and an international agreement to implicitly accept a Lebanese government that includes Hezbollah with a seat at the UN Security Council. Regional and international messages exchanged through the Lebanese arena are reassuring for the Lebanese and for the region, at least for now. Also reassuring is what the Saad Hariri Government claims by defining itself as “the government of achievements”, signifying that it will focus on the economy, reform, job-creation and privatization, considering that consensus and rapprochement, especially between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Syria, provides a good window of opportunity for political stability that would be characterized by giving priority to the economy. All of this represents an opportunity for Hezbollah to position itself locally, regionally and internationally as a Lebanese political party that has its place and its standing, and to shake off its reputation as the third corner in what is referred to as the “Emirate Triangle”, the common denominator being the fact that they receive rockets from Iran, as well as its enmity towards the United States and the countries of Arab moderation. Its enmity towards Israel is natural as long as there is no peace between Lebanon and Israel, but rather a state of war, since officially the conflict between the two still stands. Nevertheless, it is not in Hezbollah’s interest to be part of a “triangle” or to form what is described as the “South Lebanon Emirate”, alongside the “Gaza Emirate” under Hamas’s supervision or the “Saada Emirate” under the Houthis in Yemen. The South’s inhabitants may want to lend moral and material support to help the Palestinians get rid of the Israeli occupation, but they most probably do not want to be party to the wars of the Houthis or of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Such plans are truly destructive and are feared to turn Yemen into another Somalia. The responsibility of the Yemenis themselves is the prime consideration, this including the mistakes made by the Yemeni government and by President Ali Abdullah Saleh in particular. Nevertheless, there are external forces that are tampering with Yemen and there is interference, one which Iran in particular admitted to. The reactions of Saudi Arabia in warding off the spread of the fighting to its own soil are understandable, as are its fears that the internal conflict coupled with the dry nature of Yemen’s territory could lead to an unnatural flow of human migration across its borders. Indeed, the geological aspect represents a “time bomb”, according to one of the most prominent experts on Saudi-Yemeni relations, a matter which urgently requires a well-planned policy towards it, within Saudi Arabia, regionally and also in the United States, as does the possibility of Yemen turning into Somalia. Yet the aims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are difficult to understand in Yemen - beyond dangerous sectarian polarization - especially as such polarization involves the possibility of turning portions of Yemen’s territory into fertile soil for Al-Qaeda. The slogans of enmity towards America and hatred towards the “Great Satan” seem necessary for the relationship of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the United States, even at a time of increased rapprochement between the two and increasing talk of behind-the-scenes agreements, of which allowing Lebanon to finally have its government cabinet is perhaps an indication. This does not negate the reality of the shifts and surprises, as well as the incomplete and bad policies in the region, for which Lebanon has become the testing ground. Today, however, the strongest indicator points to the fact that the correct interpretation of the situation is an American, regional, European, Russian and local necessity to avoid the available opportunity slipping into corridors and nightmares for everyone.

In the issue of Lebanon, to begin with, the era of Fouad Siniora heading the Lebanese government in one of its most difficult phases should be bidden farewell to with appreciation, praise and congratulations for the pleasant surprise that was Fouad Siniora himself. Indeed, this capable man has set down an important cementing element for Lebanon, that of emphasizing the importance of state institutions for the future of the country, a legacy which it is necessary for the current Prime Minister Saad Hariri to uphold and build upon insistently.

Lebanon’s membership in the Security Council for the next two years strengthens the possibilities of it playing an exceptional role regionally and internationally, and such a role must strengthen its political and social internal fabric. Thus, instead of a reputation that turns it into an arena for proxy wars, and of sarcasm at its political structure and at its leaderships bound to external powers, the exceptional role played by the only Arab member of the Security Council can bestow on Lebanon a prestige it is in need of. This is if it correctly understands the qualities of such a position as well as its constraints, without exaggeration or excessiveness in giving the seat at the Security Council an importance that exceeds its bounds…

Lebanon’s Permanent Representative at the UN Ambassador Nawaf Salam is capable of representing Lebanon in the best way at the Security Council, and with him is an excellent team of diplomats, most of them having experience with the Security Council and two of them having represented Lebanon during one of its most difficult phases as Chargé d’Affaires of its mission, namely: current Deputy Ambassador Caroline Ziadeh and diplomat Ibrahim Assaf. During this period and before it, Majdi Ramadan had also been with them in the Lebanese mission for years, and he has returned to join the team. Thus the performance of Lebanese diplomacy has been characterized by wisdom, flexibility and composure, and that is part of the prestige Lebanon seeks after.

