By Ya Libnan
File: A Druze lady holds up a sign reading “no to sectarianism, long live a free and unified Syria” at a demonstration in southern Syria’s Druze-majority Suwayda province, 3/1/2025 (Suwayda 24). There is a huge concern that Syria’s strong man Ahmed al Sharaa is planning to expel all minorities in Syria . In Sweida, Sharra’s security forces are reportedly confiscating properties by removing or disturbing the demarcation markings.
Syria’s Druze community is facing one of the most violent internal eruptions in years, with over 40 lives lost in a crisis that has rapidly expanded beyond its origins, drawing in regional actors and unleashing widespread instability from Damascus to Hama.
It began on April 29 in Jaramana, where a fake audio recording went viral. The clip, falsely attributed to a respected Druze sheikh, contained offensive remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. Though Syrian authorities moved swiftly to debunk it, the damage had already been done. Outrage ignited in the streets, and what began as demonstrations soon spiraled into armed clashes between Druze locals and pro-government forces.
The fighting spread quickly to Sahnaya and Ashrafiyat Sahnaya. Gun battles broke out in densely populated neighborhoods, turning residential blocks into combat zones. Families fled as bullets tore through homes and alleyways. Emergency responders struggled to access the wounded, and civilians were caught in the crossfire.
By the following day, the violence had intensified. A convoy of armed Druze from Suwayda attempting to reach the besieged suburbs was ambushed en route. At least 23 were killed. Survivors recounted that some of the fighters were executed after surrendering, an act that has sent shockwaves through the community, fueling fears of sectarian targeting and deepening a sense of collective trauma.
However, this escalation did not emerge in a vacuum. Tensions had already been building since early March when Syrian security forces carried out sweeping arrests in Druze neighborhoods around Damascus.
These arrests sparked immediate backlash. Residents protested, demanding an end to harsh government policies while also calling for greater local autonomy. In response, security forces opened fire, killing at least four civilians and injuring dozens more, according to local monitoring groups.
As local anger deepened, the crisis took on a regional dimension. On May 2, Israeli warplanes launched strikes on multiple targets near Damascus, Daraa, and Hama. Israeli authorities described the campaign as a preemptive move to protect Druze communities from encroaching threats.
The strikes, among the most extensive carried out in 2025, killed one civilian and injured several others. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared the operation a “clear message” to Syria’s transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, pledging to shield the Druze from what he called “sectarian cleansing.”
As part of its broader operation, Israel also evacuated three wounded Druze civilians and fighters to hospitals across the border. The move followed days of protest by Israeli Druze citizens, who demanded immediate intervention to protect their kin in Syria.
Yet even as violence surges, the Druze continues to draw strength from centuries of resilience. For over a thousand years, the community has lived in coexistence across the Levant, maintaining cultural autonomy while navigating waves of political upheaval.
The Druze Across the Middle East
The Druze faith emerged in the early 11th century during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, evolving from Isma’ilism Islam. Specifically, it emerged from an esoteric, batini (or hidden) tradition within Ismaili Islam in Egypt . Over time, it transformed into a distinct belief system, blending Neoplatonism ( a philosophical and religious school of thought that evolved from Platonic philosophy, particularly influenced by the ideas of Plotinus), Gnosticism ( a collection of religious ideas and systems that emerged in the late 1st century AD within early Christian sects, and elements of Abrahamic monotheism ( a grouping of several religions that revere Abraham in their scripture, with the three largest and most influential being Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.) . it has also incorporated elements from a variety of traditions, including Buddhism. Its main tenets assert the unity of God, reincarnation, and the eternity of the soul.
Persecution in the early centuries drove the Druze into rugged highlands—a pattern of isolation that still defines their geography today. Most of the world’s 1.2 million Druze live in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan, while diaspora communities in the Americas and Australia remain closely linked to their ancestral homelands through enduring transnational ties.
Lebanon: A Minority with Major Influence
In Lebanon, the Druze make up only about 5% of the population, roughly 250,000 people, but continue to play an outsized role in national politics. Concentrated in the Chouf Mountains, Aley, and parts of southern Mount Lebanon, the community has left a lasting imprint on the country’s confessional structure and post-war political order.
