Houthis suffer first serious setback in south Yemen fighting

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OPERATION DECISIVE STORMLocal Sunni Muslim militia ejected Shi’ite Houthi rebels from much of the southern Yemeni city of Dalea on Monday, residents and combatants said, inflicting the first significant setback on the Iranian-backed rebels in two months of civil war.

Dalea had been a bastion of southern secessionists in Yemen before the Houthis took widespread control of the city in arch, after having seized the capital Sanaa in the north in September, toppling President Abd-Rabbu Mansour, and then thrust into the center and south of the Arabian Peninsula country.

After two months of fighting in which much of Dalea has been destroyed, Sunni fighters on Monday turned the tide by seizing a key military base and the main security directorate in the city, militia sources and local residents said. Twelve Sunni fighters and 40 Houthi rebels were killed, they said.

“In intense fighting lasting from dawn until this afternoon, the southern resistance succeeded in cleansing our city of Houthi elements,” a front-line militiaman told Reuters.

Eyewitnesses said local forces in Dalea, which has an estimated population of 90,000, were backed by weeks of air strikes on Houthi positions as well as weapons drops which intensified in recent days.

A Saudi-led coalition has been bombing the Houthis and allied loyalists of ex-president Ali Abdullah Saleh for two months while backing Sunni combatants along a jumbled series of battlefronts.

Followers of the Houthi movement attend a gathering to show support to the movement outside the Presidential Palace in Sanaa February 4, 2015. The banner reads: ''Allah is the greatest. Death to America. Death to Israel. A curse on the Jews. Victory to Islam''.
Followers of the Houthi movement attend a gathering to show support to the movement outside the Presidential Palace in Sanaa February 4, 2015. The banner reads: ”Allah is the greatest. Death to America. Death to Israel. A curse on the Jews. Victory to Islam”.
The Houthis, however, appear to remain the strongest faction in the civil war, retaining the edge in the main contested regions of central and south Yemen. The Houthis say they are fighting to root out corrupt officials and Sunni militants.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil exporter bordering Yemen to the north, and fellow Gulf Arabs worry that the Shi’ite Muslim Houthi movement’s allegiance to Iran will give the Islamic Republic a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula.

In the southern city of Taiz, residents said Houthi fighters pushed back Sunni tribal and Islamist militiamen in heavy street combat, and that shelling hit a fuel storage tank which set off an explosion, killing 10 people.

With ground combat worsening, a Yemeni official said U.N.-sponsored peace talks set to be held in Geneva on May 28 had been postponed.

Yemen’s exiled government in Saudi Arabia led by Hadi has demanded the Houthis recognize its authority and withdraw from Yemen’s main cities — two points demanded by a U.N. Security Council resolution last month.

“The Geneva meeting has been indefinitely postponed because the Houthis did not indicate their commitment to implement the Security Council resolution,” Sultan al-Atwani, an aide to Hadi, told Reuters by telephone from Riyadh.

“Also, what is happening on ground — the attacks on Aden, Taiz, Dalea and Shabwa makes it difficult to go to Geneva,” he added, naming southern provinces that have become war zones.

Ahmad Fawzi, a U.N. spokesman in Geneva, said he could not confirm the reports of a delay to talks, saying that plans were still under way for negotiations to start on Thursday.

REUTERS

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25 responses to “Houthis suffer first serious setback in south Yemen fighting”

  1. wargame1 Avatar
    wargame1

    Great development.

    1. Hannibal Avatar
      Hannibal

      Bigot…

        1. MaImequer0 Avatar
          MaImequer0

          ‘cousins’ do with you sweetie??? lol☻ you must be sore….

      1. wargame1 Avatar
        wargame1

        Bashar al Assad .. the leader of all terrorist has been caught red handed by the lebanese government for his bloody hands into the killing of Politicians, religious leaders and people. Ali Mamluk who has been coming into the spot light lately, Assad’s right hand man made a deal with Michelle Samaha in lebanon to take out politicians using TNT. The deal came directly implicating ASSAD and Mamluk. Bigot is your Dad. Now watch it

        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=93JpKK6iBmE

        1. Hannibal Avatar
          Hannibal

          You’re still a bigot… and you know it.

        2. Hannibal Avatar
          Hannibal

          The problem is that you do not really honestly READ what I write. I am not and was never a fan of the Assads (father and son)… I fought them and battled their soldiers in the 100 days war when you were still suckling on your mother’s milk.

        3. Who are Druze?

          A brief look at the beliefs of the Druze:

          The Druze originated as a secret sect among the esoteric (baatini) groups that appear outwardly to be Muslim and who sometimes pretend to be religious, ascetic and pious. They make an outward show of false pride in religion, pretending to be various kinds of Shi’ahs, Sufis and lovers of Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him)). They claim to carry the banner of peace and reconciliation amongst people, and they talk about uniting people in order to deceive them and lead them astray from their religion. When the opportunity arises, when they become stronger and find supporters among the ruling classes, they show their true colours and proclaim their real beliefs and aims, and they start to promote evil and corruption, and try to destroy religious teachings, sound beliefs and morals.

          This is clear to anyone who studies their history and follows their progress from the day the Jew ‘Abd-Allaah ibn Saba’ lay the foundations and planted the seed, a legacy which has been handed down from one generation to another, as they have tried hard to implement these principles, and this has continued until the present day.

          Although the Druze are one of these esoteric groups, they have their own characteristics as regards their origins and the time when they emerged, and the circumstances which helped them to become established. We will mention some brief details concerning that and the rulings of the scholars concerning them.

          1 – The Druze are named after Durzi, whose full name was Abu ‘Abd-Allaah Muhammad ibn Ismaa’eel al-Durzi. His name is also given as ‘Abd-Allaah al-Durzi and Durzi ibn Muhammad. It was said that Muhammad ibn Ismaa’eel al-Durzi was Tashtakeen or Hashtakeen al-Durzi. It was also said that they are named after Tayrooz, a city in Persia. Al-Zubaydi narrated that the correct form of the name is Darzi, based on the phrase “awlaad darzah” meaning those who are base and vile.

          2 – Muhammad ibn Ismaa’eel al-Durzi appeared at the time of al-Haakim bi Amrihi, Abu ‘Ali al-Mansoor ibn al-‘Azeez, one of the ‘Ubaydi kings (known in the west as Fatimids) who ruled Egypt for nearly two hundred years and who falsely claimed to be descended from the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) though Faatimah (may Allaah be pleased with her).

          Muhammad ibn Ismaa’eel al-Durzi was originally a follower of the esoteric Ismaili sect who claim to be the followers of Muhammad ibn Isma’eel ibn Ja’far al-Saadiq. Then he left this group and contacted the ‘Ubaydi al-Haakim, approving of his claim to divinity, and he called the people to worship him alone. He claimed that God had become incarnate in ‘Ali ibn Abi Taalib, and that the soul of ‘Ali has migrated to his sons one after another, until it reached al-Haakim. Al-Haakim gave him authority in Egypt so that the people would obey him in his call. When his true intentions became clear, the Muslims in Egypt rebelled against him and killed some of his supporters. When they wanted to kill him, he escaped and fled to al-Haakim, who gave him some money and told him to go to Syria to spread his call there. So he went there and stopped in Waadi Taym-Allaah ibn Tha’labah, to the west of Damascus, where he called them to deify al-Haakim and spread the principles of the Druze among them, and distributed money to them, and they responded to his call.

          Another man also spread the call of the deification of al-Haakim, a Persian man whose name was Hamzah ibn ‘Ali ibn Ahmad al-Haakimi al-Durzi, one of the leading baatinis. He had contacted the leaders of the secret call of al-Haakim’s party, and he called for his deification in secret until he became one of their main leaders. Then he proclaimed that openly and claimed that he was the messenger of al-Haakim, and al-Haakim supported him in that. When al-Haakim died and was succeeded by his son who was known as Al-Zaahir li I’zaaz Deen Allaah (the supporter of the religion of Allaah), and he disavowed himself of his father’s claim to divinity, this call was chased out of Egypt. Hamzah fled to Syria and was followed by some of those who had responded to his call. Most of them settled in the region that later came to be known as Jebel el Druze in Syria.

          Their principles are as follows:

          (a) Incarnation. They believe that Allaah was incarnated in ‘Ali (may Allaah be pleased with him), then in his sons after him, one after another, until He was incarnated in the Faatimid al-Haakim Abu ‘Ali al-Mansoor ibn al-‘Azeez. They believe that al-Haakim will return and that he disappears and reappears.

          (b) Dissimulation (taqiyah) – i.e., hypocrisy and concealment. They do not tell anyone their real beliefs except those who are of their number. Indeed they do not disclose their secrets to anyone except those whom they trust from among their own group.

          (c) Infallibility of their imams. They think that their imams are infallible and protected from sin. Indeed, they deified them and worshipped them instead of Allaah, as they did with al-Haakim.

          (d) Esotericism (baatiniyyah). They claim that the texts of sharee’ah have an esoteric or secret meaning other than the apparent meaning. They based their heresy concerning the texts on this, and distorted the meanings of the reports, commands and prohibitions.

          With regard to their heresy concerning the reports, they deny the perfect attributes of Allaah and they deny the Day of Resurrection with its reckoning and recompense of Paradise and Hell. They replaced that with something that they call the transmigration of souls, the belief that the soul of a person or animal moves, when he or it dies, to the body of another person or animal when he or it is born, to dwell therein being either blessed or tormented. They believe that the universe is eternal and is no more than wombs giving birth and the earth swallowing the bodies of the deceased (i.e., a never-ending cycle of birth and death). They do not believe in the angels or the message of the Prophets, and they follow the philosophers who followed their own whims and desires and the principles and theories of Aristotle.

          With regard to their heresy concerning the texts which stipulate commands and prohibitions, they distort them. They say that salaah (prayer) really means knowledge of their secrets, not the five daily prayers; siyaam (fasting) means concealing their secrets, not refraining from things that break the fast from dawn until sunset; and that Hajj (pilgrimage) means visiting the shaykhs whom they venerate. They regard immoral actions, both outward and inward, as permissible, and they allow marriage to daughters and mothers, and other kinds of tinkering with the texts and denying things that are clearly known to be the laws of Allaah that He has enjoined upon His slaves. Hence Abu Haamid al-Ghazaali and others said concerning them: outwardly their madhhab is Raafidi (Shi’ism) but inwardly it is pure kufr.

          (e) Hypocrisy and deceit in their call. They make an outward display of being Shi’ah and of loving Ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s household) to those whom they call. When they respond to them, they call them to Shi’ism and openly criticize the Sahaabah and slander them. If they accept that then they disclose to them the alleged faults of ‘Ali and slander him. If they accept that, then they go on to slander the Prophets and say that they have secrets that go against the message to which they called their nations; they say that they were smart and devised new laws for their nations for them to achieve worldly interests, and so on.

          Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah was asked about how the Druze and Nusairis should be judged. He replied:

          These Druze and Nusairis are kaafirs, according to the consensus of the Muslims. It is not permissible to eat the meat they slaughter, or to marry their womenfolk. They do not agree to pay the jizyah, so they are apostates from the religion of Islam and are not Muslims, nor are they Jews or Christians. They do not agree that the five daily prayers are obligatory, or that fasting Ramadaan is obligatory, or that Hajj is obligatory. They do not regard as haraam that which Allaah and His Messenger have forbidden of dead meat or wine, etc. Even if they pronounce the Shahaadatayn, with these beliefs they are kaafirs according to the consensus of the Muslims. As for the Nusairis, they are the followers of Abu Shu’ayb Muhammad ibn Naseer, who was one of the extremists who say that ‘Ali is a god, and they recite these words:

          “I bear witness that there is no god except Haidar [i.e., ‘Ali],

          and no screen covering him except Muhammad, the honest and trustworthy one,

          and there is no way to him except through Salmaan the all-powerful.”

          Haidar is a title given to ‘Ali ibn Abi Taalib (may Allaah be pleased with him).

          With regard to the Druze, the followers of Hashtakeen al-Durzi, who was one of the freed slaves of al-Haakim whom he sent to the people of Wadi Taym-Allaah ibn Tha’labah and he called them to believe in the divinity of al-Haakim and they call him “the creator, the all-knowing”, and swear by him, they are among the Ismailis who believe that Muhammad ibn Isma’eel abrogated the law of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd-Allaah. They are worse kaafirs than many other extremist groups. They believe that this universe has no creator and they deny the resurrection and the duties and prohibitions of Islam. They are among the esoteric Qarmatians (al-Qaraamitah) who are worse kaafirs than the Jews, Christians and mushrik Arabs. Basically they follow the philosophy of Aristotle and his ilk, or the Magians. Their ideas are a mixture of Magian philosophy but they make an outward, hypocritical display of being Shi’ah. And Allaah knows best.

          Shaykh al-Islam also said, refuting the ideas of some sects of Druze:

          The fact that these groups are kaafirs is something concerning which there is no dispute among the Muslims. Rather whoever doubts that they are kaafirs is a kaafir like them. They do not have a status like that of the People of the Book or of the mushrikeen, rather they are misguided kaafirs and it is not permissible to eat their food, their women may be taken captive and their wealth may be confiscated. They are heretics and apostates whose repentance cannot be accepted, rather they should be killed wherever they are found, and they may be cursed because of what they are. It is not permissible to employ them as guards and gatekeepers. Their scholars and leaders must be killed, lest they lead others astray. It is haraam to sleep with them in their houses or to be friends with them, or to walk with them or to attend their funerals, if their death is announced. It is haraam for the Muslim authorities to neglect to carry out the hadd punishment that Allaah has enjoined by whatever means they see fit. And Allaah is the One Whose help we seek and in Whom we put our trust.

