By: Ya Libnan
More than a decade after the Syrian revolution began, a new chapter is being written—but instead of hope, it is soaked in fear, especially for Syria’s minority communities. With the collapse of the Assad regime, the rise of a Sunni-majority leadership under figures like Ahmed al-Sharaa has brought not stability, but renewed anxiety. Minorities such as the Druze, Alawites, and Christians—once wary of Assad but now terrified of what follows—are facing systematic violence and abandonment.
Ahmed al-Sharaa is not just any leader. He is a former jihadist figure with documented ties to al-Qaeda and ISIS. His sudden transformation into a statesman has done little to reassure those who remember the cruelty of Syria’s darkest years. While he and his allies now speak the language of governance and unity, the ground reality tells a very different story.
Clashes in the city of Sweida, a Druze stronghold in southern Syria, have left at least 37 people dead and scores wounded. Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze fighters have once again taken up arms, and the state—under Sharaa’s leadership—has responded with silence or token de-escalation efforts. Hundreds of Druze, Alawites, and Christians have been killed since Sharaa’s emergence, yet the government has made no real effort to protect them or hold attackers accountable.
These aren’t isolated incidents. They are part of a disturbing pattern that suggests the new rulers are either unwilling or incapable of protecting Syria’s rich mosaic of identities. The result is a growing exodus, as minorities increasingly view departure as their only guarantee of survival.
This failure to govern inclusively not only betrays Syria’s remaining social fabric, but it opens the door to international fragmentation. External powers, already present in Syria in various forms, are monitoring closely. Some may seek to intervene under the guise of humanitarian concern; others may exploit the chaos to carve out influence. Either path leads to the same end: the partition of Syria into sectarian or ethnic cantons, forever ending the dream of a unified state.
Ahmed al-Sharaa still has a choice to make—though time is quickly running out. If he is truly seeking redemption from his militant past, if he truly believes in a future for Syria, then protecting the country’s minorities must be his immediate priority. That means deploying state resources to guard vulnerable communities, prosecuting those responsible for sectarian violence, and publicly affirming the equal rights of all Syrians, regardless of sect or ethnicity.
Symbolic gestures are not enough. The people need action. Security. Justice. The assurance that the new Syria will not be a replica of the old tyranny in a different costume.
If Sharaa fails to rise to this moment, Syria’s minorities will not wait to be slaughtered—they will flee, they will resist, and they may ultimately seek international protection. And when that happens, Syria may cease to exist as we know it.
The survival of the state—and the credibility of its new leadership—hinges on whether Ahmed al-Sharaa is willing to break from the very ideology that once sought to destroy Syria’s pluralism. If he cannot, or will not, then he will go down not as a liberator, but as a destroyer wearing a different banner.