And because Nawaf Salam is an expert on international law, he has for example been able to play a fundamental and constructive role in bringing Arab stances closer together, and has participated in formulating an intelligent strategy in the Arabs addressing the report of Judge Richard Goldstone, which stated that Israel and Hamas had committed “war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity” in the Gaza war. This report will remain pivotal for Arab diplomacy at the United Nations and perhaps at the Security Council, especially if the Middle East peace process continues to deteriorate to rock bottom. Indeed, there is talk of the possibility of heading to the Security Council on the issue of the peace process, if the conclusion is reached that US sponsorship of such a process has reached a dead-end. In fact, the Security Council has adopted important resolutions over the peace process, including the resolution of establishing the state of Palestine alongside Israel on the basis of the road map.

If the issue of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict was to return to the Security Council, Lebanon’s role would be of the utmost importance as its only Arab member. Similarly, in any non-Arab issues, Arab membership, represented by Lebanon, will have exceptional weight. In any case, there is the importance of proximity in forging resolutions concerned with world peace and security, which places countries elected to a seat at the Security Council at the same table of talks and negotiations that includes the five permanent members: the United States, China, Russia, Britain and France.

However, alongside rights and honor, tremendous responsibilities fall upon the shoulders of the Lebanese government as it takes its seat at the Security Council. Indeed, this seat is also one of testing the seriousness of the state and the standing it seeks after. Thus if the Lebanese delegation comes to reflect internal Lebanese disputes in the stances taken by Lebanon towards international issues, it will lose respect and also its ability to influence decision-making, as Lebanon is not a country that holds the right of veto and its vote is therefore not decisive. Hence, the importance of Lebanon at the Security Council lies in its influence much more than in its vote.

Security Council members, in their first meeting after the Lebanese government was formed this week, welcomed this achievement without any of them - including the United States - voicing reservations over the composition of the cabinet, which includes ministers who are members of Hezbollah. This is also a welcoming message to the membership of Lebanon in the council and a message of willingness to look the other way in order to help the country, however with an insistence on the resolve to implement all resolutions, including Resolution 1559, which the US representative made sure to mention. Indeed, the Security Council will not retract resolutions, and any attempt - or thought of one - towards the possibility of annulling or removing a certain resolution is only an unrealistic dream. Indeed, Resolution 1559, which demands the dismantling of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias is staying at the Security Council, as are the resolutions that established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to try those implicated in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his companions, in addition to the other assassinations which the investigation proves to be related to that of Hariri. Thus it would be wise to avoid any attempt to rally against Security Council resolutions, and it is necessary for Lebanon to cling to the firm stance it has taken, that of committing to implement all of the resolutions that concern it.

Iran could create a climate of confrontation at the Security Council, this to bring the nuclear issue out of it and to return it exclusively to Vienna, where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is based. The message of the United States and Britain during the closed session this week to look into Resolution 1701, which is concerned with Lebanon and which has laid down the circumstances and the conditions of sustaining the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, was a clear one. Indeed, the representatives put forth the issue of the Iranian ship that was seized by Israel, which claimed that it was carrying weapons and headed to Syria on its way to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Yet they did so by holding Iran responsible and did not make use of it to attack Hezbollah. Similarly, the Security Council decided to refer the matter to the sanctions commission concerned with Iran, which prohibits Iran by virtue of Resolution 1747 from smuggling weapons outside of its territory.

Yet such a message of goodwill will not last if Hezbollah insists on forcing its own agenda on the Lebanese government. Indeed, the issue of “resistance” which it seeks to introduce to the ministerial statement was resolved under the Siniora government and there is no need to provoke a crisis and an unnecessary problem on the eve of Lebanon entering the council.

As for Iran, it is well able to take care of itself in its relations with the great powers. And just as there is no need for the United States, Russia or France to corner Lebanon on the issue of Iran, there is no need for Iran to expect Lebanon to clamor on its behalf. Indeed, Lebanon’s identity at the Security Council is an Arab one.

Hence developments on the regional scene should be monitored, as some of them may reach the UN Security Council. Indeed, the council has previously addressed the Yemeni and Saudi-Yemeni issue, and developments may bring this issue back to the council on a completely different basis.

Iran has admitted this week through its Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki its direct role in Yemen, thus supporting reports which state that Iran has been providing the Houthis with funds and weapons. In fact, Mottaki threatened, saying: “we strongly advise regional and neighboring states not to interfere in Yemen’s internal affairs”. He added, promising, that “those who pour oil on the fire must know that they will not be spared from the smoke that billows”.

The United States, its government, congress, media and people, are in complete ignorance of what is happening in Yemen and why. There are even high-ranking directors in the US Administration in charge of the issue of Yemen and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) who are surprised to hear of basic evident facts, after having decided to dwarf the issue and to reject the reports of Iran’s role in Yemen. Today, the US Administration, the American media and American intellectual and research institutions must devote themselves to understanding what is happening in Yemen before it is too late and it becomes the most dangerous failed state for the region and the world.

Likewise, Saudi diplomacy must participate in the information campaign by clarifying what its current policy and strategy is towards Yemen, and how it intends to handle the issue with Iran. Indeed, there is dire need to make US officials and the American media aware of the dangers of the “time bomb” called Yemen, in terms of the geology as well as of the rebellion, the tribal structure, the Houthis and the government.

