a Red Sea–Suez Defense Command—with Europe at its center
The immediate solution should be the creation of a permanent Red Sea–Suez Defense Command, led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia and supported by European, Gulf and regional partners.
This command should not be another temporary naval coalition assembled after ships have already been attacked. It should be a permanent security organization responsible for protecting the entire commercial corridor from Bab el-Mandeb to the Mediterranean.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia are its natural leaders.
Saudi Arabia depends upon the Red Sea as its principal alternative to Hormuz. Its East–West pipeline carries oil from the eastern fields across the kingdom to Yanbu on the Red Sea.
Oil loaded at Yanbu for Europe travels north toward Suez without passing through Bab el-Mandeb. That means the Houthis cannot block this route merely by occupying positions at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
But Iran’s network appears capable of threatening the route at other points. Drones launched from Iraq have attacked the pipeline carrying the oil to Yanbu. Houthi missiles and drones can threaten Saudi ports and vessels farther north. The Damietta strike demonstrated that ships near the Mediterranean end of Suez are also vulnerable.
Egypt depends upon Suez Canal traffic for revenue, employment and national economic security. It can no longer treat events at Bab el-Mandeb as a distant Yemeni conflict.
But Europe must also assume a central role.
A large share of the oil and gas traveling north through Suez is destined for Europe or Mediterranean markets. European manufacturers and consumers also depend heavily upon the canal for trade with Asia.
When Red Sea shipping becomes unsafe, European vessels must sail around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing transportation time, insurance premiums, fuel costs and consumer prices.
Europe cannot continue treating freedom of navigation in the Red Sea as primarily an American responsibility.
France and Italy possess capable naval forces and maintain important strategic interests throughout the Mediterranean. Greece is one of the world’s leading shipping nations. Germany and other European economies depend upon secure international trade. The European Union has the financial and technical resources to support surveillance, port protection and maritime security.
The Red Sea–Suez Defense Command should include:
- Egypt and Saudi Arabia as permanent co-leaders
- France, Italy, Greece and other willing European maritime powers
- Jordan and participating Gulf states
- Turkey and Pakistan under clearly defined defense obligations
- United States intelligence, satellite and naval support
- Coordination with Yemen’s internationally recognized government
Its mission must extend far beyond escorting individual ships. It should coordinate naval patrols, minesweeping, air and missile defense, satellite surveillance, electronic warfare, drone interception and the protection of ports and energy infrastructure.
It should establish one shared operational picture covering Mokha, Perim, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, Yanbu, the East–West pipeline, Suez, the SUMED pipeline, Damietta and the Mediterranean approaches.
A central command center could be established in Egypt, with a southern operational headquarters near Bab el-Mandeb and a northern headquarters responsible for Suez and the Mediterranean.
Commercial shipping companies should be connected through a permanent warning and convoy-coordination center. When threats rise, vessels should receive protected transit schedules rather than being left to negotiate their own passage or abandon the route.
Europe should help finance this system because Europe will pay an enormous price if the corridor fails. The cost of preventing such a crisis would be considerably smaller than the economic cost of enduring one.
If Europe needs the route, Europe must help defend the route.
The Mecca Defense Pact faces its first test
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Mecca Defense Pact with a promise that an armed attack against one member would be treated as an attack against all.
Saudi Arabia is now under attack. Its cities, energy installations and principal alternative export pipeline have been targeted.
Yet Pakistan says that no military response under the pact has been discussed, while Turkey has offered no visible action equal to the seriousness of the threat.
Pakistan already has military personnel in Saudi Arabia and maintains a long-standing strategic defense relationship with the kingdom. Turkey possesses one of the region’s largest armed forces, a capable navy, sophisticated drones and valuable electronic-warfare technology.
Neither country necessarily needs to invade Yemen. But both must do more than issue statements.
Pakistan could deploy air-defense personnel, naval escorts, minesweepers and surveillance assets. Turkey could provide reconnaissance drones, electronic warfare, naval vessels and missile-defense systems.