Lebanon’s constitution officially recognizes eighteen sects, including the Druze, who are allocated eight seats in the 128-member parliament. Though numerically small, this representation reflects a long history of strategic positioning, shaped by military mobilization, shifting alliances, and political endurance.
Druze political life has largely revolved around two rival forces: the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP). The PSP, founded by Kamal Jumblatt, was central to the civil war dynamics between 1975 and 1990. A committed leftist and outspoken Arab nationalist, Jumblatt aligned the party early on with Palestinian factions and and Arab Nationalism. His assassination in 1977 marked a dramatic turn, ushering in the leadership of his son, Walid Jumblatt.
Under Walid, the PSP navigated Lebanon’s post-war landscape and helped shape the March 14 alliance, which advocated for sovereignty and challenged Syria’s presence in the country. Though he has gradually stepped away from frontline politics, Walid’s influence endures. His son, Taymour Jumblatt, now serves in parliament, continuing a legacy that has defined Druze politics for nearly half a century.
In contrast, the LDP has emerged as a more conservative counterbalance, led by Prince Talal Arslan, a descendant of the historic Arslan family. The party champions traditional values and has long aligned itself with al-Assad’s late regime. While it garners less electoral support than the PSP, Arslan remains a significant figure in sectarian negotiations and regional deal-making, providing an alternative Druze perspective in Lebanon’s fragmented political landscape.
Syria: The Largest Druze Population
With a population estimated between 700,000 and 750,000, Syria’s Druze represent the largest Druze community in the world. Most are concentrated in the southern province of Suwayda, while others live near Damascus, in towns like Jaramana and Sahnaya, in Jabel al Summaq in north western Syria and along the Jordanian border.
The Druze community in Syria played an important role in the formation of the modern state of Syria, and even though they are a minority they play an important role in the Syrian political scene.
Druze leader Sultan Pasha al-Atrash who led the Great Syrian Revolt in 1925 against French colonial rule, paving the way for Syria’s independence
The Druze always played a far more important role in Syrian politics than its comparatively small population would suggest. With a community of little more than 100,000 in 1949 or roughly three percent of the Syrian population, the Druze of Syria’s southwestern mountain of Jabal Al Arab (or Jabal el Druze) constituted a potent force in Syrian politics and played a leading role in the nationalist struggle against the French. Under the military leadership of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the Druze provided much of the military force behind the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–27.
In 1945, Amir Hassan al-Atrash, the paramount political leader of the Jabal Druze State, led the Druze military units in a successful revolt against the French, making the Jebel al-Druze the first and only region in Syria to liberate itself from French rule without British assistance. Syria achieved in dependence from the French in 1946
One advisor to the Syrian Defense Department warned in 1946 that the Syrian army was “useless”, and that the Druzes could “take Damascus and capture the present leaders in a breeze.
In June 1967 following the end end of the 6-day Arab Israeli war, former French president Charles de Gaulle was asked to comment about the defeat of the Arabs. He asked did the Druze fight in this war ? And the answer came “no because Hafez al Assad who was Syria’s defense minister at the time withdrew from the Golan Heights to Damascus” . The French president then replied “if the Druze did not fight the Arabs did not lose.”
For much of the 20th century, the Druze were firmly embedded in Syria’s state institutions. Their alignment with the Ba’ath regime was not simply pragmatic, it evolved from a deeper narrative of Arab unity and shared resistance.
The legacy of Sultan al-Atrash, still shapes the community’s collective identity. His prominence as a national figure of defiance bolstered Druze’s integration into the military and civil service, offering both stability and recognition.
However, that stability began to unravel with the onset of the 2011 uprising. As violence escalated and state authority collapsed in peripheral regions, many Druze towns distanced themselves from the main battlefronts. In Suwayda, residents prioritized self-protection over political allegiance. With state forces withdrawing, local defense groups began to take shape, not as rebel factions, but as guardians of a fragile neutrality.