The mistakes of the past are many and there is a need today to stop engaging in proxy wars and to build regional relations on the basis of turning countries into “effective states” for regional forces. Iran seems enthusiastic about persisting in this pattern, nearly making it its “signature brand”, while Arab countries wish to put a stop to such a pattern - either out of necessity or purposely due to them being occupied with internal matters and with the challenges of creating jobs for millions of young people.

Lebanon has benefited from rapprochement, consensus and agreement, at least temporarily and as a first step. As for Yemen, it deserves international mobilization before it is too late.

for a country more accustomed to serving as a battleground in regional power struggles was the fact that Lebanon has had no government since parliamentary elections in June. That was until Monday, when the majority U.S.-backed political bloc and its rivals in the Syria- and Iran-backed minority coalition finally agreed on a new power-sharing Cabinet. But while the deal ends the three-year political crisis that brought the country to the brink of civil war, it doesn't address the question underlying the dispute: Should Lebanon be a Westward-looking business-oriented tourist playground, or a frontline bastion of resistance to Israel?

Although the Western path edged out the militant posture of Hezbollah at the polls in June, Lebanon's weak political system, structured according to sect, and Hezbollah's status as one of the world's most dangerous nonstate armies, guarantees that the Shi'ite militia will remain a force to be reckoned with in Lebanese politics. (See pictures of the youth of Hezbollah.)

Ever since it survived a 33-day onslaught by Israel in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah has accused the American- and Saudi-backed ruling coalition of doing Israel's work by seeking to disarm the organization's armed wing. (The argument by its rivals is that no state can tolerate the existence of private armies independent of the sovereign government.) After the issue provoked more than a year of massive demonstrations and sit-ins in central Beirut, Hezbollah tried to settle matters the old-fashioned way in May 2008 by storming pro-government positions in West Beirut. But while its highly trained fighters easily overran the government supporters, the move alienated many Lebanese, and a democratic victory — which would have given Hezbollah's military wing all the political cover it desired — proved to be elusive. While Hezbollah and its allies easily carried the Shi'ite vote, the Christian ally it would have needed to form a government was soundly defeated in that community's polls.

Although it accepted defeat in its effort to win control of the government at the ballot box, Hezbollah has since maneuvered behind the scenes to rig the composition of the Cabinet in its favor. First it demanded veto power over all decisions, but eventually it accepted a compromise formula that left the ruling coalition without a large enough majority to make big decisions on its own. Still not content with that, the opposition pushed for control of Lebanon's telecommunications system, which would give Hezbollah added operational security from Israeli intelligence — but could also help it hamper the activities of the U.N. tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. That tribunal has implicated Syrian officials in the killing, and much of its evidence comes from telephone records. Though Hezbollah has denied wanting to derail the investigation, such pressure on its patron could disrupt the flow of weapons over the Syrian border to the Shi'ite group's arsenal. (Read a brief history of Hezbollah.)

Saad Hariri, son of the murdered former Prime Minister and leader of the ruling coalition, initially balked at Hezbollah's terms, but eventually had no choice but to give in. Lebanon's longstanding deadly rivalries and the ever present threat of violence have made Lebanese politicians wary of acting unilaterally, which is why Hariri invited Hezbollah and its allies into the Cabinet in the first place. And Hariri is increasingly isolated, with none of his allies being prepared to confront Hezbollah head-on given the experience of the May 2008 mini-civil war.

While the Bush Administration regarded the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in 2005 — as a result of international pressure and Lebanese street protests — as one of its biggest successes in the Middle East, the new Obama Administration has been less aggressive in its backing for the pro-U.S. Lebanese government. Lebanese media also suggest that Saudi Arabia was dismayed that Hariri's Future movement, which had been building a militia with Saudi money, was so easily routed by Hezbollah in the May 2008 street fights. Last month, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah traveled to Damascus for a state visit with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in part to bury the hatchet over Lebanon. Even Hariri's coalition is breaking apart. Walid Jumblatt, the leader of Lebanon's Druze community and one of the architects of the anti-Syrian movement (he once told a Washington audience that America should send car bombs to Damascus), has seen which way the wind is blowing and transformed himself into an ardent Syria-phile.

But the government's caving in to Hezbollah and Syria will have its consequences: most importantly it's a message to those in Lebanon — and the wider Middle East — who put their trust in the U.S. and political reform that guns are still more powerful than votes. Watching the Syrian-backed opposition hamstring the investigation into his father's murder will have been a bitter pill for Hariri and his followers to swallow. When the time comes to settle scores, they may be more likely to choose bullets rather than ballots to do the job.

Source: Time

- Unidentified objects will be seen, this time not only in the air, but in different places. These revelations will be the subject of many important future studies.

- An old archeological site will be discovered with carvings and paintings related to space, astrology and unidentified objects.