        4. Who are Nusayris?

          Bashaar Al-Assad, His Nusayri Sect and their Murderous Forefathers

          Suprised at the slaughter of Muslims at the hands of Bashaar Al-Assad and his regime? Don’t be. Shaykh-ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah hundreds of years ago explained exactly why the cult he and his cronies belong to i.e. the ‘Nusayriyyah’ are so treacherous, deceptive and dangerous. He writes,
          “These people named “Al-Nusayriyyah”, and other groups from among the Qaraamitah and Baatiniyyah, are greater disbelievers than the Jews and Christians. Nay, they are greater disbelievers than most of the mushrikeen (polytheists from other than Ahl ul-Kitab), and their harm to the Ummah of Muhammad, sallallahu alaihi wa sallam, is greater than the harm of the disbelievers who are in war with Muslims, such as at-Tatar, disbelieving Europeans and others.
          For they present themselves in front of ignorant Muslims as supporters and advocates of Ahl ul Bayt, while in reality they do not believe in Allaah, or the Messenger, or the Book, or [Allaah’s] orders, or prohibitions, or reward, or punishment, or Paradise, or Fire, or in one of the Messengers before Muhammad, sallallahu `alaihi wa sallam, or in a religion from among previous religions. Rather, they take the words of Allaah and His Messenger, known to the scholars of Muslims, and they interpret them based on their fabrications, claiming that their interpretations are “hidden knowledge (“ilm `ul-baatin”), such as what the questioner mentioned and more. They have no limit in their unbelief with regards to Allaah’s Names, His verses, and their distortion of the Speech of Allaah, the Most High, and His Messenger from their proper places [usages]. Their aim is repudiation of Islaamic Beliefs and Laws in every possible way, trying to make it appear that these matters have realities that they know, like those mentioned by the questioner and others, such as that “five prayers” means knowledge of their secrets, “obligatory fast” hiding of their secrets, and “pilgrimage to Bayt al-`Atiq” visit to their sheikhs, and that the two hands of Abu Lahab represent Abu Bakr and Umar, and that “the great news and the manifest imaam” (an naba’ul `adheem wal imaamul mubin) is `Ali ibn Abi Talib.
          There are well known incidents and books they have written with regards to their enmity to Islaam and its people. When they have an opportunity, they spill the blood of Muslims, such as when they once killed pilgrims and threw them into the well of Zamzam. Once they took the black stone and it stayed with them for a period of time, and they have killed so many Muslim scholars and elders that only Allaah knows their number. They wrote many books, such as what the questioner mentioned, and others.
          Muslim scholars have written books, unveiling their secrets, exposing their veils, explaining what they are upon from disbelief, infidelity and atheism, by which they are greater disbelievers than the Jews, Christians, and Indian idol-worshipping Brahmans.
          What the questioner mentioned as their description is a little from a great deal that is known to the scholars regarding their characteristics. It is known to us that the coast of Sham was only taken over by the Christians from their (Nusayri) side. And also that they are always on the side of every enemy against Muslims, so [you find that] they are with Christians against Muslims.
          From the greatest afflictions that have befallen them are Muslims’ opening conquest of the coast (of Sham) and defeat of the Christians. Nay, one of the greatest afflictions that has befallen them is Muslims’ victory over Tatar, and from the greatest holidays for them is the Christians conquest – and refuge is sought with Allaah the Most High – of Muslim ports.
          They don’t admit that this world has a Creator that created it, or that He has a religion that he orders with, or that He has a place with which He will reward people for their deeds, other than this place (in this world).
          [Majmoo` al-Faatwaa 35/145]

          It’s all about history people. The ancestors of Bashaar Al-Assad and his cronies’ Nusayri sect, the “Qaraamitah” were just as filthy, heretical, disbelieving and aggressive as his offspring in Syria are today. They were a Shi’a (obviously) Isma’eeli offshoot in the Bahrain area (where ironically much of their modern day majoosi offspring are spreading their fitnah). They claimed to have found their long awaited Mahdi in the form of a Persian prisoner who once amongst them, re-instituted the majoosi ritual of Fire-worshipping, changing their Qiblah from Makkah to the ancient Zoroastrian fire in Persia. Although initially outwardly professing Shiaism, they eventually revealed their true atheism, mocking Islamic rites and attacking hujjaj. This culminated in their famous attack on Masjid Haram, in Makkah in 317h during the Hajj where they slaughtered 30,000 pilgrims, dumped their bodies in the well of Zam Zam and stole the black stone from the Ka’bah and then made off with it back to their stronghold in Bahrain. Most people don’t know about this incident. Such was the weakened state of the Muslims (it’s not something limited to our time today) that the Qaraamitah kept the black stone in their position for 22 years until eventually the Abbasid Khalifah had to pay to get it back! Much of these anti-Islamic fitan and killing throughout the history and even today is traced back to the rotten legacy of the Shi’a and their false cult.
          —-
          Following on from the post below, in true Bashaar Nusayri style, when the leader of the Qaraamitah Abu Taahir Al-Jannaabi oversaw the murdering of pilgrims inside the Haram (it was the 8th of Dhul Hijjah), he sat at the door of the Ka’bah and mockingly proclaimed
          أنا بالله وبالله أنا – يخلق الخلق وأفنيهم أنا
          “I am with Allah and Allah is with me – The Creator created (them) and I am ending (them)”.
          Al-Jannaabi then ordered one of his men to pull out the black stone from the Ka’bah. The man struck it with his sword, proudly reciting verses of kufri poetry as he did so saying,
          أين الطير الأبابيل – أين الحجارة من سجيل؟
          “Where are the flocks of birds? – Where are the stones of baked clay?” (In reference to Abraha’s destruction). A direct challenge to Allah and mockery of His House.
          As the Qaraamitah left Makkah, they recited once more,
          فلو كان هذا البيت لله ربنا – لصب علينا النار من فوقنا صبًا
          لأنا حججنا حجة جاهلية – محللة لم تبق شرقًا ولا غربًا
          وإنا تركنا بين زمزم والصفا -جنائز لا تبغي سوى ربها ربًا
          “Had this house (Al-Haram) truly been of Allah, our Lord – Surely He would have cast down fire from above us, a fearful casting!
          For indeed we came as pilgrims on a pilgrimage borne of ignorance – legitimised (by us), unfounded from east to west!
          Thus we have left behind between ZamZam and Mount Safa – (a multitude of) funerals, who sought none as their lord except the Lord [thus they were killed, for worshipping Allah]
          Once again we see stark similarities between Bashaar Al-Assad An-Nusayri and the kufr his cronies openly declare on television in front of the people as well as his forces and the mockery of Islam, with his Qaraamitah forefathers who were open with their kufr and mockery of the Deen such that they attacked the very house of Allah and His worshippers. May Allah rid us of Bashaar, the remnant of a long lasting disease within this ummah that has used the cloak of Islam to hide it’s true anti-Islam agenda.

          Ruling on the Nusayri/Alawi Sect

          What follows is Imam ibn Taymiyyah’s, may Allah have mercy on him, answer to a question posed to him about the sect called an-Nusayriyyah (in English they are also known as Alawis/Alawite sect).

          The question is very long, as it mentions many Nusayri beliefs and practices, and most of it is not translated for the sake of brevity.

          Those who want to see the question in full, they can refer to Ibn Taymiyyah’s Fatawa 35/145. In summary, the questioner mentioned, among other things their legalization of intoxicants, belief in reincarnation; disbelief in resurrection, Paradise and Hellfire; belief that “Five Prayers” (as-Salawat al-Khams) is an expression referring to five names: “`Ali, Hasan, Husayn, Muhsin and Fatimah”, and that mentioning these five names suffices one instead of making ghusl from major impurity, or ablution, or fulfilling other conditions and obligatory actions of the five daily prayers; that `Ali is the creator of the heavens and the earth, and that he is their god in heavens and imam on the earth etc.

          What follows is the end of the question and Ibn Tayiyyah’s answer.

          Question:

          “…Is it permissible for a Muslim (man or woman) to marry them (Nusayris)? Is it permissible to eat the meat of cattle they slaughter? What is the ruling on eating the cheese made from the rennet of their sacrificed animals? What is the ruling on using their dishes and clothes? Is it permissible to bury them with Muslims? Is it permissible to employ them in Muslim ports and handing the ports over to them? Or is it obligatory upon the ruler to cut them off and employ others from among qualified Muslim men; and is there a sin in delaying their explusion?”

          Answer:

          All Praise is for Allah, Lord of all worlds. These people named “Al-Nusayriyyah”, and other groups from among the Qaraamitah and Baatiniyyah, are greater disbelievers than the Jews and Christians. Nay, they are greater disbelievers than most of the mushrikeen (polytheists from other than Ahl ul-Kitab), and their harm to the Ummah of Muhammad, sallallahu alaihi wa sallam, is greater than the harm of the disbelievers who are in war with Muslims, such as at-Tatar, disbelieving Europeans and others.

          For they present themselves in front of ignorant Muslims as supporters and advocates of Ahl ul Bayt, while in reality they do not believe in Allah, or the Messenger, or the Book, or [Allah’s] orders, or prohibitions, or reward, or punishment, or Paradise, or Fire, or in one of the Messengers before Muhammad, sallallahu `alaihi wa sallam, or in a religion from among previous religions. Rather, they take the words of Allah and His Messenger, known to the scholars of Muslims, and they interpret them based on their fabrications, claiming that their interpretations are “hidden knowledge (“ilm `ul-baatin”), such as what the questioner mentioned and more. They have no limit in their unbelief with regards to Allah’s Names, His verses, and their distortion of the Speech of Allah, the Most High, and His Messenger from their proper places [usages]. Their aim is repudiation of Islamic Beliefs and Laws in every possible way, trying to make it appear that these matters have realities that they know, like those mentioned by the questioner and others, such as that “five prayers” means knowledge of their secrets, “obligatory fast” hiding of their secrets, and “pilgrimage to Bayt al-`Atiq” visit to their shaikhs, and that the two hands of Abu Lahab represent Abu Bakr and Umar, and that “the great news and the manifest imam” (an naba’ul `adheem wal imaamul mubin) is `Ali ibn Abi Talib.

          There are well known incidents and books they have written with regards to their enmity to Islam and its people. When they have an opportunity, they spill the blood of Muslims, such as when they once killed pilgrims and threw them into the well of Zamzam. Once they took the black stone and it stayed with them for a period of time, and they have killed so many Muslim scholars and elders that only Allah knows their number. They wrote many books, such as what the questioner mentioned, and others.

          Muslim scholars have written books, unveiling their secrets, exposing their veils, explaining what they are upon from disbelief, infidelity and atheism, by which they are greater disbelievers than the Jews, Christians, and Indian idol-worshipping Brahmans.

          What the questioner mentioned as their description is a little from a great deal that is known to the scholars regarding their characteristics. It is known to us that the coast of Sham was only taken over by the Christians from their (Nusayri) side. And also that they are always on the side of every enemy against Muslims, so [you find that] they are with Christians against Muslims.

          From the greatest afflictions that have befallen them are Muslims’ opening conquest of the coast (of Sham) and defeat of the Christians. Nay, one of the greatest afflictions that has befallen them is Muslims’ victory over Tatar, and from the greatest holidays for them is the Christians conquest – and refuge is sought with Allah the Most High – of Muslim ports.

          They don’t admit that this world has a Creator that created it, or that He has a religion that he orders with, or that He has a place with which He will reward people for their deeds, other than this place (in this world).

          [Majmoo` al-Faatwaa 35/145]

          1. wargame1 Avatar
            wargame1

            Great information. Thank you

        5. Who are Rafidah/Rawafidh/Shias?

          THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME RAFIDAH (shias) AND THEIR CRITICISM FROM SALAAF
          THE ORIGIN OF THE TITLE GIVEN TO MODERN DAY SHIA’AS I.e “RAFIDAH OR RAWAFIDH ”

          The word Raafidah means “rejecter”, the Rawaafidh (all modern day shia’as and majority of the ancestral shias) have obtained their name by their rejection of Zayd ibn ‘Alee ibn al-Hussayn ibn Alee ibn Abee Taalib, the great grandson of ‘Alee.

          Imaam adh-Dhahabee said in his Siyaar A’laam an-Nubalaa (5/390):

          قال عيسى بن يونس جاءت الرافضة زيدا فقالوا تبرأ من أبي بكر وعمر حتى
          ننصرك قال بل أتولاهما قالوا إذا نرفضك فمن ثم قيل لهم الرافضة

          “ ‘Eesaa bin Yoonus said: The Raafidah came to Zayd ibn `Alee and said to him, “Free yourself from Abee Bakr and ‘Umar so that we can aid you.”He replied, “Rather I will give allegiance to them (i.e. Aboo Bakr and ‘Umar).” They said, “Then we reject you.” So then it was said to them, “ar-Raafidah” (the rejecters).”

          Shaykh al-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah mentioned in his Majmoo’ al-Fataawa (4/435):

          قيل للإمام أحمد : من الرافضي ؟ قال : الذي يسب أبا بكر وعمر . وﺑﻬذا سميت الرافضة، فإﻧﻬم رفضوا زيد بن علي لما تولى الخليفتين أبا بكر وعمر، لبغضهم لهما، فالمبغض لهما هو الرافضي، وقيل : إنما سموا رافضة لرفضهم أبا بكر وعمر

          “It was said to Imaam Ahmad: “Who is the Raafidhee?” He said: “Those who insult Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. And by this they were named the Raafidah, for they rejected Zayd bin ‘Alee when he gave allegiance to the two Khaleefah’s Abaa Bakr and ‘Umar,
          (so they rejected him) because of their hatred for them. And the one who hates them (i.e. Aboo Bakr and ‘Umar) is a Raafidhee.” And they were named as the Raafidhah because of their rejection of Abaa Bakr and ‘Umar.”

          He then said:

          وأصل الرفض من المنافقين الزنادقة، فإنه ابتدعه ابن سبأ الزنديق

          “And the foundation of rejection is from the hypocrites and the heretics, for they followed the innovation of the heretic Ibn Saba’. ”

          He also said in volume 28 on page 483:

          وقد ذكر أهل العلم أن مبدأ الرفض إنما كان من الزنديق عبد الله بن سبأ؛ فإنه أظهر الإسلام وأبطن اليهودية، وطلب أن يفسد الإسلام، كما فعل بولص النصرانى، الذى كان يهوديا فى إفساد دين النصارى

          “And the people of knowledge have mentioned that the beginning of the Rafdh (rejection) is from the Heretic (Zindeeq) ‘Abdullaah bin Saba’; for he manifested Islaam and while he hid his Judaism and he sought to cause corruption in Islaam just
          like Paul the Christian, who was a Jew who caused corruption in the religion of the Christians.”

          Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah also said :
          From the time of the revolt of Zaid, the Shi’ah were divided into Raafidah and Zaidiyyah, and when he (Zaid) was asked about Abu Bakr and ‘Umar he invoked mercy upon them both, a people rejected him (rafadahu), and he said to them, “You have rejected me (rafadtumoonee)”. So they were called “ar-Raafidah”, due to their rejection of him. And anyone who did not reject him from amongst the Shi’ah was called a “Zaidiyy” due to their ascription to him.

          [Ref: Minhaaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah of Shaykh ul-Islaam Ibn Taymiyyah 1/35; Translated by Abu `Iyaad Amjad Rafiq]

          So the foundation of the Raafidhee belief is found in this man, ‘Abdullaah bin Saba

          Note: this Man ‘Abdullah ibn Saba is the founding father of Shi’ism, i.e the man who originated the fitnah and fasaad during the time of Uthman (r.a). He was originally a Jew disguised as a Muslim i.e pretending to be a Muslim, but he wanted to avenge himself and his family and etc by breaking the Ummah from within. There are tons of literature work on him, which will be converted here to docs soon if time permits bi-idhnillah

          Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalaanee said in his Leesaanul Meezaan:

          عبد الله بن سبا من غلاة الزنادقة ضال مضل

          “Abdullaah bin Saba’ from the extremists of the heretics, deviated and deviates others.”

          Ibn Abil ‘Izz al-Hanafee mentioned in his Sharh ‘Aqeedatut Tahaawiyyah on page
          490:أصل الرفض إنما أحدثه منافق زنديق ، قصده إبطال دين الإسلام ، والقدح في الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم ، كما ذكر ذلك العلماء . فإن عبدالله بن سبأ لما أظهر الإسلام ، أراد أن يفسد دين الإسلام بمكره وخبثه ، كما فعل بولس بدين النصرانية ، فأظهر التنسك ، ثم أظهر الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر ، حتى سعى في فتنة عثمان وقتله ، ثم لما قدم علي الكوفة أظهر الغلو في علي والنصر له ، ليتمكن بذلك من أغراضه ، وبلغ ذلك عليًا ، فطلب قتله ، فهرب منه إلى قرقيس وخبره معروف في التاريخ

          “The foundations of Rafdh (rejection) came to begin from a heretic and hypocrite who intended to bring falsehood into the religion of Islaam and to bring insult to the Messenger ( صلى لله عليه وسلم ) as the scholars have mentioned. For indeed, Abdullaah
          bin Saba’ when he manifested Islaam, he sought to cause corruption in the religion of
          Islaam by plotting and vileness just as what Paul did with the Christian religion. First he manifested piety and then manifested enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, until he was involved in the Fitnah of ‘Uthmaan and his killing. Then when he entered Koofah he manifested extremism for ‘Alee and supporting him to gain from it
          necessities and this was made clear to ‘Alee so he sought his killing and fought him to
          Qarqees and the narrations of that are known in History.”

          Thus from this man (Abdullaah bin Saba’) whom Ahlus Sunnah has criticized; stemmed this group known as the Rawaafidh Shee’ah.

          Ibn Hajar al-Haythamee mentioned in his Majma’ az-Zawaa’id (10/22) the narration of Ibn ‘Abbaas which was reported by at-Tabaraanee with a Hasan chain of narration (according to him) that the Messenger of Allaah ( صلى لله عليه وسلم ) said:

          وعن ابن عباس قال : كنت مع النبي – صلى الله عليه وسلم – وعنده علي ، فقال النبي – صلى الله عليه وسلم – : ” يا علي ، سيكون في أمتي قوم ينتحلون حب أهل البيت ، لهم نبز يسمون الرافضة ، قاتلوهم فإنهم مشركون ” . رواه الطبراني ، وإسناده حسن .

          “O ‘Alee, there will be in my Ummah a group of people who will go beyond bounds in love of my family, they will have an insulting name, they will be known as the Raafidah. Fight them, for they are polytheists.”

          [ Shaikh Albani has discussed this hadeeth and its likes in detail quoting all the references for this narration and has declared (quoting the jumhoor as well that) all routes are weak in Silsilah ad-Da’eefa (13/568-572) Under hadeeth 6267]

          Also the Shaikhs of Islamweb replied :

          فإن هذا الحديث رواه الطبراني، وقال الهيثمي في المجمع إسناده حسن، ولكن في سنده الحجاج بن تميم وقد ضعفه العقيلي وتبعه ابن الجوزي والألباني، وللحديث روايات ضعيفة ضعفها ابن الجوزي في العلل المتناهية كما ضعف هذا الحديث أيضاً.

          Source: http://fatwa.islamweb.net/fatwa/index.php page=showfatwa&Option=FatwaId&Id=76321

          Ibn Hajar al-Haythamee also metioned in his Majma’ az-Zawaa’id (2/10) with a good
          chain of narration that ‘Aasim bin Bahdalah said:

          قلت للحسن بن علي : الشيعة يزعمون أن عليًا يرجع ؟ قال : كذب أولئك الكذابون، لو علمنا ذلك ما تزوج نساؤه، ولا قسمنا ميراثه

          “I said to ‘al-Hasan bin ‘Alee: “The Shee’ah claim that ‘Alee will return.” He said:
          “Those liars have lied. For if we had known that, his women would not have married and we would not have divided his inheritance.”

          روى ابن بطة في الإبانة الكبرى باب ذكر افتراق الأمم في دينهم، و على كم تفترق الأمة من حديث أبو علي بن إسماعيل بن العباس الوراق ، قال حدثنا الحسن بن محمد بن الصباح الزعفراني ، قال حدثنا شبابة ، قال حدثنا سوادة بن سلمة أن عبد الله بن قيس رضي الله عنه قال اجتمع عند علي رضي الله عنه جاثليتو النصارى و رأس الجالوت كبير علماء اليهود فقال الرأس: تجادلون على كم افترقت اليهود؟ قال: على إحدى و سبعين فرق فقال علي رضي الله عنه: لتفترقن هذه الأمة على مثل ذلك، و أضلها فرقة و شرها: الداعية إلينا!! ( أهل البيت ) آية ذلك أﻧﻬم يشتمون أبا بكر و عمر رضي الله عنهما

          “Ibn Battah reported in his al-Ibaanah al Kubraa, in the chapter: Mentioning the sections of the Nations in their religion and upon how many sects will the Ummah split into, from the Hadeeth of Abee ‘Alee bin Ismaa’eel bin al-Abbaas al-Warraaq who said: al-Hassan bin Muhammad bin as-Sabaah az-Za’faraanee narrated to me that Shabbaabah said, that Sawaadah bin Salamah said that ‘Abdullaah bin Qays رضي لله عنه) ) said:

          “A group of Christians came to ‘Alee ( رضي لله عنه ) and at the head of them was a major scholar of the Jews. So the leader said:

          “You debate about how many groups the Jews split into?” He said: “Into seventy one
          sects”. And ‘Alee ( رضي لله عنه ) said:

          “And this Ummah will split into similar to that, and the most deviated and evil sect of them: the ones who call to us (Ahlul Bayt), and a sign of them is that they insult Aboo Bakr and ‘Umar
          رضي لله عنھما و أبو علي بن العباس الوراق روى عنه الدارقطني و وثقه و قال الذهبي عنه: المحدث الإمام الحجة، و ذكره يوسف بن عمر القواس في جملة شيوخه الثقات

          “And as for Aboo ‘Alee bin al-’Abbaas al-Warraaq, then ad-Daaruqutnee reported from him and considered him reliable. And adh-Dhahabee said about him: ((The Scholars of hadeeth, the Imaam, the Proof)) and Yoosuf bin ‘Amr al-Qawwaas mentioned him from the reliable scholars. Look to Taareekh Baghdaad (6/300) of al-Khateeb al Baghdaadee and al-Muntadhim (6/278) of Ibnul Jawzee and Siyaar A’laam an-Nubalaa (15/74) of Adh-Dhahabee. And al-Hassan bin Muhammad bin as-Sabaah az-Za’faraanee is Reliable. See
          Tahdheeb at-Tahdheeb (2/318) and at-Taqreeb (1/170) of Ibn Hajar al ‘Asqalaanee.”

          و روى ابو القاسم البغوي عن علي رضي الله عنه قال: يخرج في أخر الزمان قوم لهم نبز (أي لقب ) يقال لهم الرافضة يعرفون به، و ينتحلون شيعتنا و ليسوا من شيعتنا، و آية ذلك أﻧﻬم يشتمون أبا بكر و عمر أينما أدركتموهم فاقتلوهم فأﻧﻬم مشركون

          “And Abul Qaasim al-Baghawee reported from ‘Alee ( رضي لله عنه ) that he said: A group will arise in the last times, they will have a nickname (an insulting name), they will be known as the “Raafidhah” (rejecters) and they will be known by it. They will say that they are our “shee’ah” (our group) but they are not from our group. And the signs of that is that they will insult Abaa Bakr and ‘Umar, where ever you find them, then kill them for they are mushrikoon (polytheists).” [Da’eef]

          PROOFS FROM AHLE BAYT THAT THEY HATED THEIR SO-CALLED SHIA’AS

          Note: These are from shia’a sources and like their religion we don’t believe in their reports for we have our (Sunni) sources well preserved unlike them and even though sometimes parts of these narrations match with our narrations, we (the sunnis) have a different context and understanding than these rawafidh. The below is only to counter the so called shia’s (more appropriately known as rafidah) from their own books.

          Imam Jafar as-Sadiq (رضّى الله عنه) said the following about the so-called Shia:

          “No one bears greater hatred towards us [the Ahlel Bayt] than those who claim to love us.”

          [Abdullâh al-Mâmaqânî, Miqbâs al-Hidâyah vol. 2 p. 414 (Mu’assasat Âl al-Bayt li-Ihyâ’ at-Turâth, Beirut 1991) quoting from Rijâl al-Kashshî.]

          During the fight against the people of Syria [Muawiyyah], Ali said to his Shia:

          “Woe to you. I am tired of rebuking you. Do you accept this worldly life in place of the next life? Or disgrace in place of dignity? When I invite you to fight your enemy your eyes revolve as though you are in the clutches of death, and in the senselessness of last moments. My pleadings are not understood by you and you remain stunned. It is as though your hearts are affected with madness so that you do not understand. You have lost my confidence for good. Neither are you a support for me to lean upon, nor a means to honour and victory. Your example is that of the camels whose protector has disappeared, so that if they are collected from one side they disperse away from the other side.”

          [source: Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 34, http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/34.htm%5D

          In the same sermon, Ali (رضّى الله عنه) also condemns the Shia for being trouble-makers and fitnah-mongerers, saying:

          “By Allah, how bad are you for igniting flames of war.”

          Hasan did not trust these Shia either as they were very disloyal. In his book al-Ihtijâj, the prominent Shia author Abu Mansur at-Tabarsi has preserved the following remark of Hasan:

          “By Allah, I think Muawiyyah would be better for me than these people who claim that they are my Shia (supporters).”

          [Abû Mansûr at-Tabarsî, al-Ihtijâj vol. 2 p. 290-291 , Mu’assasat al-A‘lamî, Beirut 1989]

          Distrusting his Shia, Hasan (رضّى الله عنه) made peace with Muawiyyah (رضّى الله عنه) and gave him the Caliphate. His Shia protested at this, and Hasan’s reply (رضّى الله عنه) is preserved in the most important of the Shia books of Hadith, Al-Kafi:

          “By Allah, I handed over power to him for no reason other than the fact that I could not find any supporters. Had I found supporters I would have fought him day and night until Allah decides between us. But I know the people of Kufa (i.e a city in Iraq where the shia’as were dominant). I have experience of them. The bad ones of them are no good to me. They have no loyalty, nor any integrity in word or deed. They are in disagreement. They claim that their hearts are with us, but their swords are drawn against us.”

          [Al-Kafi, vol. 8, p.288]

          Hussain’s cousin Muslim Ibn Aqil (رضّى الله عنه) was sold out to Yezid’s men by the Shia. Muslim Ibn Aqil (رضّى الله عنه) sent a message to Hussain (رضّى الله عنه) warning him about the Shia of Kufa:

          “Do not be deceived by people of Kufa. They are those same Shia of your father from whom he so dearly wished to part, by death or by being killed. The Kuffans have lied to me and have lied to you, and a liar has no sense.”

          Before being executed, Muslim Ibn Aqil (رضّى الله عنه) said about the Shia:

          “O Allah, You be the Judge between us and our people. They deceived us and deserted us.”

          Then, Hussain (رضّى الله عنه) would be betrayed by the Shia of Kufa, who would feed him to Yezid’s men who slaughtered Hussain (رضّى الله عنه) at Karbala. Hussain (رضّى الله عنه) would say before being martyred,

          “Our Shia have deserted us.”

          And the Shia betrayal of the Ahlul Bayt did not stop with Ali, Hasan, and Hussain; indeed, they did not even spare Hussain’s grandson, Zayd ibn Ali ibn Hussain (رضّى الله عنه). The Shia would betray him on the battlefield, defecting against him. Before being martyred, Zayd (رضّى الله عنه) said:

          “I am afraid they have done unto me as they did to Hussain .”

          Ali (رضّى الله عنه) condemned the Shia so many times in the Nahjul Balagha, page after page of how much he reviled the people who claimed to be his supporters. Here, Ali (رضّى الله عنه) says that Allah will destroy the Shia of Kufa if they continue to be decietful, and he asks Allah to change his Shia for other supporters, because he distrusts his Shia who are not really his supporters but rather his enemies:

          Ali chastises the Shia of Kufa:

          “O’ Kufa, if this is your condition that whirlwinds [of deciet] continue blowing through you, then Allah may destroy you…Your disobedience of your Imam in matters of right and their [the Syrian’s] obedience to their leader [Muawiyyah] in matters of wrong, their [the Syrian’s] fulfilment of the trust in favor of their master [Muawiyyah] and your betrayal, their good work in their cities and your mischief. Even if I give you charge of a wooden bowl I fear you would run away with its handle.”