Both countries had important relationships with Iran before signing the agreement. They knew those relationships could conflict with their commitments to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia wanted greater security and reduced dependence upon Washington. Pakistan wanted Saudi investment, energy cooperation and defense business. Turkey wanted influence, investment and expanded opportunities for its defense industry.
All three received political benefits from announcing the pact. Now comes the price of credibility.
An alliance cannot collect its benefits during peace and disappear when one of its members comes under attack.
If Turkey and Pakistan will not perform even clearly defined defensive missions while Saudi territory is being attacked, what exactly does their defense pact defend?
President Trump cannot remain a spectator
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asked President Donald Trump for American strikes against the Houthis. Trump declined, although Washington offered intelligence and targeting assistance.
The president may reasonably wish to avoid another open-ended American war in Yemen. But the choice is not limited to invasion or passivity.
The United States can provide satellite intelligence, missile tracking, naval escorts, minesweeping, drone interception and assistance in stopping weapons shipments.
It can help defend international navigation without sending American troops into another ground war.
Freedom of navigation through the Red Sea and Suez is not a favor to Saudi Arabia. It is an American, European and global economic interest.
If the Houthis conclude that Washington, Turkey and Pakistan all prefer restraint while they continue changing conditions on the ground, restraint will invite further aggression rather than prevent it.
Recover Mokha and Perim before they are fortified
The most urgent military objective must be preventing the Houthis from converting Mokha and Perim into permanent missile, drone and surveillance bases.
Yemen’s internationally recognized government should lead a carefully planned operation to recover those positions and the surrounding coastline. Saudi Arabia and its partners should provide intelligence, logistics, surveillance and precisely limited military support.
This cannot become another indiscriminate bombing campaign. Yemen’s civilians have already suffered terribly. Civilian casualties would strengthen Houthi recruitment and destroy the political legitimacy of the operation.
But allowing the Houthis to fortify positions beside Bab el-Mandeb would be equally irresponsible. Removing entrenched missile batteries later will be far more difficult and costly than preventing their installation now.
Iraq must control its own territory
The Iraqi government has confirmed that the recent drone attacks against Saudi Arabia originated from Iraqi territory. It dismissed a military commander responsible for the region from which they were launched.
That is a beginning, but it is not enough.
Baghdad must close militia drone bases, arrest those responsible for cross-border attacks and prevent Iranian weapons from moving through Iraqi territory.
No sovereign state can permit armed factions to launch attacks against neighboring countries and then claim that its government bears no responsibility.
Iraq’s leaders must decide whether their country belongs to the Iraqi people or serves as a launching platform for Iran’s regional wars.
Those responsible should face targeted sanctions, but the Iraqi population should not be punished for the actions of armed factions operating outside state authority.
Make the Saudi pipeline resilient
Saudi Arabia’s 1,200-kilometer East–West pipeline cannot be made completely invulnerable. Its length creates too many possible targets.
It can, however, be made far more resilient through hardened pumping stations, alternative pipeline sections, distributed oil storage, mobile repair teams, replacement equipment, short-range air defenses and continuous surveillance.
The goal should not be to imagine that every drone can be intercepted. The goal should be to ensure that one successful attack cannot shut down the entire system.
Saudi Arabia should also accelerate additional export routes, loading facilities and storage capacity. No country should allow one drone, one missile or one narrow strait to paralyze millions of barrels of daily exports.
End the militias’ protection through deniability
Deniability is one of Iran’s most effective weapons.
An attack comes from the Houthis, an Iraqi militia, Hezbollah or another hidden network. No one claims responsibility. Governments debate attribution. By the time the investigation ends, another target has been struck.
A joint international attribution center should examine every drone’s wreckage, electronic signature, flight path, component serial numbers and communications.
Its findings should be published quickly and supported by evidence.
The purpose is not propaganda. It is to make it harder for armed groups and their sponsors to attack while hiding behind permanent uncertainty.
The Damietta attacker remains unidentified. That fact must be respected. But the absence of a claim does not erase the attack or its strategic effect.