- Despite the many dialogues and negotiations and compromises regarding the government formation, I see a number of top Lebanese politicians regretting later its formation.
-A government therefore will be formed in Lebanon

- The case of Joseph Sader's kidnapping will come to a conclusion .

- The case of the four generals will become a very hot issue . I see a red circle of heat and the temperature around it is rising .

- An official Lebanese holiday is accompanied by an unexpected event

- Confusion and noise over some parliamentary seats and there will be a rush to find a settlement.

- Confusing battle over the issue of former minister Wiam Wahhab

- An Iranian military action beyond its borders.

- A new n Israeli plot is on the way using new tactics . It is their third try …according to my calculations, their first 2 plots have failed so far

Behind this rebirth lies a sobering reality.

As September drew to an end, most of the thousands of young expats that flocked to Lebanon for the summer left the country. Like me, the expat returns to his life in a land far away.

Though envied by his compatriots at home for the generous opportunities in richer and more stable countries, this Lebanese silently suffers. His prize is economic opportunity. The cost, however, is separation from loved ones and from a place he calls home.

An estimated 20,000-40,000 Lebanese leave the country of 4 million every year. Most are students or young professionals seeking what Lebanon fails to offer: economic opportunities in a stable environment. A lot has been said about the effect of brain drain on the country, but few think about the plight of the emigrating youth. They too suffer as a result of their ambitions. Most would prefer to remain with loved ones, yet they end up aliens abroad.

For the young expat, the dilemma is painstakingly familiar: he sits at the airport waiting for a connecting flight to Europe or America, wondering whether he is committing a huge mistake. Is it worth leaving his people, his culture, and his family behind in search for opportunity? This is not his first time leaving home. In fact, he has been shuttling back and forth for many years now. Yet he cannot explain why his throat still throbs and why he has to fight back tears each time he leaves. Though surrounded by many, he is completely alone.

The emigrant’s plight is a tale of schizophrenia. For years, he attempts to integrate into the new culture. Though he now shares experiences with his new cohort, he lacks a shared sense of identity. On many an occasion, he is reminded that he is an outsider, an alien. Meanwhile, as he acclimates to the norms of the host country, he becomes rusty with the customs of his native home. He has one foot abroad, one foot at home. Neither is enough to ground him anywhere. In essence, he becomes an outsider in both countries. That is the dissociative state of being torn between two places.

The irony is that the emigrant knows his clock is ticking. The longer he stays abroad, the harder it is for him to return home. The opportunity cost of leaving everything behind soars, and the risks rise. It becomes difficult to forego his professional standing, which he sacrificed so much to achieve, for an outcome that is uncertain. Lebanon’s political instability clouds his opportunity for decent economic gain. He could accept a mediocre job or start something from scratch. The risk of failure, however, is high as dictated by a fragile and primitive business environment. There is also no guarantee that his experience abroad will be of any use at home. Lebanon thus becomes a bittersweet memory, an ache in his heart.

The emigrant’s struggles are further exacerbated by the stigma of carrying the Lebanese passport. In the new world order defined by the events of September 11, the Lebanese migrant is less than welcomed by custom officials in Western countries. In American airports, he is labeled “special registrant,” which entails additional searches, longer waits, and inquisitive cross examinations by unwelcoming and sometimes disrespectful officers. As the West evaluates its immigration policies, the Lebanese emigrant continues to struggle to find a new home in lands that seem to no longer welcome him.

Who is to blame for the struggles of the young emigrant? The home country for creating the conditions for emigration? Globalization for making the process easier? Or the emigrant’s own ambitions for wanting what was not offered at home?

While the answer is probably a combination of all three, this reality, ultimately, is a plea to our politicians. In the new rounds of negotiations, may they genuinely attempt to form a government that maintains a seeming perception of political stability. The slightest efforts in that direction could create economic opportunities that obliterate much of the conditions for emigration and encourage émigrés to return. May their conscience remind them that young souls the age of their sons and daughters are being forced to leave their loved ones every day. They are the foregone future leaders that Lebanon so desperately needs. Their struggle is the country’s struggle. Their loss of a homeland is the country’s loss of its future.

*Maurice Obeid, a graduate from MIT and formerly with McKinsey & Company in New York, is currently pursuing an MBA and a Master in Public Policy at Harvard. He left Lebanon when he was eighteen.

Many analysts believe the risks of a strike by Israel, even one not endorsed by its ally the United States, are significant.

Here's where matters stand:

COULD ISRAEL LAUNCH A STRIKE AGAINST IRAN?

It's a poker game with high stakes and a degree of bluff. Israeli leaders refuse to rule out any option. They do not believe Iran's assurances it wants only nuclear energy. Noting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's repeated assertions that Israel has no future Israel has said an Iranian bomb would be a threat to its very existence that it simply would not tolerate.