          Ali invokes Allah against his Shia:

          “O my Allah, they are disgusted of me and I am disgusted of them. They are weary of me and I am weary of them. Change them for me with better ones”

          [ Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 25, source: http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/25.htm%5D

          Ali says to his Shia at the Battle of Siffin:

          “Keep quiet, may Allah make you ugly, O you with broken tooth. Certainly, by Allah, when truth became manifest even then your personality was weak and your voice was loose. But when wrong began to shout loudly you again sprouted up like the horns of a kid.”

          [Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 183, source: http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/183.htm%5D

          Ali says to his Shia:

          “You are a group whose heads are devoid of wit and intelligence. May you have no father! Allah’s woe be to you!”

          [Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 36]

          There are tons and tons of such references wherein the Ahle Bayt has oppenly opposed, denounced and cursed their Shia’as such as :

          Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 4 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 29 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 39 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 57 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 68 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 69 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 70 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 96 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 115 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 118 , Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 124 , 126, 130, 179, 191 so on and so forth…

          ALI (R.A) GETS ANGRY AT THE ONE WHO ELEVATES HIM ABOVE ABU BAKR AND UMAR (R.A.A)

          و بلغ علي أبن أبي طالب أن عبد الله بن السوداء يبغض أبا بكر وعمر فهم بقتله فهاج الناس و قالو له: أتقتل رج ً لا يدعوا إلى حبكم أهل البيت؟ فقال: لا يساكنني في دار أبدآ. ثم أمر بنفيه إلى المدائن عاصمة الفرس

          “And ‘Alee bin Abee Taalib clarified that ‘Abdullaah bin as-Sawdaa’ hated Abaa Bakr and ‘Umar, so he gave importance to his killing. So the people became roused and said to him: “Do you kill a man who calls to loving Ahlul Bayt?” He said: “Do not reside with me in my residence ever” Then he ordered with his banishment to Madaa’in, the capital of Persia.”

          و روى الحكم بن حجل قال: سمعت علي يقول: لا يفضلني أحد على أبو بكر و عمر رضي الله عنهما إلا جلدته حد المفترى

          “And al-Hakm bin Hajal said: I heard ‘Alee saying, “Nobody honors me over Aboo Bakr and ‘Umar ( رضي لله عنھما ) except punish him with the punishment of the lashing of a liar.”

          Now this is a “mutawaatir” (too many to deny) narration and alhumdulillah summa alhumdulillah we (sunnis) have tons of such reports , some of which are :

          عن المغيرة عن شباك قال: بلغ عليا أن ابن السوداء ينتقص أبا بكر و عمر فدعا به و دعا بالسيف فهم بقتله فكلم فيه فقال: لا يساكنني ببلد أنا فيه, فسيره للمدائن

          Al-Mugheerah from Shabak: It had reached ‘Ali that ibn al-Sawdaa(Ibn Saba) is insulting Abu Bakr and ‘Umar so he called for him asked for a sword to kill himbut he was talked out of it so he said: “He will not live with me in the same land” then he exiled him to al-Madaen.

          [Source: al-Lalikaee in “Sharh I’itiqad Ahlul-Sunnah” #2379]

          Hafidh ibn Hajr quotes Ali :

          ولا يبلغني عن أحد يفضلني عليهما إلا جلدته حد المفتري

          “I will lash anyone who prefers me over Abu Bakr and Omar, the lashing of a slanderer (liar/spreading lies).”

          [Lisan al-Mizan, Vol. III P. 290]

          Hafidh ibn Katheer in “Bidaya wal Nihaya” vol 7, chapter “شيء من فضائل أمير المؤمنين علي بن أبي طالب” wrote:

          وقد ثبت عنه بالتواتر أنه قال على منبر الكوفة: أيها الناس! إن خير هذه الأمة بعد نبيها أبو بكر ثم عمر، ولو شئت أن أسمي الثالث لسميت

          “And it’s proven from him [Ali] in “tawatur” form, that He said on the pulpit in Kufa: “O people! The best one in this Ummah after her Prophet is Abu Bakr , then Omar , and if I wanted to say you the third name, I would do that.”

          جاء في ( طوق الحمامة ) ليحيى بن حمزة الزبيدي عن سويد بن غفلة الجعفي الكوفي المتوفى عام (80هـ/699م) أنه دخل على علي-رضي الله عنه- في إمارته، فقال: إني مررت بنفر يذكرون أبا بكر و عمر بسوء، ويروون أنك تضمر لهما مثل ذلك، منهم عبد الله بن سبأ، فقال علي: مالي ولهذا الخبيث الأسود، ثم قال : معاذ الله أن أضمر لهما إلا الحسن الجميل، ثم أرسل إلى ابن سبأ فسيره إلى المدائن، ونهض إلى المنبر، حتى اجتمع الناس أثنى عليهما خيرا، ثم قال : إذا بلغني عن أحد أنه يفضلني عليهما جلدته حد المفتري –

          الهي ظهير، إحسان، السنة والشيعة، نشر إدارة ترجمة السنة- الهور.

          In ‘Tuq Al-Hamamh’ by Yahya bin Hamzah Al-Zobaydi on the authority of bin Ghaflah Al-Jo’fi Al-Kufi (80H) who said that he entered upon Ali – may Allah be pleased with him and said: ‘I passed by some men. among them was Abdallah Ibn Saba’, who were talking negatively about Abu Bakr and Omar saying that you [Ali] hold the same feelings towards them.’ Ali replied: ‘What does this wretched black man (Ibn Saba’s mother was Ethiopian) want from me?’ He then said: “I seek refuge in Allah in holding anything but beautiful respect for them both.” Then he sent after Ibn Saba and exiled him to Al-Mada’in (former capital of the Persian empire) and ascended the pulpit until the people were gathered, he then praised Abu Bakr and Omar, then he said: ‘If it reaches me that anyone prefers me over them then I shall lash them as they do with the slandering liar.

          From Abdullaah bin Salmah who said I heard Ali saying:

          ‘The best of the people after the Messenger of Allaah is Abu Bakr, and the best of the people after Abu Bakr is Umar . . . . .’

          [Collected by Ibn Majah in his Sunan & authenticated by Albaani no. 86]

          From Abu Juhayfah who said: ‘I heard Ali saying: ‘Shall I not inform you who is the best of this Ummah after its Prophet, it is Abu Bakr.’ Then Ali continued: ‘Shall I not inform you who is the best of this Ummah after Abu Bakr it is Umar.’

          [Collected by Ahmad & authenticated by Ahmad Shakir. Imam Dhahabi said in ‘Tareekh al-Khulafah’ p.115: ‘I swear by Allaah the Magnificent, that this is what Ali said and it is Mutawatir from him, because he said this while on the Mimbar in Koofah, may Allaah fight the Rafidaah, how ignorant they are!’]

          From Shaqeeq who said:

          ‘It was said to Ali -Radi Allaahu anhu: ‘Will you not appoint a leader?’ He replied: ‘The Messenger of Allaah -sallAllaahu alayhi wa sallam- did not appoint a leader, so how can I appoint one. If Allaah – Tabaraka wa Ta’ala – wants good for the people then He gathers them as He gathered them after their Prophet upon the best of them.’ [i.e. Abu Bakr]

          1. wargame1 Avatar
            wargame1

            Great post Mashallah. I have learned a lot from this post. Thank you.

          2. Numerous branches and sub-sects of Shi’ism and their False claims:

            There were many more shia sub-sects which with time got extinct. Here are some known Shia sub-sects. These are:

            Sabaiyyah Sect: The founder of this sect is Abdullah bin Saba. Basis of their beliefs are; Ascribing Uluhiyyat (praying and obeying only to ) to Hazrath Ali (as) and his descendants. They claim that Hazrath Ali (as) is not death, the one who has died was a Satan incognito as Ali (as). Hazrath Ali (as) ascended to heaven. Thunder is his voice; flash of lightening is his scourges clatter.

            Kamiliyyah Sect: According to this sect, Imamate (duties and rank of Imam) is a nur (heavenly light). One other attribute of imam is prophet at the same time. These people claim that sahaba (Companions of Prophet) are unbelievers.

            Ulyaniyyah Sect: The followers of this sect who pray and obey to Hazrath Ali (as) and to his descendants claim that Hazrath Ali (as) sent Hazrath Mohammad (pbuh) as a messenger.

            Mughapriyyah Sect: They say that Allah (swt) has a shape of a mortal man and carries a crown, which is made of a heavenly light and believe so many other outdated superstitions that would even amaze Satan himself.

            Mansuriyyah Sect: Imams are blameless; prophets are not free from mistakes. Imams are higher in ranks. They believe such like superstitions and myths.

            Hatabiyyah Sect: According to them world is eternal. There is no Hell. They do not accept Haram (anything that is prohibited by faith), or Halal (anything that is permissible under Islam).

            Hashimiyyah Sect: They think of Allah in shape of a human.

            Numaniyyah Sect: They are also called as Sataniyyah Sect. Just like Hashimiyyah Sect, they think of Allah in shape of a human.

            Yonusiyyah Sect: They claim that Allah sits on a throne and the angels always see Him.

            Nasriyyah Sect: They claim that Allah penetrated into Hazrath Ali (as) and his descendants. That is to say they became a united whole.

            Canahiyyah Sect: They drivel by claiming that Allahs spirit was with Hazrath Adam and passed to the other Prophets and to the twelve Imam.

            Gurabiyyah Sect: These sects members by defending an opininion of Hazrath Alis (as) likeness to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) claim that Angel Gabriel revealed to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) by mistake.

            Zarrariyyah Sect: They believe that all the other attributes of Allah except the Life Attribute came into being afterwards.

            Zarramiyyah Sect: They say that Imamet came down from Ali (as) to his son Mohammad Hanafi and from him to the others.

            Mufavizzah Sect: They are in dark by saying that Allah created Prophet Mohammad and he created the heavens and earth and the universe.

            Badahiyyah Sect: Their situation is much weirder than the others are. They claim that Allah created his creations without thinking of their pasts and futures.

            Banaiyyah Sect: Just like Nasriyyah Sect they believe in becoming one (Allah and Hazrath Ali and his descendants)

            Salahiyyah Sect: They are mutazillah (man is the owner of his acts and they negate the effects of fate) in faith, Hanafis (school of the oldest of the four schools of thought or jurisprudence within Sunni Islam. The Hanafi sect named after its founder, Abu Hanifa) in practice.

            Sulaymaniyyah Sect: They accept Hazrath Abu Bakrs (as) and Hazrath Omars (as) Imamate however reject of their being imam prior to Hazrath Ali.

            Imamiyyah Sect: According to them, Hazrath Mohammad (pbuh) appointed Hazrath Ali (as) as imam personally and he was the one who can choose the following imams because of Hazrath Mohammads will.

            Garrudiyyah Sect: They claim that the words of our Prophet about Imamet clearly refer to Hazrath Ali (as) and blame Companions of Prophet of being blasphemous.

            Ismailiyyah Sect: By the followers of this sect under the cover of religion, it had been tried to be founded a kingdom. Under the leadership of Ubaydullah whom was one of the descendants of ibn-i Meymoon it became an Empire spreading from Damascus to Morocco. After 270 years of ruling, it fell in the year 570 (Islamic calendar). These are also called as Batinis.

            They, by keeping their imams distinct from others consider them as being approved by the divine enlightenment. According to them, their imams are blameless, they do not make mistakes, and they do not sin. They cannot be responsible for their acts because they know things, which anybody cannot.

            Ghulat Shia sects

            Bazighiyya- who believed that Ja’far al-Sadiq was God.

            Dhammiyya- who believed that Ali was God and Muhammad was his appointed Messenger and Prophet.

            Ghurabiyya- who believed the angel Gabriel was mistaken when passing on the prophecy to Muhammad instead of Ali.

            Ya’furiyya- who believed in reincarnation and that a man named Mu’ammar al-Kufi was their Lord.

            Kaysanites- who believed in the Imamate of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah after the death of Husayn Ibn ‘Ali Ibn abu Talib.

            Hurufiyya, who believed God is incarnated in every atom, reminiscent of the Alevi-Bektashism.

            Nuqtavites- who believed in a cyclical view of time, reminiscent of the Isma’ili Shia.

            Soldiers of Heaven- who believed that their former leader Dia Abdul Zahra Kadim (died 2007 CE) was the Mahdi and reincarnation of Ali ibn Abi Talib.

            Zaydi Shia sects

            Dukayniyya- who believed Muhammad’s followers fell into unbelief after his death because they did not uphold the Imamate of Ali.

            Jarudiyya- who believed the companions were sinful in failing to recognise Ali as the legitimate Caliph. They became extinct in Iran and Iraq but still survive in Yemen under the Hadawi sub-sect.

            Khalafiyya- who believed in a unique line of Imams after Zayd ibn Ali ibn Husayn Ibn ‘Ali Ibn abu Talib, starting with a man named Abd al-Samad and continuing with his descendants.

            Khashabiyya- who believed that the Imamate must remain only among the descendents of Hasan and Husayn, even if that Imam is ignorant, immoral and tyrannical.

            Tabiriyya/Butriyya/Salihiyya- who believed the companions, including Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman, had been in error in failing to follow Ali, but it did not amount to sin.

            Imami/pre-Twelver Shia sects
            Ismā’īlī Shia sects

            Hafizi- who believed the ruler of the Fatimid Empire, Al-Hafiz, was also the Imam of the Time.

            Sevener- who believed Muħammad ibn Ismā’īl al-Maktum, the son of Ismā’īl ibn Jaʻfar al-Sadiq, would return as the Mahdi.

            Qarmatians- who believed in a world view where every phenomenon repeated itself in cycles, where every incident was replayed over and over again.

