Ahmed al Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammad al-Golani leader of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) told CNN on December 5: “These sects ( Alwawites, Christians and Druze) have coexisted in this region for hundreds of years, and no one has the right to eliminate them.” Golani has been saying the right things, but they proved to be hollow promises . The minorities have come under attack by Islamic extremists and since he has no army he could not protect them , his failure could shatter Syria if he doesn’t act fast enough to reunite the country
By Maher Al khatib
Regardless of how the ongoing crisis with the Druze community unfolds, one thing is clear: interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa has squandered the opportunity to preserve the country’s unity. This failure stems largely from the transgressions of armed factions affiliated with him. While Sharaa has repeatedly attempted to distance himself from these actions—portraying the official authorities as protectors of Syria’s diverse sectarian and ethnic components—his subsequent efforts to broker agreements only underscore his lack of control.
In light of this, the positions adopted by Syria’s minority communities today—particularly their calls for international protection—should be understood as a response to this erosion of confidence. Few now believe that Sharaa is capable of guaranteeing their safety, especially as he has proven unable to rein in factions responsible for atrocities and as sectarian rhetoric intensifies at an alarming rate.
According to sources cited by Al-Nashra, following the massacres on the Syrian coast in March, Sharaa attempted to frame the situation as a coup attempt driven by Iran and remnants of the former regime. He did so in the presence of several regional and international actors, a move that succeeded in temporarily softening their reactions. Still, this narrative holds little weight in the face of the current Druze crisis.
These same sources explain that Sharaa’s controversial rise to power—despite his known associations with terrorist groups—was initially justified on the belief that he could at least maintain a minimum level of stability. His appointment was seen as part of a broader strategy to reduce Iranian influence in the region, especially in the wake of events triggered by the October 7, 2023, regional upheaval.
However, discussions are now reportedly taking place within influential circles about whether it is viable to continue with the current political formula. While no viable alternative has yet emerged, it is increasingly apparent that maintaining the status quo will only deepen Syria’s instability and heighten security threats. Those who supported or enabled Sharaa’s rise may ultimately be held responsible for the consequences.
Crucially, the ongoing violations against minority communities have undermined any efforts by Sharaa to open a channel of dialogue with Washington. The United States continues to treat the Syrian government as a test case, demanding concrete concessions—particularly concerning its relationship with Israel. But even such concessions may not be enough to secure international legitimacy.
Informed political circles also told Al-Nashra that the recent Israeli airstrike near the Presidential Palace cannot be interpreted solely as an act to protect the Druze community, as is being publicly suggested. Rather, it reflects Israel’s broader security concerns about the situation in southern Syria. Regardless of Syria’s internal dynamics, Tel Aviv has made it clear that it will not tolerate any future threats along its border.
In this context, it is perplexing that some figures close to Sharaa continue to promote the idea that his removal from power would endanger regional security—a notion he himself hinted at in a past interview. According to political analysts, this narrative does not bolster his legitimacy; on the contrary, it amplifies doubts about his future conduct and intentions. They maintain that Sharaa has thus far failed to implement any meaningful internal reforms that could improve his standing.
Ultimately, these observers conclude that Sharaa’s ability to maneuver domestically is severely weakened. His hold on power cannot be sustained without major concessions—not only in relation to Israel but also regarding the structure of the regime itself. Furthermore, his increasingly strained relationship with allied factions may pose an additional risk. Some suggest that those who helped facilitate his rise may have done so precisely to reach this point: to compel Syria toward normalization with Israel and the acceptance of separatist solutions.
El/ Nashar translated from Arabic/ Ya Libnan