Last year, however, it emerged officials were making plans for how Israel might live with a nuclear Iran in a state of mutual deterrence. And a June poll showed Israelis would not expect a nuclear Iran to attack . Last week, Defense Minister Ehud Barak said even a nuclear Iran could not destroy Israel, stating: "Israel can lay waste to Iran."

Since becoming prime minister in March, Benjamin Netanyahu has, aides say, made ending threats from Iran a defining element of what he sees as his personal role in Jewish history. A 1981 Israeli air strike that destroyed Iraq's only nuclear reactor, as well as a strike in Syria in 2007 that is cloaked in mystery, set precedents. Despite a policy of silence, few doubt Israel has nuclear weapons and missiles that can hit Iran.

WHAT MIGHT HOLD ISRAEL BACK?

It is not clear how Israel would define achieving its goal of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. But a pledge from Iran to forswear such arms, backed by some form of supervision and intelligence data, might be a minimum. Much will depend on Iran's actions and on U.S. President Barack Obama and others, who are pressing Iran through sanctions and diplomacy.

While many analysts doubt Iran's denials of military intent, some say Iran may be content with showing it has the potential to go nuclear quickly, without actually arming itself. Israel, however, might not accept that level of potential threat.

In the meantime, were Israel to consider a unilateral strike on it Iran it would have to weigh several major risks:

-- of retaliation, not just from Iran but its allied guerrilla groups, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Palestinian Hamas

-- of economic and diplomatic backlash from U.S. and allies

-- of a failed attack still triggering the above reactions

WHAT ARE THE KEY ELEMENTS IN TIMETABLE?

First, Iran's technology: Israel's national security adviser said in July it had passed a "red line" in terms of being able to make its own nuclear explosive but could not make significant amounts nor yet put viable nuclear warheads on its missiles.

Mossad chief Meir Dagan, seen as a key figure in Israel's Iran policy who has just had his mandate unusually extended to 2010, said in June Iran could have a viable warhead in 2014.

Second, diplomacy: Iran is to meet on Oct. 1 with six major powers concerned about its nuclear plans. In May, Obama told Netanyahu that "by the end of the year" he expected to judge whether diplomacy was succeeding. Last week, a former senior official said that if the West did not agree crippling sanctions by the end of the year, Israel would have to strike

Russia, a veto-holding member of the Security Council and potential arms supplier to Iran, has a major role

WOULD ISRAEL GO IT ALONE, WITHOUT U.S. BACKING?

Obama, at odds with Netanyahu over Jewish settlement in the West Bank and peace moves with the Palestinians, said in July he had "absolutely not" given Israel a green light to attack. He was responding to his vice-president saying that Israel had a right to act if it felt "existentially threatened". Israel would be reluctant to anger its key ally. It would not wish Washington to be surprised, might even want U.S. help. But many analysts believe Israel might yet go it alone.

Some question whether Israel's U.S.-armed military has the range and firepower to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities without U.S. help. Analysts say Israel might be content with slowing any nuclear arms program, hoping for political change to end it.

Talk of an Israeli unilateral strike may also be part of a tactic of deterrence, or a bid to ensure U.S. cooperation.

HOW MIGHT ISRAEL ATTACK IRAN?

Overt or covert? Israel has been developing "cyber-war" capabilities that could disrupt Iranian industrial and military control systems. Few doubt that covert action, by Mossad agents on the ground, also features in tactics against Iran . An advantage of sabotage over an air strike may be deniability.

Militarily Israel can also deploy the following forces:

AIR -- 500 combat aircraft, including F-15s and F-16s able to bomb Iran's west, and further with aerial refueling, a technique for which the air force has been training. Planes can overfly hostile Arab states using stealth technology. Armed with "bunker buster" bombs that can be released with accuracy outside Iran's airspace. Israel is also assumed to have dozens of Jericho missiles designed to carry conventional or nuclear warheads to the Gulf. An Israeli nuclear strike is unlikely.

LAND -- Special forces could be deployed on the ground, to spot targets, and also possibly destroy them with sabotage.

SEA -- Israel sailed one of its three German-made Dolphin submarines into the Red Sea through Suez in June, opening a way to the Gulf. The submarines are believed to be capable of firing nuclear and conventional cruise missiles.

MISSILE DEFENCE - Israel is upgrading its Arrow missile interceptor, which is underwritten by Washington, and can also expect to avail itself of American Aegis anti-missile ships deployed in the Mediterranean. X-band, a U.S. strategic radar stationed in Israel, further cements the alliance .

The Hezbollah have remained as silent as the grave - of which there are a lot in Lebanon - as well they might. For both Mr Ezzedine's radio station and his publishing business were named after Hadi Nasrallah, son of Hezbollah's general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed leading a brave but suicidal attack on Israeli occupation troops in southern Lebanon.

But things were worse than this. It now appears that Mr Ezzedine's financial collapse became inevitable after he wrote a $200,000 cheque to Hussein Haj Hassan, one of Nasrallah's closest political advisers and a Hezbollah member of parliament. The cheque bounced. The response to this within Hezbollah's bunkers can only be imagined.