          3. The Imami Twelver Shia like to claim that they are on the true path, they claim that they take their religion from infallible Imams, they claim they’re united behind Ahlul-Bayt while on the other hand Ahlul-Sunnah are divided to various sects like “Hanafis, Malikis, Sufis, Salafis, ect…”

            Sadly many un-informed Muslims may be fooled by this, because they do not have sufficient knowledge about Ahlul-Sunnah or the Shia in general. A Muslim with basic knowledge knows that this is untrue, the groups mentioned above are not sects, they are schools of jurisprudence and methodologies, all of them a part of Ahlul-Sunnah, also the Shia themselves were divided to more than a hundred different sects since their earliest days such as the Kaysaniyah, the Waqifiyah, the Nawousiyah, the Zaydiyah ect… one only needs to refer to their book “Firaq al-Shia” by al-Nawbakhti to read more about it.

            Today the majority of Shia are of the Ja`fari sect, which they claim is a “Madhab”, so we will go one step further to prove that the Ja`fari Madhab itself is extremely divided, setting aside all the other Shia sects.

            Many people assume that the Shee’ahs are united in their beliefs. This is incorrect. The Shee’ah have split into many different sects, each sect as misguided as the other.

            Among the different sects are:

            – Isma’eelis: In the early days of Shee’ism, the belief of imaamate was that the Imaamate goes from father to the eldest son, and no other line of succession is possible. But when Imaam Ja’far As-Saadiq’s eldest son Isma’eel died in his father’s lifetime, his younger son Musa was designated by his father as the next Imaam. In this case the Imaamate moved from Isma’eel to Musa and the normal procession from father to eldest son was broken. Some Shee’ahs objected to this solution and a new sect developed within the group. This is the origin of the Isma’eeli sect which holds that the belief that Isma’eel Ibn Ja’far was the last rightful Imaam. Ja’far As-Saadiq being the husband of Faatimah, who was the daughter of Hasan Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Husain Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Abee Taalib.

            – The Nusayriyyah.

            – The Twelvers. This sect appear to judge the Isma’eeli and Nusayriyyah sect as disbelievers. This sect believes that the 12 Imaams have all come and gone, except for the 12th “hidden” Imaam (the one they believe to the the Mahdi). They claim that the 12th Imaam is hidden in a cave somewhere and will soon come out. The 11th Imaam being Al-Hasan Al-‘Askari. Strangely, Ja’far, the brother of this Al-Hasan Al-‘Askari said that he had no child. Fearing that the foundations of the Shee’ah sect will fall asunder, a Shee’ah scholar named ‘Uthmaan Ibn Sa’d claimed that the Imaam actually had a son who went into hiding at the age of 4 and that he (‘Uthmaan) was his deputy. Since then, over 1000 years ago, this hidden Imaam is still in a cave and the Shee’ahs are awaiting for the time he comes out of hiding!

            – The Kaisaniyyah.
            They are ascribed to Kaysaan who is the mawlaa of Ali (radiallaahu anhu), and also the student of Muhammad bin al-Hanafiyyah (son of Ali). The core belief of this sect is that Ali (radiallaahu anhu) encompassed all the divine knowledge, and he knows all the secret hidden ta’weels (explanations, exegesis), and that he alone has the right to make interpretations of the Shariah texts, and obedience to this Imaam is the very essence of the religion (and which in turn invalidates the necessity of the legislated actions). Muhammad bin al-Hanafiyyah freed himself from these people openly, however when he died, they claimed he is still living and that he will be given the permission to return. To the Kaysaaniyyah, Muhammad bin al-Hanafiyyah is the awaited Mahdi. Note the diffrence between this sect and others in that they only said Ali (radiallaahu anhu) possessed the divine knowledge, but did not actually deify him.

            – The Zaidiyyah. Many Shee’ah sects consider this sect to be infidels.
            And they ascribe to Zayd bin Ali bin al-Husayn bin Ali bin Abi Talib. Whilst they believe in the superiority of Ali (radiallaahu anhu), they also accept the principle that a person of lesser rank is able to take leadership despite the presence of the one with higher rank due to some considered beneficial interest which needed to be attained on account of the situation of presence of factors. This is how they view the rulership of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman (radiallaahu anhum). When the Shias of Kufah heard of this position and that they do not free themselves of the two Shaykhs (Abu Bakr and Umar), they rejected them and so the Zaydiyyah labelled them “Raafidah.” Zayd bin Ali bin al-Husayn studied with Wasil bin Ataa (founder of the Mu’tazilah), there were elements of i’tizaal (rationalism) as well as aspects of khurooj (revolt of the Kharijites), although he was not upon the actual core usool of the Mu’tazilah and Kharijites, and for this reason, traces of these influences are found in the Zaydee fiqh and manhaj. The Zaydiyyah are the least deviant faction of the Shi’a.

            – The Jaroodiyah. This are an offshoot of the Zaidiyyah sect and are the only ones that are considered Rawaafidh from that branch.

            – The Ghaliyyah.

            – The Ja’fari. They call upon ‘Ai Ibn Abee Taalib, Hasan and Husain, and according to the permanent committee of Saudi Arabia (comprising of Sh. ‘Abdul-Razzaaq Al-Afifi, Sh. ‘Abdullaah Ibn Ghudayaan & Sh. ‘Abdulaah Ibn Qa’ood) this sect are polytheists who have apostatized from Islaam.

            – The Durooz.

            – The Shaykiyyah. The former of this sect is the Shee’ah scholar Ahmad Al-Ahsaa’i.

            – The Kashifiyyah. The former of this sect was the disciple of Ahmad Al-Ahsaa’i^, a Shee’ah scholar by the name of Kazim Ar-Rushti.

            – The Karimkhniyyah. The former of this sect was the disciple of Kazim Ar-Rushti^, a Shee’ah scholar by the name of Muhammad Karim Khan.

            – The Qartiyyah. The former of this set was a female scholar named Qurrat Al-Ayn, and was a disciple of the Shee’ah scholar Muhammad Karim Khan^.

            – The Bayaniyyah. The former of this sect was a Shee’ah scholar by the name of Mirza ‘Ali Ash-Shirazi

            – The Baha’iyyah. The former of this sect was a Shee’ah scholar by the name of Mirza Husain ‘Ali.

            – The Khattabiyyah. Like the Isma’eeli sect, this sect also believes that after Ja’far As-Saadi, his son Isma’eel should have been the next Imaam.

            – The Futaihiyyah. The followers of ‘Abdullaah “Al-Aftah” Ibn Ja’far As-Saadiq, and reject the other “Imaams” who came after him.

            – The Waqifiyyah. This sect stopped their Imaams at Musa, the son of Ja’far and do not accept the Imamate of all the Imaams after him.

            – The Nawusiyyah. This sect are the followers of a man called Nawus or Ibn Nawus, who believed that Ja’far As-Saadiq did not die and that he is the Mahdi.

            One finds that almost each and every Mujtahid and marji’ has his own madhhab in some sort of way, despite the fact that about 30 scholars claimed that they are in contact with the hidden 12th Imaam (who is believed to be hidden in a cave).

            In the encyclopedia “Dairatul Ma’arif” is says: “Many Shee’ah sects appeared, the number far exceeded the 73 known sects that splintered away from Islaam.” [Dairatul Ma’arif, 4/67]

            Al-Maqrizi mentioned that the Shee’ah sects are more than 300 in number! [See Al-Khitat, 2/351]

            The leader of the Twelver Imami Shia sect al-Tusi says in “al-`Iddah fi Usoul al-Fiqh” 1/138:

            وقد ذكرت ما ورد عنهم عليهم السلام في الأحاديث المختلفة التي تخص الفقه في كتابي المعروف بالاستبصار وفي كتاب تهذيب الأحكام ما يزيد على خمسة آلاف حديث. وذكرت في أكثرها اختلاف الطائفة في العمل بها. وذلك أشهر من أن يخفى، حتى إنك لو تأملت اختلافاتهم في هذه الأحكام وجدته يزيد على اختلاف أبي حنيفة والشافعي ومالك

            [I (al-Tusi) have mentioned their narrations (as) in different Ahadith regarding Fiqh in my book “al-Istibsar” and “Tahdheeb al-Ahkam” and they number around five thousand(narrations). I have mentioned that the (Twelver) sect differed in following most of them. That is too popular and cannot be hidden. In fact, if you observe their difference in the rulings you would find that they differ more than the difference between Abu Hanifa, Malik and al-Shafi`i.]

            Their leader al-Tusi is saying that the Twelver Shia disagree on the majority of the five thousand narrations, each group of scholars follows different narrations and has different interpretations, this is mainly because of the huge amount of fabricated Shia narrations and the contradictions and the so called Taqiyyah of their Imams. al-Tusi goes as far as to say that the difference among the Ja`fari scholars in Fiqh is more than that of Abu Hanifa, Malik and Shafi`i put together!!

            The reality of the Ja`fari sect, is That it isn’t the word of the infallible, it is simply the word of the scholars, their Ijtihad and their opinions. Each grand Shia Mufti today, or as they like to call him “Marji`” has his own Madhab and Ijtihad, such as Rouhani or Sistani or Shirzai ect… each has different rulings and they are many, it is even considered prohibited for a Shia who follows a certain Marji` to go and take religious rulings from another Marji`.

            Just like Ahlul-Sunnah have the four renowned Madhabs, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali, we can easily say that each Shia Marji` is a Madhab of his own!! Sistani is a Madhab, Khu’i is a Madhab, Subhani is a Madhab, Fadlullah is a Madhab and so on…

            How then can they claim unity and accuse Ahlul-Sunnah of being divided because of the four Madhabs? If these Shia were truely following the infallible then they wouldn’t differ in their rulings and opinions nor would it be Haram for a Shia to follow more than one Marji` at the same time.

            Grand Ayatullah Fadlullah confirms this in his book “al-Ma`alim al-Jadidah lil Marji`iyah al-Shi`iyah” pg.117

            إن المشكلة التي نواجهها في تعدد المرجعيات هي المشكلة التي نواجهها في تعدد المذاهب الفقهية لأن المرجعيات هي مذاهب فقهية متعددة من خلال طبيعة تنوع الفتاوى، وتنوع النظريات في هذا المجال

            [The problem that we are facing in having numerous Marja`iyat (plural of Marji`) is the same as that of having numerous Fiqhi Madhabs, because the Marji`iyat are numerous Fiqhi Madhabs in their natural variety of Fatwas and views.]

            al-Tusi talks more about their differences in “al-`Iddah” 1/137:

            ومما يدل أيضاً على جواز العمل بهذه الأخبار التي أشرنا إليها ما ظهر من الفرقة المحقة من الاختلاف الصادر عن العمل بها فإني وجدتها مختلفة المذاهب في الأحكام . ويفتي أحدهم بما لا يفتي صاحبه في جميع أبواب الفقه من الطهارة إلى باب الديات . من العبادات والأحكام والمعاملات والفرائض وغير ذلك. مثل اختلافهم في العدد والرؤية في الصوم . واختلافهم في أن التلفظ بثلاث تطليقات ان يقع واحدة أو لا . ومثل اختلافهم في باب الطهارة في مقدار الماء الذي لا ينجسه شيء. ونحو اختلافهم في حد الكر . ونحو اختلافهم في استئناف الماء الجديد لمسح الرأس والرجلين. واختلافهم في اعتبار أقصى مدة النفاس . واختلافهم في عدد فصول الأذان والإقامة . وغير ذلك في سائر أبواب الفقه حتى أن باباً منه لا يسلم إلا وجدت العلماء من الطائفة مختلفة في مسائل منه أو مسائل متفاوتة الفتاوى

            [You will see one (Shia scholar) making a Fatwa that his companion disagrees with, this is true to all matters of Fiqh from purity to blood-money. From worship to rulings to worldly issues to obligatory duties and others… such as their difference in the number and the seeing of the moon in fasting, and their difference about if uttering divorce three times is counted as one or more, and their difference about what quantity of water preserves its purity and the measurement of al-Karr, and their difference about using new water to wipe the head and feet, and their difference about the maximum period for post natal bleeding, and their difference about the number of words in the call to prayer and the Iqamah, and other differences in all matters of Fiqh. Not even one chapter of Fiqh is safe unless you find the scholars of the (Ja`fari) sect differing in it.]

            Even their contemporary scholars are coming up with new Fatwas and opinions that were not know to their classical scholars, Ja`far al-Shakhouri says in “Marji`iyat al-Marhalah wa Ghubar al-Taghyir” pg.135:

            فلو نظرنا إلى فتاوى علمائنا المعاصـرين فسوف نجد أنهم كلـهم خارجـون عن دائرة المـذهب الشيعي

            [If we were to observe the Fatwas of our contemporary scholars, we will find that they all have left the circle of the Shi`ah Madhab.]

            Here are some samples from the Twelver Shia disagreements in Fiqh, such as the matter of marrying a woman from Ahlul-Kitab (Jew or Christian), Shia scholar Muhammad Jawad Mughniyah says in “Tafsir al-Kashif” 1/334:

            اتفقت مذاهب السنة الأربعة على صحة الزواج من الكتابية، واختلف فقهاء الشيعة فيما بينهم

            [The four Madhabs of Ahlul-Sunnah have agreed on the validity of the marriage from the Kitabi, whereas the Shia jurists differed in this matter among themselves.]

            Shia scholar Dr.Ahmad al-Wa’ili said in “Fiqh al-Jins” pg.245:

            أما اليهود والنصارى ففي الزواج منهم أقوال ستة، وأبرز الأقوال
            قول بعدم الجواز مطلقاً.
            قول بالجواز متعة لا دواماً، وبملك اليمين.
            قول بالجواز في حالة الإضطرار وعدم وجود المسلمة .
            قول بالجواز مطلقاً على كراهية .
            قول بالجواز مطلقاً بدون كراهية .
            ثم قال: هذا التفصيل الذي ذكرته هو عند (الأمامية). أما المذاهب الإسلامية الأخرى فقد أجمعوا على الجواز من النصرانيـة
            واليهودية دون المجوسية

            [As for the Jews and Christians, there are six opinion when it comes to marrying them:

            1- Absolutely prohibited.

            2-Permissible in temporary Mut`ah marriage.

            3- Ownership of what the right hand possesses.

