After Sinwar’s death, what’s next for Iran’s Axis of Resistance?

By Atlantic Council

Three hundred and seventy-six days later, he is dead. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of last October’s terrorist attack on Israel, which set off a year of war in the Middle East, was killed by Israeli soldiers today in the Gaza Strip. Sinwar’s death follows Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and ongoing campaign against both Hezbollah and Hamas, leaving Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” proxies in the region under severe strain. What should we expect now from Israel, Iran, and these groups? Our experts are on the case.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

• Ahmed F. Alkhatib (@afalkhatib): Resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and analyst who grew up in Gaza City
• Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East
• Emily Milliken (@EmilyMPrzy): Associate director at the N7 Initiative in the Middle East Programs

For Hamas in Gaza, chaos and an opening

• Sinwar’s death provides possible “off-ramps” for the war in Gaza, Ahmed tells us. He predicts “chaos” within the group that gives Israel and its allies a “chance to exploit uncertainties and divisions” to gain the release of the remaining Israeli hostages and “a general stand-down and demobilization within Hamas.”
• Jonathan notes that a new Hamas leader, especially one from outside Gaza, “may be more inclined to finalize a deal than Sinwar was.” That means US President Joe Biden will have his best opportunity in months to “again push for a ceasefire” and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will face more political pressure to strike a hostage deal ”than at any point since the war began.”
• Ahmed says there are certain steps the United States, Israel, and Arab states can take now to hasten the group’s demise: “mass amnesty” for Hamas members who stop fighting, “financial rewards” to those who help recover hostages, and a commitment from Israel “to pull out of Gaza and avoid the reoccupation of the Strip in the immediate future” while opening up the Strip to “Arab, international, and Palestinian Authority figures” to stabilize the situation.

For Hezbollah in Lebanon, the fight continues

• For the past year, Hezbollah has tied its rocket attacks on Israel to the war in Gaza. But “Israel’s operations in Lebanon have already begun and are not likely to stop, no matter the result in Gaza,” Jonathan tells us, unless there’s a mega-deal that also includes Hezbollah moving its fighters away from the Israeli border, “allowing some 70,000 Israelis finally to return home.”
• There are divisions within Israeli political and military circles around the war in Gaza. Not so regarding the campaign against Hezbollah, Jonathan notes.
• “With air and ground operations already underway, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is likely to want to continue eliminating Hezbollah’s cache of its most lethal weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles,” Jonathan says. 

For the Houthis in Yemen, new prominence and new risks

• The Yemen-based Houthis could rise in prominence after spending the last year disrupting global shipping by firing on vessels in the Red Sea, Emily says. “Tehran will likely prioritize providing the group with advanced weapons and weapon components to enable more accurate and devastating maritime operations and strikes on Israeli territory,” she tells us, with Iran perhaps working with Russia to provide the Houthis with anti-ship missiles.
• But increased prominence comes with increased risks that the group’s leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, could meet the same fate as Nasrallah and Sinwar (among many others who end up in Israel’s crosshairs). If the IDF targets senior Houthi leaders, Emily says, it “could degrade the group’s ability to operate, spur a leadership crisis, and widen the leadership vacuum within Iran’s network of allies and proxies.

(Atlantic Council)