The movement, created in 1982 as a result of Israel's Lebanon invasion, had built up its prestige in the Arab world on its squeaky-clean reputation for financial and political probity. Middle East dictatorships and the third-rate leadership of the Palestinian Authority may salt their millions away in foreign bank accounts, but not the incorruptible Hezbollah. Or so the world thought, until the scandal that burst around Salah Ezzedine. He is now being interviewed by the Lebanese judiciary, and is allegedly being held in the grim old prison at Roumieh, north of Beirut.

The story seems a familiar one. Flushed with massive profits in the oil business, Salah Ezzedine - so say economists in Beirut - began investing the savings of Lebanon's Shia population, rewarding them with 40 per cent interest on their deposits - with the money from yet newer investors attracted by the rewards of his scheme. Whether Salah Ezzedine did this with the calculation of a Bernard Madoff or with a charitable desire to spread his own wealth among the largest single community in Lebanon, we do not know.

The Hezbollah - the "Party of God" in Arabic - has been strangely silent this past week, an unusual characteristic for such a publicity-conscious movement whose own millions - faithfully shipped in US currency bills to Beirut from Tehran - rebuilt dozens of Shia Muslim villages destroyed in Israel's bombardment of southern Lebanon in 2006. Hezbollah members could be seen handing out bundles of newly minted hundred-dollar bills to villagers and thousands of home-owners in the Dahiya area of Beirut whose property was "rubble-ised" in Israel's bombing. Many of these civilians, Lebanese newspapers are reporting, have now lost their money with Salah Ezzedine's collapse.

While traditionally ignored by the country's government and living in the stony hills of southern Lebanon - many grow tobacco crops - as well as the Bekaa valley, members of the Shia Muslim community have been emigrants to west Africa, Brazil and Holland and have made fortunes abroad (especially on the Antwerp diamond market). The size of their remittances home is made manifest in many of their ancestral towns. Villas of unseemly conspicuous wealth - replete with marble colonnades, Greek pillars and manicured lawns - sit on desolate hillsides, sometimes only metres from the Israeli border.

Of course, there is another reason why Hezbollah might want to keep quiet just now. Many Muslims believe that bank interest is un-Islamic, which is why the Lebanese Shia put their money in businesses run by Salah Ezzedine, who was known as a "pious" man - an optional extra for all friends of the Hezbollah - and whose Haj pilgrimages had become an essential element of that fixed part of the Muslim calendar in Lebanon.

Independent

Lebanon, the pretend state ,on the other hand likes to think of itself as a modern democratic republic when in fact it is ruled and controlled by traditional modern day feudal lords whose power is rarely challenged or even questioned and whose sphere of influence is viewed as being rather saintly. Rafic Hariri is assassinated and his Premiership passes automatically to his son Sa'ad who has not lived in the country for a long time and whose knowledge of its policies and social formation is practically nil. As if that is not enough Sa'ad is seriously thinking about bringing into the Government another one or two Hariri neophytes. The same story repeats itself ad infinitum. Pierre Gemayel who started the Phalange party modeled around Generalissimo Franco's fascist brown shirts passed the leadership of the party,just like anyother family heirloom, to his sons who have in turn passed it along to their sons. It is doubtful that either Sami or Nadim Gemayel has any qualifications besides the family name. (Rumours have it that one of these young Gemayels will be given a Ministry to run in the new cabinet) The same pattern repeats itself with the Frangieh clan where the leadership has passed from father to son to grandson. And then there is Walid Jumblatt who not only inherited the leadership of the Druze but also the mantle to the Progressive Socialist Party. Note the irony. A rich feudal lord inherits,based on kinship only, the leadership of a clan and the Progressive Socialist Party that obviously can neither be socialist nor progressive. Its funny how all of these political feudal lords always have next of kin that are ready to assume their role in order to continue the charade that we call democracy.

The names mentioned above might be the most powerful and the most egregious but they are by no means the only unquestioned political dynasties in Lebanon. There are the Arslans, the Salams, the Beydouns, the Karamis and the new comers of the Aouns,possibly the Beris and Lahouds among others. Why all of this nepotism and undemocratic practices? Is there a special virus in the water of the region or in the air that we inhale?
The current impasse in forming a cabinet is very much related to nepotism. No major party in Lebanon takes a stand dictated by ideas. It is always about personal power and spheres of influence. It is never about Lebanon the state but about the preservation of privilege and the ability to abuse power. This is no fertile ground for democracy , these are the conditions to ensure that any longing for true responsible representation is suffocated at birth. Yet what our feudal lords and abusers do not realize is that one can check freedom only for so long. Eventually the people will rise and the yoke of exploitation will be broken.