            4-Permissible in case of need when there are no Muslim women.

            5-Permissible but disliked.

            6-Absolutely permissible.

            This is as far as the Imamiyah (Shia). As for the other Islamic Madhabs, they have consensus that it is allowed to marry the Christian and the Jew but not the Zoroastrian.]

            Another example is the Friday prayer, all Muslims agree that it is obligatory to attend this prayer every week, but the Twelver scholars differed among themselves. Shia scholar Muhammad al-`Amili al-Kadhimi talks about the different opinions of the Twelver scholars in “Haqa’iq al-Ahkam fi Risalat al-Islam” pg.33:

            ومن أشهر الأقوال:
            1- التحريم مطلقاً.
            2- الوجوب التخيري.
            3- الوجوب التعيني.
            4- الوجوب بشرط أن يكون الأمام فقيهاً .
            5- التوقف بين الحكم بالوجوب والحكم بالحرمة .

            [From the most famous of sayings:

            1-Absolutely prohibited.

            2-Wajib Takhyiri (One is given the choice between attending Zuhr or attending the Friday).

            3-Wajib `Ayni (Absolutely obligatory on all).

            4-Obligatory only if the Imam is a jurist.

            5-To stop and not declare it obligatory or forbidden.]

            Then he continues:

            [And disagreement has occurred when it comes to this prayer, are the Imam and his representative a condition or not? Here are the sayings:

            First saying: The Imam and his representative are not a condition according to the Muhadditheen al-Kulayni and al-Saduq.

            Second saying: In the case of the Wajib `Ayni their presence is a condition, but if not then it becomes Wajib Takhyiri. This is the apparent position of al-Tusi in al-Nihayah.

            Third saying: Presence of the Imam and his representative is a condition, without the occultation of the Imam, according to al-Shaheed al-Thani in his books and al-`Allamah in al-Nihayah.

            Fourth saying: Presence of the Imam and his representative is a condition if possible, and if both are unavailable for some reason then it is sufficient for one who has the required qualities to lead the prayer. This is the saying of abu al-Salah al-Halabi.

            Fifth saying: Presence of the Imam and his representative is a condition, whether he is present or in occultation, and if he does not show then the Friday prayer is replaced by the noon prayer. This saying is attributed to al-Daylami and Ibn Idrees and it is the opinion of al-Murtada in some of his answers, and al-`Allamah in al-Muntaha and al-Shaheed in al-Dhikra.]

            Then the author goes on to state some other differences but the above is sufficient for our readers.

            We read in “Fiqh al-Imam Ja`far al-Sadiq” by Mughniyah 1/239:

            قال صاحب مفتاح الكرامة: اختلف الفقهاء في مسألة القراءة خلف الإمام في الركعة الثالثة من المغرب والأخيرتين من العشاء والظهرين اختلافاً شديداً حتى إن الفقيه الواحد اختلف مع نفسه

            [The author of Miftah al-Karamah said: The (Shia) jurists differed greatly in the matter of reciting behind the Imam in the third Rak`ah of sunset and two last ones from the evening and the two noons, it was so great that the jurist would contradict himself.]

            They would even contradict themselves in matters of Halal and Haram, Shia scholar `Abbas al-Radhwi sasy in “Ara’ fil-Marji`iyah al-Shi`iyah” pg.299:

            كان الخميني يفتي بحرمة أكل السمك الذي ينتج الكافيار لأنه ليس هناك قشور على جسمه. ولكن بعد ذلك غير فتواه إلى الحلية. وكان الخميني يفتي بحرمة لعب الشطرنج ولكنه غير فتواه إلى الحلية

            [al-Khumayni used to give the Fatwa that eating the fish which produce caviar is Haram because they do not have scales on their bodies, but then he changed his opinion to Halal. Also al-Khumayni used to give the Fatwa that playing chess is Haram, but later he decided it was Halal.]

            This is why the renowned scholar al-Faydh al-Kashani describes the situation of the Ja`fari scholars in the introduction of his book “al-Wafi” 1/9:

            تراهم يختلفون (أي علماء الشيعة) في المسألة الواحدة إلى عشرين قولاً أو ثلاثين قولاً أو أزيد. بل لو شئت أقول: لم تبق مسألة فرعية لم يختلفوا فيها أو في بعض متعلقاتها

            [You will see them (Shia scholars) differ in one issue with about twenty or thirty different opinions, or more. In fact I can even say: That there is not one single minor issue that they did not disagree on.]

            After all of this, you will still find some of their scholars who have the audacity to say that we must join the ranks of the Twelver Shia so that we may find salvation and not differ!!

            al-`Allamah al-Hilli one of the Shia top classical scholars wrote about the differences of the Shia up until his time, which is the eight century, and the result was a huge ten volume book called “Mukhtalaf al-Shi`ah”, and if the reader were to browse through those books he would realize that al-Tusi was right when he said that the Ja`fari scholars differed on every single matter in Fiqh.

            It even exceeded this to murder, some of the Shia scholars got killed by the Shia because of differences of opinions!! Shia scholar Yusuf al-Bahrani wrote in “Lu’lu’at ul-Bahrayn” pg.81:

            أكثر المتأخرون التأليف. وفي مؤلفاتهم سقطات كثيرة عفا الله عنا وعنهم. وقد أدى ذلك إلى قتل جماعة منهم

            [The late scholars authored many works, and in those works are many slips may Allah forgive us all. And this has lead to a group of them being killed.]

            So what is this unity and “divine guidance” that the Ja`fari Twelver Shia keep boasting about!? When their opponents are doing far better than they are!

        6. The Nusayriyyah: A History of Bloodshed and Treachery

          The barbaric atrocities of the Alawis did not begin with Bashar al Assad; stories of the massacres and treachery of the Alawis are recorded from as far back as 717 AH. This short documentary sheds light on just a few incidents in history where the Alawis committed a total betrayal to the Muslims and carried out the most inhumane atrocities against them.

          http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=trzYDfwZaDM

          http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=Muj3doJW8Vs

        7. The Nusayri, Al-Wahash (Beast) Family’s Barbaric and Treacherous Capture and Hold of Power in Syria:

          In the 1940s Bashar Al-Assad’s father, Hafez, changed his family name from Al-Wahash (meaning “beast”) to Al-Assad (meaning lion) before he became engaged in domestic politics.

          The man who won the long contest for control of Syria, Hafiz ibn ‘Ali ibn Sulayman al-Asad, was born on 6 October 1930 in Qardaha, a village not far from the Turkish border and the seat of the ‘Alawi religious leader. Hafiz was the second of five children (Bayat, Hafiz, Jamil, Rif’at, Bahija); in addition, his father had an older son by another wife. The family belongs to the Numaylatiya branch of the Matawira tribe. (This means Asad’s ancestors came from Iraq in the 1120s.)

          For many centuries, the ‘Alawis were the most rural, most despised and hated, and most backward people of Syria. In recent years, however, they have transformed themselves into the ruling elite of Damascus. Now, ‘Alawis dominate the government, hold key military positions, enjoy a disproportionate share of the educational resources, and are becoming wealthy. How did this dramatic change occur? When did the ‘Alawi manage to escape their traditional confines, and what was the mechanism of their rise?

          Sunnis and others unsympathetic to the Asad regime answer this question by accusing the ‘Alawis of an elaborate and long-term conspiracy to take power in Syria. Annie Laurent suggests that “determined to get their revenge” after the failure of a rebel leader, Sulayman Murshid, “the ‘Alawis put into effect a strategy of setting up cells in the army and the Ba’th Party, and this won them power in Damascus.” Adherents of this view date the ‘Alawi ascent to 1959, the year that the Military Committee of the Ba’th Party was formed. Why, they ask, did leaders of this group keep its existence secret from the party authorities? This furtiveness suggests that the Military Committee from the beginning had a sectarian agenda. Matti Moosa argues that “it is almost certain that the officers were acting not as Baathists, but as Nusayris [‘Alawis], with the intent of using the Baath and the armed forces to rise to power in Syria. The formation of the military committee was the beginning of their plan for a future takeover of the government.”

          This speculation is confirmed by the 1960 clandestine meeting of ‘Alawi religious leaders and officers (including Hafiz al-Asad) that reportedly took place in Qardaha, Asad’s home town. “The main goal of this meeting was to plan how to forward the Nusayri officers into the ranks of the Ba’th Party. They would then exploit it as a means to arrive at the rule in Syria.” Three years later, another ‘Alawi meeting in Homs is said to have followed up the earlier initiatives. Among other steps, it called for the placement of more ‘Alawis in the Ba’th Party and army. Further secret meetings of ‘Alawi leaders appear to have taken place later in the 1960s.

          Analysts better disposed to Asad tend to discount not just these meetings and a premeditated drive for power, but the sectarian factor more generally. John F. Devlin, for example, denies that the disproportion of ‘Alawis in the army implies ‘Alawi dominance of Syria. He would resist seeing “every domestic disagreement in terms of a Sunni-‘Alawi clash.” For him, the fact that ‘Alawis are in power is basically accidental: “The Ba’th is a secular party, and it is heavy with minorities.” Alasdair Drysdale calls it “reductionist” to focus on ethnicity, arguing that this is one of many factors – geographic, class, age, education, occupation – that define the ruling elite. According to Yahya M. Sadowski, “sectarian loyalties play an insignificant role in the Ba’th, and even confessional bonds are only one among many avenues by which patronage is extended.”

          The truth lies between conspiracy and accident. The ‘Alawis did not “plan for a future takeover” years in advance, nor was it mere chance that the Ba’th Party was “heavy with minorities.” ‘Alawi power resulted from an unplanned but sectarian transformation of public life in Syria. Michael van Dusen explains: “From 1946 to 1963, Syria witnessed the gradual erosion of the national and eventually subnational political power of the traditional elite, not so much through the emergence of new and especially dynamic elites but rather by internal conflict.” Translated from the jargon of political science, van Dusen is saying that internal divisions caused non-Ba’th civilian Sunnis to lose power. This provided an opening that Ba’thist officers of ‘Alawi origins exploited.

          How these processes occurred is my subject here. First, however, some background on the ‘Alawis and their place in traditional Syrian society, followed by a sketch of their ascent.

          THE ‘ALAWI HERESY TO 1920

          People and Faith

          “‘Alawi” is the term that ‘Alawis (also called ‘Alawites) usually apply to themselves ; but until 1920 they were known to the outside world as Nusayris or Ansaris. The change in name – imposed by the Fr ench upon their seizure of control in Syria – has significance. Whereas “Nusayri” emphasizes the group’s differences from Islam, “‘Alawi” suggests an adherent of ‘Ali (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad) and accentuates the religion’s similarities to Shi’i Islam. Consequently, opponents of the Asad regime habitually use the former term, while its supporters use the latter.

          ‘Alawis today number approximately 1.3 million, of which about a million live in Syria. They constitute some 12 percent of the Syrian population. Three-quarters of the Syrian ‘Alawis live in Latakia, a province in the northwest of Syria, where they make up almost two-thirds of the population.

          ‘Alawi doctrines date from the ninth century A.D. and derive from the Twelver or Imami branch of Shi’i Islam (the sect that predominates in Iran). In about A.D. 859, one Ibn Nusayr declared himself the bab (“gateway to truth”), a key figure in Shi’i theology. On the basis of this authority, Ibn Nusayr proclaimed a host of new doctrines which, to make a long story short, make ‘Alawism into a separate religion. According to Ibn Kathir (d. 1372), where Muslims proclaim their faith with the phrase “There is no deity but God and Muhammad is His prophet,” ‘Alawis assert “There is no deity but ‘Ali, no veil but Muhammad, and no bab but Salman.” ‘Alawis reject Islam’s main tenets; by almost any standard they must be considered non-Muslims.

          Some ‘Alawi doctrines appear to derive from Phoenician paganism, Mazdakism and Manicheanism. But by far the greatest affinity is with Christianity. ‘Alawi religious ceremonies involve bread and wine; indeed, wine drinking has a sacred role in ‘Alawism, for it represents God. The religion holds ‘Ali, the fourth caliph, to be the (Jesus-like) incarnation of divinity. It has a holy trinity, consisting of Muhammad, ‘Ali, and Salman al-Farisi, a freed slave of Muhammad’s. ‘Alawis celebrate many Christian festivals, including Christmas, New Year’s, Epiphany, Easter, Pentecost, and Palm Sunday. They honor many Christian saints: St. Catherine, St. Barbara, St. George, St. John the Baptist, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Mary Magdalene. The Arabic equivalents of such Christian personal names as Gabriel, John, Matthew, Catherine, and Helen, are in common use. And ‘Alawis tend to show more friendliness to Christians than to Muslims.

          For these reasons, many observers – missionaries especially – have suspected the ‘Alawis of a secret Christian proclivity. Even T. E. Lawrence described them as “those disciples of a cult of fertility, sheer pagan, antiforeign, distrustful of Islam, drawn at moments to Christianity by common persecution.” The Jesuit scholar Henri Lammens unequivocally but gullibly concluded from his research that “the Nusayris were Christians” and their practices combine Christian with Shi’i elements.

          The specifics of the ‘Alawi faith are hidden not just from outsiders but even from the majority of the ‘Alawis themselves. In contrast to Islam, which is premised on direct relations between God and the individual believer, ‘Alawism permits only males born of two ‘Alawi parents to learn the religious doctrines. When deemed trustworthy, these are initiated into some of the rites at 16-20 years of age ; other mysteries are revealed later and only gradually. Religious secrecy is strictly maintained, on pain of death and being incarnated into a vile animal. Whether the latter threat is made good, mortals cannot judge; but the first certainly is. Thus, the most renowned apostate from ‘Alawism, Sulayman Efendi al-Adhani, was assassinated for divulging the sect’s mysteries. Even more impressive, at a time of sectarian tension in the mid-1960s, the suggestion that the ‘Alawi officers who ran the country publish the secret books of their religion caused Salah Jadid to respond with horror, saying that, were this done, the religious leaders “would crush us.”

