24 soldiers killed on deadliest day for Israeli forces in Gaza combat
BY : Anshel Pfeffer
The loss of 21 IDF soldiers in a single incident proves the danger of ground operations involving large quantities of explosives. It also calls into question the merit of creating a buffer zone on the border.
Monday evening wasn’t the first time during the war that Israeli WhatsApp and Telegram groups were buzzing with dark rumors of terrible news from inside Gaza. In some previous cases, the rumors were based on reality. In others, they were drummed up by hostile sources. But just after 7 A.M. on Tuesday morning, it emerged that in the latest instance it was true – almost beyond belief.
January 22 was the bloodiest day for Israel since October 7. And since the casualties on the day of the massacre had been inside Israel, this was Israel’s bloodiest day in Gaza.
Of the 24 Israel Defense Forces soldiers killed in 24 hours, three paratrooper officers were killed in western Khan Yunis, where the IDF is still advancing against Hamas. But 21 others, all reserve troops – 19 from the 261st Infantry Brigade and two from the 205th Armored Brigade operating alongside them – were killed in an incident that took place in the Maghazi refugee camp, just 600 meters (about 2,000 feet) from the border with Israel.
The IDF has been operating in Maghazi since mid-December. It’s an area where the IDF had “operational control,” after nearly all of the residents fled and most remaining Hamas fighters were either killed or wounded. The brigade combat team there was focused on demolition work of buildings and tunnels. Two soldiers who were part of a tank team securing the force were killed by a rocket-propelled grenade fired at them, and then the explosives inside the buildings that were being prepared for destruction were detonated with the infantry force still inside, killing 19.
The direct cause of the explosions is still under investigation. Was the detonation the result of a second rocket-propelled grenade? Or was it caused by the previous strike or another source?
What’s clear, though, is that this is the price of ground operations involving large quantities of explosives. The IDF has carried out hundreds, if not thousands, of these missions in the past three months. On January 8, six soldiers were killed in another premature blast – this time of explosives that were meant to destroy a tunnel under the Bureij camp, also just a few hundred meters from the border.
In both cases, the IDF had already been in control of the area for some time. But operational control doesn’t mean there aren’t small pockets of Hamas fighters in the area capable of launching ambushes, or that the demolition work can proceed as if it was just any normal civil engineering project. Whether the cause is Hamas fire or simply the kind of accident that will happen when high explosives and immense firepower are being used in such close proximity, this is the kind of incident that will continue to occur and eventually cause more casualties than actual combat.
Senior IDF officers have admitted in recent weeks that the “follow-up” operations – trying to destroy as much of Hamas’ military infrastructure, tunnels and buildings as possible, before the IDF scales back its presence in Gaza’s main urban areas – come with a price. On January 22, the price was 21 dead soldiers.
The other question arising from the tragedy at Maghazi is whether this is part of the wider plan of creating a 1,000-meter buffer zone from the border with Israel.
An explosion in the Gaza Strip last week following Israeli airstrikes in its war against Hamas.Credit: Tyrone Siu/Reuters
IDF soldiers and officers have spoken in recent weeks of this buffer zone. Indeed, in areas close to the border in the northern sector – especially in the Shujaiyeh neighborhood in eastern Gaza City and the town to its northeast, Beit Hanoun – it has been visible from the earlier stages of the war. The streets closest to the border have all been flattened, first by airstrikes and then during the ground maneuver by tank shells and explosives laid by combat engineers.
The buffer-zone operation is questionable under international law. While the IDF is anxious to emphasize that the buildings slated for demolition served as “terror infrastructure,” this could hardly be the case for every single one near the border. There would have to be a clear military reason for destroying them. Officers involved in the operations have said the intention is to allow Israeli residents in the Gaza border communities to return home after being uprooted on October 7.
Destroying the buildings near the border serves a number of purposes. Hamas and other organizations would not have direct line-of-sight firing or observation posts on Israeli bases and communities near the border. The buffer zone would also serve as an advance staging area for IDF raids deeper into Gaza.
The military effectiveness of a buffer zone is limited, though.
The IDF maintained a buffer zone, or security zone, in southern Lebanon for 15 years between 1985 and 2000. It fulfilled its main purpose: to prevent civilian casualties along Israel’s northern border. However, 559 IDF soldiers were killed, mainly in clashes with Hezbollah, during that time – until then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak decided to fully retreat from Lebanon.
But what worked on an international border between two countries is less likely to work for a tiny, crowded coastal enclave.
For a start, the moment Hamas and other organizations reestablish their presence within Gaza City – and they are already trying to do so – they have plenty of mid- to long-range mortars and rockets to continue shelling their targets within Israel. They can make up for the absence of direct line-of-sight targeting by using drones and satellite footage that is easily accessible online. And it’s not as if they cared about being that accurate in the past anyway.
And while the destruction of buildings in the buffer zones means that many of the tunnels and shafts that existed there are no more, there will still be tunnels that were not discovered by the IDF in recent months that they can use to operate from beneath the buffer zone.
We can expect them to be used in the same fashion as they were before the disengagement from Gaza in 2005, when tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor – Israel’s buffer zone on the border with Egypt – were used to blow up IDF outposts and vehicles.
Then there are the political and diplomatic aspects. The Israeli government has assured the Biden administration and other allies that it doesn’t intend to occupy any part of the Gaza Strip once Hamas is destroyed and the war is over. The IDF will insist that the buffer zone is temporary, but it is hard to see any Israeli government, not just the present one, announcing the total withdrawal from a Gaza buffer zone with the events of October 7 still fresh in the public’s memory.
Yet in the absence of any clear strategic direction coming from the Netanyahu government, which has proved incapable of even holding a cabinet discussion on Israel’s “day after” policy in Gaza, this is the only solution the IDF can come up with for now: Dangerous demolition operations that will continue to cause casualties, and a temporary buffer zone that may or may not serve its purpose and become semi-permanent.
HAARETZ
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