A Podcast of the above may be heard at: ramblings11.mypodcast.com

Comments: wp.karam@gmail.com

A Podcast of the above can be heard at: ramblings11.mypodcast.com

Send comments to: wp.karam@gmail.com

In a keynote speech Friday night marking the third anniversary of that war's end, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah outlined his strategy for Lebanon to deter Israel from launching another offensive. Responding to Israeli threats to flatten southern Lebanese villages and infrastructure, he vowed to attack Tel Aviv if Israel targeted Beirut or its southern suburbs, where Hezbollah's headquarters are.

"We are now capable of attacking any city or village throughout Israel," he said, dismissing recent Israeli threats against Hezbollah as psychological warfare. "When Israelis talk a lot, it means that they will do nothing. However, when they are silent like a snake we have to be cautious." Nasrallah's comments, delivered via a live video feed to a crowd of flag-waving supporters and invited politicians, were the latest in a month-long barrage of threats from both sides of the Lebanon-Israel border.

The saber-rattling, touched off in mid-July by explosions near an alleged Hezbollah weapons cache here in the hills of south Lebanon, seems driven more by a fear that the other side will take action, than a desire to launch a fresh round of fighting, say analysts and United Nations peacekeepers here.

"Contrary to the talk, the situation on the ground in our area of operations is generally quiet," says Milos Strugar, senior advisor to the UN peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL, which patrols the southern Lebanon border district. "In our contacts with all the parties, they reiterate to us their interest in upholding the cessation of hostilities."

Israel fears retaliation for assassination

That Israeli media has reflected concerns that Hezbollah may be planning an attack against Israel in revenge for the slaying of Imad Mughniyah, the group's top military commander, in a car bomb assassination in Damascus in February last year. There was no claim of responsibility for the assassination, but Hezbollah has blamed Israel. There have been reports over the past year of foiled revenge attacks against Israeli targets in Central Asia and Africa.

The warnings have cast a cloud over what has been a bumper summer tourist season for Lebanon with more than 1 million visitors recorded in July in a country with a population of only 4 million.

On Thursday, Israeli President Shimon Peres called Hezbollah a "curse" and accused it of "destroying" Lebanon and "bringing calamity" upon the Lebanese through its subservience to Iran.

Last week, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that in the next war Israel would bomb Lebanese infrastructure. Sheikh Hisham Safieddine, a top Hezbollah official, responded that if Barak commits a "foolish act" in Lebanon, the next war would make the 2006 conflict "look like a joke."

Hezbollah, meanwhile, has made little effort to disguise the fact that it has rearmed and expanded its military capabilities in anticipation of a fresh conflict.

Hezbollah No. 2: We're stronger than in 2006

In a recent interview with the Monitor, Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's No. 2, said the group has absorbed and implemented the lessons learned from the 2006 war and has been "getting ready and prepared in case Israel launches an aggression against us."

"This is the shape of the Resistance at this stage," the white-turbaned cleric said. "Hezbollah is in a better condition than it was in July 2006. And if the Israelis think they will cause more damage against us, they know that we also can inflict more damage on them."

Danny Ayalon, Israel's deputy foreign minister, on Sunday expanded the geographical scope of the threats.

"If, God forbid, one hair falls off the head of any Israeli representative abroad, or of even an Israeli who is not an official representative, tourists etc., we will consider Hezbollah responsible," he said.

It is not the first time both sides have engaged in a flurry of cross-border threats, however.

"We have witnessed many times Israeli threats and Hezbollah counter threats and then nothing happens," says Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a Lebanese expert on Hezbollah.

Active weapons cache sparked saber-rattling

Tensions began to mount in mid-July when a series of powerful explosions shook this village set among steep hills in south Lebanon, 10 miles north of the border with Israel. The explosions emanated from a suspected Hezbollah arms cache in the basement of a two-story building on the side of a valley outside Khirbet Silm.

UNIFIL counted up to 60 separate blasts that caused extensive damage to the building, hurled unexploded ordnance up to 200 yards away, and sparked a brush fire on the valley slopes.

The explosions hardened a long-standing Israeli belief that Hezbollah has been stashing weapons in southern Lebanese villages in contravention of UN Resolution 1701. The resolution, which helped end the 2006 war, forbids "any armed personnel, assets and weapons" in the southern border zone other than those of the Lebanese state and UNIFIL.

Hezbollah said that the blasts were caused by an old stock of Israeli munitions left over from the 2006 war, and noted that Israel flouts Resolution 1701 on a near daily basis by flying jets and reconnaissance drones in Lebanese airspace - actions the UN has repeatedly criticized.

Exclusive details from forthcoming U.N. report

The Monitor has learned that the preliminary findings of a UNIFIL investigation into the incident, which is expected to be completed next week, concludes that the arms were generally old and had been stored there before the 2006 war. They included large quantities of 60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortar tubes and rounds, a few 107mm Katyusha rockets and heavy machine gun rounds - all of which are used by Hezbollah. The cache additionally included old Israeli 155mm and 152mm artillery shells. Hezbollah does not possess artillery capable of firing those shells.

