By: Ya Libnan Editorial Board
A sharp drop in commercial shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—one of the most critical maritime corridors in the world—is fueling fears of a major escalation in the Middle East. The development comes on the heels of a dramatic turn: the United States struck three Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, marking its most direct involvement yet in efforts to halt Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
Iran has responded with defiance, condemning the strikes and declaring that all options are on the table to protect its sovereignty. One of the most concerning of those options is the reported approval by Iran’s parliament to close the Strait of Hormuz—a decision that, if acted upon, would represent an alarming miscalculation and a profound act of self-harm.
The Strait of Hormuz is not just any waterway. It is the artery through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil and petroleum products pass, as well as a fifth of global liquefied natural gas, mostly from Qatar. Even a brief disruption could send energy prices skyrocketing, threaten global inflation, and put a chokehold on international shipping.
But in threatening to close the Strait, Iran is shooting itself in the foot.
Its economy is already on life support—crippled by sanctions, inflation, mismanagement, and capital flight. Oil exports are among the few reliable sources of revenue left. Blocking the Strait would not only disrupt global energy flows—it would cut off Iran’s own economic lifeline. In effect, Tehran would be undermining its already fragile position in a fit of strategic posturing.
Worse yet, Iran risks alienating its most important international partners. China, its largest oil customer, has little patience for disruptions that imperil its own energy security. Tehran may find that its threats will do more than rattle markets—they could fracture its few remaining strategic alliances.
And practically speaking, Iran’s ability to close the Strait is more limited than it once was. In the 1980s, the U.S. responded to similar threats by escorting oil tankers through the waterway. Today, that capability still exists—and regional players like Saudi Arabia have developed alternative pipelines to the Red Sea, capable of diverting millions of barrels per day.
The reality is clear: Iran cannot win this standoff by turning off the tap. Any attempt to weaponize the Strait would only accelerate its own economic collapse and invite overwhelming international backlash. It would not be an act of strength, but of desperation.
The wiser path for Iran is de-escalation, diplomacy, and a long-overdue investment in its own people and economy. Threats to the global oil supply won’t gain it leverage—they’ll deepen its isolation.
Tehran must ask itself: Can it afford to gamble what little stability it has left? Because shutting down Hormuz won’t bring relief or victory—it will only tighten the noose around Iran’s own neck.