          Women do most of the hard labor ; they are prized “precisely because of the work they do that men will not do except grudgingly, finding it incompatible with their dignity.” Women are never inducted into the mysteries (“Would you have us teach them whom we use, our holy faith?”); indeed, their uncleanliness requires their exclusion from all religious rituals. Females are thought to retain the pagan cult of worshipping trees, meadows, and hills, and to have no souls. In all, females are treated abominably; but one consequence of this disrespect is that they need not be veiled and enjoy greater freedom of movement than Muslim women.

          Unveiled women and several other ‘Alawi practices – in particular, that wine drinking is permitted, and that some ceremonies take place at night – long excited Muslim suspicions about ‘Alawi behavior. Then too, the obsessive secrecy inherent to the religion suggested to many Sunnis that the ‘Alawis had something to hide. But what? Over the centuries, the Sunnis’ imaginations supplied a highly evocative answer: sexual abandon and perversion.

          Thus, the theologian al-Ash’ari (874-936) held that ‘Alawism encourages male sodomy and incestuous marriages and the founder of the Druze religious doctrine, Hamza ibn ‘Ali (d. 1021), wrote that ‘Alawis consider “the male member entering the female nature to be the emblem of their spiritual doctrine.” Accordingly, ‘Alawi men freely share their wives with co-religionists. These and other accusations survived undiminished through the centuries and even circulated among Europeans. A British traveler of the early 1840s, who was probably repeating local rumors, wrote that “the institution of marriage is unknown. When a young man grows up he buys his wife.” Even ‘Alawis believed in the “conjugal communism” of their religious leaders. Such calumnies remain a mainstay of the anti-‘Alawi propaganda circulating in Syria today.

          Although the charges are false, ‘Alawis do reject Islam’s sacred law, the Shari’a, and therefore indulge in all manner of activities that Islamic doctrine strictly forbids. ‘Alawis ignore Islamic sanitary practices, dietary restrictions, sexual mores, and religious rituals. Likewise, they pay little attention to the fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage ceremonies of Islam ; indeed, they consider the pilgrimage to Mecca a form of idol worship. “Spiritual marriages” between young (male) initiates and their religious mentors probably lie at the root of the charges of homosexuality.

          Most striking of all, ‘Alawis have no prayers or places of worship ; indeed they have no religious structures other than tomb shrines. Prayers take place in private houses, usually those of religious leaders. The fourteenth-century traveler Ibn Battuta described how they responded to a government decree ordering the construction of mosques: “Every village built a mosque far from the houses, which the villagers neither enter nor maintain. They often shelter cattle and asses in it. Often a stranger arrives and goes to the mosque to recite the [Islamic] call to prayer; then they yell to him, ‘Stop braying, your fodder is coming.’” Five centuries later another attempt was made to build mosques for the ‘Alawis, this time by the Ottoman authorities; despite official pressure, these were deserted, abandoned even by the religious functionaries, and once again used as barns.

          Beyond specific divergences, non-conformity to the Shari’a means that ‘Alawi life follows its own rhythms, fundamentally unlike those of Muslims. ‘Alawis do not act like Sunni Muslims, with only slight differences; rather, they and Muslims resemble Christians and Jews in their pursuing a wholly distinct way of life. Matti Moosa notes that, “like the other extremist Shiites… the Nusayris had total disregard for Muslim religious duties.” Ignaz Goldziher put it succinctly: “This religion is Islam only in appearance.” It is important to make this point very clear: ‘Alawis have never been Muslims and are not now.

          Yet, as Ibn Battuta’s account suggests, there is a permanent inconsistency in the ‘Alawi wish to be seen as Muslim. In his case, it was mosques built and then neglected; at other times it is some other half-hearted adoption of Islamic ways. ‘Alawis have a long history of claiming Islam when this suits their needs and ignoring it at other times. In short, like other sects of Shi’i origins, ‘Alawis practice taqiya (religious dissimulation). This might mean, for example, praying side-by-side with Sunni Muslims but silently cursing the Sunni caliphs. The apostate ‘Alawi, Sulayman Efendi al-Adhani, recounted having been sworn to dissimulate about his religion’s mysteries. An ‘Alawi saying explains the sentiment behind taqiya: “We are the body and other sects are but clothing. However a man dresses does not change him. So we remain always Nusayris, even though we externally adopt the practices of our neighbors. Whoever does not dissimulate is a fool, for no intelligent person goes naked in the market.” Another ‘Alawi phrase expresses this sentiment succinctly: “Dissimulation is our righteous war!” (al-kitman jihadna).

          A British traveler observed in 1697 that the ‘Alawis are

          of a strange and singular character. For ’tis their principle to adhere to no certain religion; but camelion-like, they put on the colour of religion, whatever it be, which is reflected upon them from the persons with whom they happen to converse…. No body was ever able to discover what shape or standard their consciences are really of. All that is certain concerning them is, that they make much and good wine, and are great drinkers.
          A hundred and fifty years later, Benjamin Disraeli described the ‘Alawis in a conversation in the novel Tancred:

          “Are they Moslemin?”
          “It is very easy to say what they are not, and that is about the extent of any knowledge we have of them; they are not Moslemin, they are not Christian, they are not Druzes, and they are not Jews, and certainly they are not Guebres [Zoroastrians].”
          Sulayman Efendi al-Adhani explained this flexibility from within:

          They take on the outward practices of all sects. If they meet [Sunni] Muslims, they swear to them and say, “We are like you, we fast and we pray.” But they fast improperly. If they enter a mosque with Muslims, they do not recite any of the prayers; instead, they lower and raise their bodies like the Muslims, while cursing Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and other [major figures of the Sunni tradition].
          Taqiya permitted ‘Alawis to blow with the wind. When France ruled, they portrayed themselves as lost Christians. When Pan-Arabism was in favor, they became fervent Arabs. Over 10,000 ‘Alawis living in Damascus pretended to be Sunnis in the years before Asad came to power, only revealing their true identities when this became politically useful. During Asad’s presidency, concerted efforts were made to portray the ‘Alawis as Twelver Shi’is.

          Relations with Sunnis

          Mainstream Muslims, Sunni and Shi’i alike, traditionally disregarded ‘Alawi efforts at dissimulation; they viewed ‘Alawis as beyond the pale of Islam – as non-Muslims. Hamza ibn ‘Ali, who saw the religion’s appeal lying in its perversity, articulated this view: “The first thing that promotes the wicked Nusayri is the fact that all things normally prohibited to humans – murder, stealing, lying, calumny, fornication, pederasty – is permitted to he or she who accepts [‘Alawi doctrines].” Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111), the Thomas Aquinas of Islam, wrote that the ‘Alawis “apostatize in matters of blood, money, marriage, and butchering, so it is a duty to kill them.”

          Ahmad ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), the still highly influential Sunni writer of Syrian origins, wrote in a fatwa (religious decision) that “the Nusayris are more infidel than Jews or Christians, even more infidel than many polytheists. They have done greater harm to the community of Muhammad than have the warring infidels such as the Franks, the Turks, and others. To ignorant Muslims they pretend to be Shi’is, though in reality they do not believe in God or His prophet or His book.” Ibn Taymiya warned of the mischief their enmity can do: “Whenever possible, they spill the blood of Muslims. They are always the worst enemies of the Muslims.” In conclusion, he argued that “war and punishment in accordance with Islamic law against them are among the greatest of pious deeds and the most important obligations” for a Muslim. From the fourteenth century on, Sunnis used the term “Nusayri” to mean pariah.

          1. Alawites Known as the Nusayri or Ansari prior to French rule, the Allawites were once concentrated in poor rural areas.

            The Allawi doctrine dates back from the ninth century A.D. and is derived from a branch of Shia Islam.

            The sect formally came to existence after its founder Ibn Nusayr proclaimed a set of new doctrines.

            Despised under the Ottoman empire for being Muslim heretics, Allawites were seen as closer to the Christian faith than to Islam.

            With accusations ranging from indulging in incestuous relationships, homosexuality, to sharing sexual partners, myths around the mysterious sect have done little to appease tensions.

            Rejected by Islam:

            Ibn Katir (d.1372), a well know Syrian religious scholar and historian even charged: “Alawis reject Islam’s main tenets; by almost any standard they must be considered non-Muslims.”

            Ahmad ibn Taymiya (1268-1328), an influential Sunni writer of Syrian origins even noted “The Nusayris are more infidel than Jews or Christians, even more infidel than the polytheists.”

            Even T.E Lawrence described them as “those disciples of a cult of fertility, sheer pagan, anti-foreign, distressful of Islam, drawn at moments to Christianity by common persecution.”

            The sect is describes as a mystic and secretive religious group of which most beliefs are hidden to outsiders, in line with Taqiyya, a practise emphasised in Shia Islam whereby adherents may conseal their religion to escape persecution.

            While male are taught the main religious tenets, women are said to be excluded from most religious rituals.

            Alawites don’t believe in pilgrimages or fasts, do not pray in a mosque, and drink consecrated wine, which further disinguishes them from the Sunni majority who aver all alochol.

            Imperialism and The Alawite Ascendency:

            Things however started to change when the Syrian republic was established as a French controlled mandate at the end of World War 1.

            Though their relationship was marked by tensions, the Alawites found in France a strong ally, as the country preferred to side with the minorities to make the best use of its colonial policy of divide-and-rule.

            In 50 years (from 1920 to 1970), Alawites stated a rapid ascent to power dominating the army and the Mukhabarat, the feared Syrian military intelligence appartus, which culminated in Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970.

            Assad the Beast:

            In the 1940s Bashar Al-Assad’s father, Hafez, changed his family name from Al-Wahash (meaning “beast”) to Al-Assad (meaning lion) before he became engaged in domestic politics.

            His son rapidly turned Syria into an autocracy with power concentrated within his household and Alawite cabal. Until the 1980s, the Syrian power elite was mainly made-up of Assad, his family and closer friends. With Alawites filling the vast majority of positions in the military, security forces other state institutions and the Baath party.

            Assad’s grip on power was however only further consolidated after he started to cultivate support of members of the old Sunni Damascus elite, made up of influential merchants, technocrats and intellectuals. Three quarters of the Alawites were after all located in the coastal city of Latakia, not the capital.

            He propelled some of his new allies into important government positions even appointing the sister of an exiled Muslim Brotherhood member, Najah Attar, as minister of culture because of her family’s influence.

            Though extensive patronage helped Assad remain in power, he also led a brutal crackdown on many Sunni Muslims, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) being one of the most severely oppressed groups.

            The army killed 20, 000 people in Hama in 1982 in a bid to quash an MB rebellion and up to 17,000 members of the group remain unaccounted for in Syria.

            The regime also led a severe anti-Islamic propaganda, rarely differentiating between Islamist radical and moderate groups.

            It warned other ethnic minorities in the country that the rise in power of the MB would transform Baathist Syria from a secular country into an Islamist one.

            This in turn led to a series of terrorist acts by Sunni militants, still in the 1980s, around urban centres such as Damascus, Hamah, Homs, Latakia and Tartus or Aleppo.

            The 2011 Uprising:

            While Syria’s history has been marked by rivalries, rancour, bloodshed and persecution, the 2011 uprising against Bashar al-Assad however did not have a sectarian character in essence.

            It started after years of abuse of power and use of excessive force by the president and his security apparatus.

            When people marched in Daraa in 2011 against the torture of 15 young boys, they were outraged by the regime’s forces impunity not by Assad’s “Alawite-ness.”

            But now Assad is whipping up Alawite fears to defend himself: arms are reported to have been distributed to Alawite communities living among Sunni populations and the gangs of ‘Shabiha’ (Ghosts) have been unleashed on towns linked to the opposition such as Houla, and have committed the worst atrocities, including the murder of children.

            Ben Macintyre of The Times concluded: “The systemic murder of children by forces of the regime represents a new increase in the sectarian conflict; as in Bosnia, Rwanda and Nazi Germany, the Syrian state is now involved in a war of ethnic cleansing.”

          2. It’s the Centuries of hatred towards Sunnis which barbarically reflects the psyche of Bashar Al-Wahash’s and the Alawites atrocities, massacres, and genocides committed on Sunnis. In addition to praying for the damnation of their Sunni enemies, ‘Alawis attacked outsiders. They acquired a reputation as murderous and unruly mountain people who resisted paying the taxes they owed the authorities and frequently plundered Sunni villagers on the plains. John Lewis Burckhardt observed in 1812 that those villagers “hold the Anzeyrys [Ansaris] in contempt for their religion, and fear them, because they often descend from the mountains in the night, cross the Aaszy [‘Asi, or Orontes River], and steal, or carry off by force, the cattle of the valley.”

            Matters seemed to be even worse in 1860 when Samuel Lyde added that “nothing is thought of thus killing a Mussulman as a natural enemy, or a Christian as an unclean thing.” Writing about the same time, a British travel-guide writer warned of the cool reception to be expected from the ‘Alawis: “They are a wild and somewhat savage race, given to plunder, and even bloodshed, when their passions are excited or suspicion roused.” With wonderful understatement, the guide author concluded, “their country must therefore be traversed with caution.”

            THE RISE OF THE ‘ALAWIS, 1920-1970:

            The ‘Alawis’ ascent took place over the course of half a century. In 1920 they were still the lowly minority just described; by 1970, they firmly ruled Syria. This stunning transformation took place in three stages: the French mandate (1920-46), the period of Sunni dominance (1946-63), and the era of ‘Alawi consolidation (1963-70).

            The French Mandate, 1920-1946:

            According to Yusuf al-Hakim, a prominent Syrian politician, the ‘Alawis adopted a pro-French attitude even before the French conquest of Damascus in July 1920. “The ‘Alawis saw themselves in a state of grace after hell; accordingly, they were dedicated to the French mandate and did not send a delegation to the [General] Syrian Congress.” So intensely did they oppose Prince Faysal, the Sunni Arab ruler of Syria in 1918-20 whom they suspected of wanting to dominate them, they launched a rebellion against his rule in 1919, using French arms. According to one well-informed observer, the ‘Alawis cursed Islam and prayed “for the destruction of the Ottoman Empire.” General Gouraud received a telegram in late 1919 from 73 ‘Alawi chiefs representing different tribes, who asked for “the establishment of an independent Nusayri union under our absolute protection.”