Still, UNIFIL found evidence that the facility was being guarded by Hezbollah militants, who control the surrounding area. Among the debris in the building, according to a UNIFIL officer, were mattresses, a military boot, a forklift truck for loading pallets of ammunition, a flatbed truck, and a sports utility vehicle.

In the past three years, UNIFIL on many occasions has discovered and removed old munitions, such as mortar shells and rockets, abandoned by Hezbollah after the 2006 war in rugged valleys along the border. But the incident in Khirbet Silm is the first evidence of an active arms cache in the UNIFIL area.

"The difference between the previous findings of arms is that this was, according to preliminary reports, an actively maintained ammunition depot," UNIFIL's Strugar says, adding it was a "serious violation" of Resolution 1701.

The Christian Science Monitor

This logic seems sound. Many in the Levant gave competing ideologies a second chance after Arab nationalists were humiliated in the 1967 War. In fact, Israel welcomed nonviolent Islamic cultural movements during this period—especially in the Gaza Strip—with hopes that it would weaken the PLO’s monopoly on power, and exempt them from providing for the Palestinian population. Over time, certainly given the chance from the inability and corruption of the PLO, the Palestinian Islamists were able to build enough support that it could even win an election.

The problem with this popularized version of history is that it is incomplete. Sure the Palestinian politics of today are bitterly divided into competing nationalist and Islamic factions; what isn’t so talked about, however, is a so-called “third force” that has entered Palestinian political sphere. Lets call it the rise of Salafi-Jihadism.

While this new brand of Islamism is still relatively contained to Palestinian refugee camps outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories, the recently foiled plot in South Lebanon should send chills down the streets of Arab capitals.

Last Monday the Lebanese Army arrested 10 suspects accused of plotting attacks against UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Nearly all arrested had origins from other Middle Eastern countries, and had entered Lebanon on fake passports. Though the extent of their plot is yet to be fully exposed, these men reportedly belonged to the al Qaeda-inspired Fatah al-Islam group, that became famous after a heated battle with the Lebanese Army at the Nahr al-Barid camp, in the summer of 2007.

Though it is a dangerous game to contemplate hypotheticals , one can’t help but imagine the implications of such an attack against the UN peacekeeping force. None of the usual players...Hezbollah, Lebanon, Israel—vest much faith in UNIFIL’s supposed mission of disarmament and territorial guardianship, as defined in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, to begin with. And at this point in the great political game, UNIFIL’s ability to “get even more tough” seems unlikely.

Such an attack would not only have served as catalyst for a troop reevaluation, but it would have caused the countries involved to question their commitment to this fragile peacekeeping mission. Though UNIFIL has a vastly limited role in keeping the peace along the Blue Line, the withdrawal of such a force would likely be written in history as a melodic overture for the next Lebanon war,

Simply put, this kind of plot has the marks of a Salafi-Jihadi group all over it. Islamists like Hamas or Hezbollah—for whatever one many think of their actions, do in fact have indisputable local and territorial connections to their conflict. Fatah al-Islam, in both this week’s case and the 2007 standoff at the Nahr al-Bahred camp in North Lebanon, have at least shown to be more interested in provoking conflict vis-à-vis global jihad than working for the poor who live in it.

The truth is that a new wave of Salafi-Jihadism is breaking over the Palestinian refugee camps of the Levant. Jordanian journalist, Murad Batal al-Shishani, published an article in al-Hayat on 29 June 2009, titled “Salafi-Jihadism: A New Face in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria’s Palestinian Camps,” where he argues that these camps have turned into a playground for “neo-Zarqawis” to spread their Jihadi ideology. He argues that the reason is rooted in the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the slow decline of the PLO’s hegemony of the camps, the political fallout of the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and the simple fact that poverty and unemployment are on the rise.

Combining these factors, it should come as no surprise that there is an increased willingness to listen to this kind of Islamist ideology in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. And, while there are plenty of fingers to point for this crisis, the truth is that the political system in Lebanon cannot feasibly absorb some 400,000 Palestinian refugees without crumbling the existing ethos in Lebanon.

The catch-22 arrives—at least for those interested in the predicable status quo—when these camps become a destination ground for international Salafi-Jihadist who are intent on using these camps for planning attacks, like the planned attacks against UNIFIL earlier this week. Though these camps may be monitored by Syrian intelligence, the Lebanese Army and Hezbollah, the events of earlier this week have shown that the archetype of the wild western refugee camp must finally be addressed. No matter how much any of the mentioned parties do not want to work with the Palestinian factions who traditionally control these camps, the new era of Salafi-Jihadi will prove to be much worse.

There should be no doubt that with the ingenuity and commitment of the new U.S administration, the global community and a committed Lebanese government that the worsening situation in these camps cannot be resolved. If the rise of a bunch of “neo- Zarqawis” in the prison-like camps of Lebanon can teach us anything, it should be that this is how dire the hidden camps of Lebanon have become.