Someone demonstrated that a vessel at the Mediterranean end of the Suez route could be reached. Egypt and its partners must discover how it happened and prevent its repetition.
Interdict weapons—not food
The flow of Iranian missiles, drones, components and targeting equipment to the Houthis and other armed groups must be disrupted.
But Yemen’s civilian population must not be subjected to another broad blockade. Ships carrying food, fuel and medicine should continue under inspection. Vessels carrying weapons should be intercepted, and their cargo should be publicly documented.
Humanitarian suffering should never become a weapon. Besides being morally wrong, collective punishment would strengthen the Houthis politically and provide them with new recruits.
Iran must be offered a choice
Security measures should be accompanied by a clear diplomatic proposal.
Iran should stop supporting attacks against Saudi territory, commercial shipping and regional energy infrastructure. It should end the transfer of missiles and drones to armed groups and respect freedom of navigation through Hormuz and the Red Sea.
In return, regional negotiations, commercial normalization and carefully staged sanctions relief could proceed—but only when matched by verifiable action.
The world has signed enough agreements based upon promises. Any new arrangement must be implemented in stages and enforced through evidence and performance.
Beyond Hormuz: Protect the seas, not merely the straits
In the long term, the Strait of Hormuz may lose much of its importance as additional pipelines are constructed to carry Gulf oil to ports outside the strait.
Saudi Arabia can expand routes to the Red Sea. The United Arab Emirates can increase exports through Fujairah on the Arabian Sea. Other Gulf producers may eventually develop additional pipelines, storage facilities and terminals that reduce their dependence upon Hormuz.
This is precisely why the international community must look beyond the present crisis.
As pipelines gradually weaken Iran’s leverage over Hormuz, Tehran and its armed partners may shift their attention toward the seas through which the bypassed oil must still travel.
Oil loaded at Fujairah must cross the Arabian Sea. Oil loaded at Yanbu for Europe must travel through the Red Sea and Suez. Ships emerging into the Mediterranean must still reach European ports safely.
The strategic contest may therefore move from one narrow waterway to a much larger maritime corridor.
The permanent objective should not be limited to keeping Hormuz open. It should be protecting freedom of navigation across the Arabian Sea, through Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, across the Suez Canal and into the Mediterranean.
Pipelines can bypass geography at one point, but ships must eventually return to the sea.
That is why the proposed Red Sea–Suez Defense Command should eventually become part of a broader Arabian Sea–Mediterranean maritime security system. Its members should share satellite intelligence, coordinate naval patrols, protect energy terminals and respond collectively to attacks against commercial shipping.
The world must stop waiting for each new chokepoint to become a crisis before organizing its defense.
Hormuz may eventually lose its power to hold the world hostage. Iran’s proxies must not be allowed to transfer that power to Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea or the Mediterranean.
Political unity is the missing weapon
Iran’s regional system succeeds by dividing responsibility.
Iran pressures Hormuz. Iraqi militias threaten Saudi Arabia from the north. The Houthis threaten Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Hezbollah can generate instability in Lebanon and the eastern Mediterranean. Unidentified actors can strike ports such as Damietta while leaving no signature behind.
Each incident is treated as a separate crisis. Each government hesitates because attribution is incomplete. Each alliance waits for another member to act.
The response must reverse that strategy.
An attack on any commercial ship, pipeline or port along the Hormuz-to-Suez corridor should be treated as an attack on the security of the entire corridor.
There is still time to prevent Bab el-Mandeb from becoming another Hormuz. But that window is closing.
The Houthis must not be allowed to consolidate their control of Mokha and Perim. Saudi Arabia’s pipeline and Red Sea ports must be protected. Egypt must help defend the waterway upon which the Suez Canal depends. Europe must defend the energy and trade route upon which its economy depends. Turkey and Pakistan must demonstrate that the Mecca Defense Pact is more than a ceremonial promise.
The necessary military capabilities already exist. What is missing is political unity and the determination to act before separate threats become one continuous chain of coercion.
Iran does not need to occupy the Suez Canal.
It only needs the world to believe that every route leading to it is unsafe.