            Two years later the ‘Alawis rebelled against French rule under the leadership of Salih al-‘Ali, an event that the Asad government proudly points to as an anti-imperialist credential. But a close look, suggests that the revolt had more to do with the fact that the Isma’ilis had sided with France and, given the state of Isma’ili-‘Alawi relations, this led to hostilities between the ‘Alawis and French. As soon as the French authorities granted autonomy to the ‘Alawis, they won ‘Alawi support.

            Indeed, the establishment of French rule after World War I benefited the ‘Alawis more than any other community. French efforts to cooperate with minority populations meant the ‘Alawis gained political autonomy and escaped Sunni control; the state of Latakia was set up on 1 July 1922. They also gained legal autonomy; a 1922 decision to end Sunni control of court cases involving ‘Alawis transferred these cases to ‘Alawi jurists. The ‘Alawi state enjoyed low taxation and a sizeable French subsidy. Not surprisingly, ‘Alawis accepted all these changes with enthusiasm. As an anti-‘Alawi historian later put it, “At the time when resistance movements were mounted against the French mandate, when Damascus, Aleppo, and the Hawran witnessed continuous rebellions on behalf of Syrian unity and independence, the Nusayris were blessing the division of the country into tiny statelets.”
            In return, ‘Alawis helped maintain French rule. They turned out in large numbers when most Syrians boycotted the French-sponsored elections of January 1926. They provided a disproportionate number of soldiers to the government, forming about half the eight infantry battalions making up the Troupes Spéciales du Levant, serving as police, and supplying intelligence. As late as May 1945, the vast majority of Troupes Spéciales remained loyal to their French commanders. ‘Alawis broke up Sunni demonstrations, shut down strikes, and quelled rebellions. ‘Alawis publicly favored the continuation of French rule, fearing that France’s departure would lead to a reassertion of Sunni control over them. Henri de Jouvenel, the French High Commissioner for Syria (1925-27), quoted a leading ‘Alawi politician telling him: “We have succeeded in making more progress in three or four years than we had in three or four centuries. Leave us therefore in our present situation.”

            Pro-French sentiment was expressed especially clearly in 1936, when the temporary incorporation of the ‘Alawi state into Syria provoked wide protests. A March 1936 petition referred to union with the Sunnis as “slavery.” On 11 June 1936, an ‘Alawi leader wrote a letter to Prime Minister Léon Blum of France, reminding him of “the profoundness of the abyss that separates us from the [Sunni] Syrians,” and asking him to “imagine the disastrous catastrophe that would follow” incorporation.

            Days later, six ‘Alawi notables (including Sulayman Asad, said to be Hafiz al-Asad’s grandfather) sent another letter to Blum in which they made several points: ‘Alawis differ from Sunnis religiously and historically; ‘Alawis refuse to be joined to Syria, for it is a Sunni state and Sunnis consider them unbelievers (kafirs); ending the mandate would expose the ‘Alawis to mortal danger; “the spirit of religious feudalism” makes the country unfit for self-rule; therefore, France should secure the ‘Alawis freedom and independence by staying in Syria.

            An ‘Alawi note to the French government in July 1936 asked: “Are the French today ignorant that the Crusades would have succeeded if their fortresses had been in northeast Syria, in the Land of the Nusayris?…. We are the people most faithful to France.” Even more strongly worded was a petition of September 1936, signed by 450,000 ‘Alawis, Christians, and Druzes, which read:

            The ‘Alawis believe that they are humans, not beasts ready for slaughter. No power in the world can force them to accept the yoke of their traditional and hereditary enemies to be slaves forever…. The ‘Alawis would profoundly regret the loss of their friendship and loyal attachment to noble France, which has until now been so loved, admired, and adored by them.
            Although Latakia lost its autonomous status in December 1936, the province continued to benefit from a “special administrative and financial regime.”

            ‘Alawi resistance to Sunni rule took a new turn in 1939 with the launching of an armed rebellion led by Sulayman al-Murshid, the “half-sinister, half-ludicrous, figure of the obese, illiterate, miracle-working ‘god.’” Murshid, a bandit who proclaimed himself divine, challenged Sunni rule with French weapons and some 5,000 ‘Alawi followers. In the words of a 1944 British consular report: “The local Alaouite leaders, whose conception of the new order in Syria is a Nationalist Government who will treat them after the fashion of the French, upholding their authority and condoning their excesses, are doing their best to combine, and the movement appears to be supported by the French.” Murshid succeeded in keeping Damascus’ authority out of the ‘Alawi territories.

            Right up to independence, ‘Alawi leaders continued to submit petitions to the French in favor of continued French patronage. For example, a manifesto signed by twelve leaders in March 1945 called for all ‘Alawi soldiers to remain under French command and French arbitration of disputes between the ‘Alawi government and Damascus. ‘Alawis formed a plurality among the soldiers and some two-thirds of the non-commissioned officers.

            Sunni leaders apparently believed that reserving the top positions for themselves would suffice to control the military forces. Accordingly, minorities filled the lower ranks and for some years found it difficult to rise above the company level. Ironically, this discrimination actually served them well; as senior officers engaged in innumerable military coups d’état between 1949 and 1963, each change of government was accompanied by ruinous power struggles among the Sunnis, leading to resignations and the depletion of Sunni ranks. Wags claimed, with some justice, that there were more officers outside the Syrian army than inside it. Standing apart from these conflicts, the non-Sunnis, and ‘Alawis especially, benefited from the repeated purges. As Sunni officers eliminated each other, ‘Alawis inherited their positions. With time, ‘Alawis became increasingly senior; and, as one ‘Alawi rose through the ranks, he brought his kinsmen along.

            Purges and counter-purges during the 1946-63 period bred a deep mistrust between the officers. Never knowing who might be plotting against whom, superior officers frequently bypassed the normal hierarchy of command in favor of kinship bonds. As fear of betrayal came to dominate relations between military men, having reliable ethnic ties gave minority officers great advantage. In circumstances of almost universal suspicion, those officers within reliable networks could act far more effectively than those without. Sunnis entered the military as individuals, while ‘Alawis entered as members of a sect; the latter, therefore, prospered. ‘Alawi ethnic solidarity offered a far more enduring basis of cooperation than the shifting alliances formed by Sunni officers.

            In addition to the military, ‘Alawis also acquired power through the Ba’th Party. From its earliest years, the Ba’th held special attraction for Syrians of rural and minority backgrounds, including the ‘Alawis, who joined in disproportionately large numbers (especially at the Ba’th Party’s Latakia branch ). Rural migrants who went to Damascus for educational purposes constituted a majority of the membership in the Ba’th Party. They tended to be students of lower middle-class origins, the sons of ex-peasants newly arrived in the towns. In Aleppo, for example, the Ba’th claimed as members as many as three-quarters of the high school students in some schools. One of the founders of the party was an ‘Alawi, Zaki al-Arsuzi, and he brought along many of his (rural) coreligionists to the Ba’th.

            In particular, two doctrines appealed to the ‘Alawis: socialism and secularism. Socialism offered economic opportunities to the country’s poorest community. (The Ba’th’s socialism was unclear, however, until the 1960s; only when the minorities took over did this feature became prominent ). Secularism – the withdrawal of religion from public life – offered to a despised minority the promise of less prejudice. What could be more attractive to members of a downtrodden religious community than a combination of these two ideologies? Indeed, these aspects drew ‘Alawis (and other poor rural minorities) to the Ba’th more than its Pan-Arab nationalism.

            The only rival to the Ba’th was the SSNP, which offered roughly the same attractions. The two competed rather evenly for a decade, until the Ba’th eliminated the SSNP through the Maliki affair in 1955. From then on, especially in Syria, ‘Alawis were associated predominantly with the Ba’th.

            ‘Alawi Consolidation, 1963-1970:

            Three changes in regime marked the ‘Alawi consolidation of power: the Ba’th coup d’état of March 1963, the ‘Alawi coup of February 1966, and the Asad coup of November 1970.

            ‘Alawis had a major role in the coup of 8 March 1963 and took many of the key government positions in the Ba’th regime that followed. Between 1963 and 1966, sectarian battles pitting minorities against Sunnis took place within the military and the Ba’th Party.

            First the military: to resist President Amin al-Hafiz, a Sunni, and to consolidate their new position, ‘Alawi leaders flooded the military with cosectarians. In this way, minority officers came to dominate the Syrian military establishment. When seven hundred vacancies opened in the army soon after the March 1963 coup, ‘Alawis filled half the positions. So restricted were Sunnis, some graduating cadets were denied their commissions to the officer corps. While ‘Alawis, Druze, and Isma’ilis held politically sensitive positions in the Damascus region, Sunnis were sent to regions distant from the capital. Although communal affiliation did not drive every alliance, it provided the basis for most enduring relationships. ‘Alawi leaders such as Muhammad ‘Umran built key units of members from their own religious community. Sunni officers often became figureheads, holding high positions but disposing of little power. In retaliation, Hafiz came to see nearly every ‘Alawi as an enemy and pursued blatant sectarian policies, for example, excluding ‘Alawis from some positions solely on the basis of communal affiliation.

            Even ‘Alawi officers who resisted confessionalism eventually succumbed to it. Political events solidified ties between ‘Alawis, reducing the tribal, social, and sectarian differences that historically had split them. Itamar Rabinovich, a foremost student of this period, explains how confessionalism acquired a dynamic of its own:

            J’did [Salah Jadid, ruler of Syria 1966-70] was among those who (for political reasons) denounced ‘Umran for promoting “sectarianism” (ta’ifiyya) but ironically he inherited the support of many ‘Alawi officers who had been advanced by ‘Umran…. The ‘Alawi officers promoted by ‘Umran realized that their overrepresentation in the upper echelons of the army was resented by the majority, and they seem to have rallied around J’did, by then the most prominent ‘Alawi officer in the Syrian army and the person deemed most likely to preserve their high but precarious position. It was also quite natural for [Amin al-]Hafiz… to try to gather Sunni officers around himself by accusing J’did of engaging in “sectarian” politics…. The solidarity of [Jadid’s] ‘Alawi supporters seems to have been further cemented by the feeling that the issue had assumed a confessional character and that their collective and personal positions were at stake.
            The same factors caused Druze officers – also overrepresented in high military offices – to throw in their lot with the ‘Alawis in 1965.

            A similar dynamic occurred in the Ba’th Party. Just as ‘Alawis filled more than half of seven hundred military vacancies, so they moved in numbers into the party. To make their recruitment possible, ideological requirements for admission were relaxed for two years after March 1963. Many party officials brought in members of their family, tribe, village, or sect. As an internal Ba’th Party document of 1966 explained the problem, “friendship, family relationship and sometimes mere personal acquaintance were the basis” of admission to the party, leading “to the infiltration of elements alien to the party’s logic and points of departure.” While ‘Alawis brought in other ‘Alawis, many Sunnis were purged. Membership quintupled in the year after its accession to power, transforming the party from an ideological to a sectarian affiliation. The Ba’th became an entirely different institution during its first two and half years in power (March 1963 to late 1965 ).

            These changes culminated in Hafiz’ decision in February 1966 to purge 30 officers of minority background from the army. Hearing of his plan, a group of mainly ‘Alawi Ba’thist officers pre-empted Hafiz and took power on 23 February in Syria’s bloodiest-ever change of government. Once in office, they purged rival officers belonging to other religious groups – first the Sunnis and Druze, then the Isma’ilis – further exacerbating communal tensions. ‘Alawi officers received the most important postings, and acquired unprecedented power. The Regional Command of the Ba’th Party, a key decisionmaking center, included no representatives at all during the 1966-70 period from the Sunni urban areas of Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama. Two-thirds of its members, however, were recruited from the rural and minority populations in Latakia, the Hawran, and Dayr az-Zur. The skewing was even more apparent among military officers on the Regional Command; during 1966-70, 63 percent came from Latakia alone.

            The ‘Alawi hold on power provoked bitter complaints from other communities. A Druze military leader, Salim Hatum, told the press after he fled Syria that ‘Alawis in the army outnumbered the other religious communities by a ratio of 5-to-1. He noted that “the situation in Syria was being threatened by a civil war as a result of the growth of the sectarian and tribal spirit.” He also observed that “whenever a Syrian military man is questioned about his free officers, his answer will be that they have been dismissed and driven away, and that only ‘Alawi officers have remained.” Playing on the Ba’th slogan, “One Arab nation with an eternal mission,” Hatum mocked the rulers in Damascus, saying that they believe in “One ‘Alawi state with an eternal mission.”

            Salah Jadid (1926-93) ruled Syria in 1965-70 and was Hafiz al-Asad’s final rival. He spent the last 23 years of his life in a Syrian prison.

            ‘Alawi domination did not assure stability. Two ‘Alawi leaders, Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad, fought each other for supremacy in Syria through the late 1960s, a rivalry that ended only when Asad prevailed in November 1970. In addition to differences in outlook – Jadid was more the ideologue and Asad more the pragmatist – they represented diverse ‘Alawi sects. The September 1970 war between the PLO and the Jordanian government was the decisive event in Asad’s rise to power. Jadid sent Syrian ground forces to help the Palestinians but Asad refused to send air cover. The defeat of Syrian armor precipitated Asad’s bloodless coup d’état two months later. This, Syria’s tenth military coup d’état in seventeen years, was to be the last for a long time to come. It also virtually ended intra-‘Alawi fighting.

  2. Patience2 Avatar
    Patience2

    What a lousy photograph. On another note, I hope this ‘setback’ won’t be their last.

  3. Hend Abyad Avatar
    Hend Abyad

    To YaLibnan that’s how a Zionist speaks about my my cousins their wives and children.

    MaImequer0

    Hend Abyad

    12 minutes ago

    ‘cousins’ do with you sweetie??? lol☻ you must be sore….
    Reply

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    1. Hannibal Avatar
      Hannibal

      Sadly, YaLibnan is nowhere to be found.

      1. 5thDrawer Avatar
        5thDrawer

        Only us sexy old guys, Hannibal. ;-))

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