Amid the chaos, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri emerged as a leader of growing influence. Known for his spiritual leadership, al-Hijri , a lawyer offered a voice that resonated across ideological and tribal divides. His sermons, marked by restraint and clarity, helped unify a community that had long avoided confrontation. In the absence of a credible state presence, al-Hijri’s prominence continued to rise quietly but steadily.
Following the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, al-Hijri called for a comprehensive national dialogue under international supervision to establish a transitional government representing all segments of the Syrian society.
File : Ahmed al Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Golani leader dressed as a fighter of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) . He told CNN on December 5: “These sects ( Alwawites, Christians and Druze) have coexisted in this region for hundreds of years, and no one has the right to eliminate them.” Golani has been saying the right things, but they proved to be hollow promises . The minorities have come under attack by Islamic extremists and since he has no army he could not protect them , his failure could shatter Syria if he doesn’t act fast enough to reunite the country
On May 1, Druze community leaders, spiritual authorities and prominent figures in Sweida affirmed that they are an integral part of a united Syria and that they reject any plans for division or separation.
This came in a statement that was published by the Sweida Governorate on its official Telegram channel.
The statement was issued in the name of “the spiritual leadership of the Druze community, its religious authorities, dignitaries and the community at large.”
In their statement, they said: “We affirm our unwavering national stance, passed down to us from our forefathers “: We are an inseparable part of the unified Syrian homeland. Our country is our honor, our Syrianness is our dignity, and love of the homeland is part of faith. We reject division, dismemberment, or separation.”
They stressed their commitment to a Syria that includes all Syrians, free from destructive strife, sectarianism, personal grudges, or tribal vengeance, which they described as legacies of ignorance that were abolished by the Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) and eradicated by Islam.
Israel: Institutional Inclusion and Civil Unease
Roughly 150,000 Druze live in Israel, primarily in Galilee, Mount Carmel, and the occupied Golan Heights. Since a 1956 agreement, Druze men—unlike other Arab citizens—have been subject to mandatory military service.
Over the years, this arrangement has allowed Druze citizens to integrate into Israel’s military, police, and civil administration. Many have advanced to senior positions and have been regularly elected to the Knesset, often through centrist or right-wing parties.
Yet no political faction speaks exclusively for the Druze’s interests. While officials have cited their participation as evidence of coexistence, growing voices within the community are now questioning whether formal representation has translated into meaningful equality.
The 2018 Nation-State Law, defining Israel exclusively as the nation-state of the Jewish people, deepened these doubts. By omitting any reference to equality for non-Jewish citizens, the law sparked unease across Druze-majority towns. The move was widely viewed as a constitutional demotion of their status. That unease gave way to large-scale protests in 2024 and 2025, particularly in Daliyat al-Karmel and Beit Jann, where civil society groups, veterans, and young activists organized rallies demanding full recognition.
Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif, the community’s spiritual authority, has continued engaging with Israeli officials but has increasingly raised concerns in public. In a recent statement, he warned of an “erosion of civil rights,” marking a rare departure from his usual cautious approach, reflecting a growing anxiety among a community long considered a pillar of state loyalty.
Moreover, despite their presence in state institutions, many Druze still face social discrimination, neglected infrastructure, and slow economic growth in their towns. This disconnect between institutional inclusion and daily realities has prompted a deeper reckoning.
More members of the community are now questioning the long-term costs of political and military alignment with the state, particularly as concerns over fairness and identity become more urgent.
Jordan: Quiet Continuity
With an estimated population ranging between 30,000 and 40,000, Jordan’s Druze community is one the smallest religious minorities in the country. According to the Jordanian law , the Druze are classified as Muslims .
The Druze have achieved General officer rank in the military and have served in parliament. As of 2022, there is one Druze cabinet member, foreign minister Ayman Safadi.
Safadi was a member of the Jordanian Senate from September 2016 until his appointment as minister in 2017
Under King Abdullah I, the father of King Hussein, Druze people in Jordan served in the military, primarily within the Arab Army and the Jordan Armed Forces. This military service was part of the broader commitment to the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Extracted from an article in Shafaq.com