The threat of a civil war appears to have been averted. However, the toll of the most recent political crisis (65 dead and 250 injured) that pitted Shiites against Sunnis is no cause for celebration on either side. The opposing parties could at most breathe a sigh of relief that things could have been worse.

The mediators, the Emir of Qatar and an Arab League delegation presented the terms of the accord in a diplomatic manner in order to prevent Lebanon's governing parties from losing face. However, they were unable to conceal the fact that the Hezbollah-led opposition was the victor.

How the crisis began

The crisis began when the Lebanese government declared that Hezbollah's extensive telephone network, which the group installed to provide secure communications between its leaders and cadres, was illegal. At the same time, the authorities announced that they would sack a pro-Hezbollah general who was the chief of security of Beirut's international airport. The Shiite group viewed this as an attempt by the United States and Israel to bring an end to their special position in Lebanon. Hezbollah and its militia - which enjoy the support of Syria and Lebanon - form a kind of state within a state.

Hezbollah's armed fighters took over mostly Sunni western Beirut in no time at all. Elsewhere in Lebanon they seized strongholds of the governing parties. The Lebanese army did not get involved in the fighting out of fear of a split between Shiite and Sunni soldiers.

It was soon obvious how lopsided the balance of power was - the government had overplayed its hand The two measures were quickly rescinded before talks began in Qatar on reaching a political solution.

Crisis over

The accord demonstrates the balance of power. It involves the formation of a government of national unity in which the opposition led by Hezbollah has the right of veto, a demand for which Hezbollah has been fighting for the past 18 months. The Shiite group had erected a campsite in the centre of Beirut which paralyzed the work of the government. The opposition also prevented the election of a new president. Now that Hezbollah has got its way the siege has been lifted and the new president, army leader Michel Soleiman, can be elected this Sunday.

New electoral legislation will also redraw the boundaries of constituencies so they better reflect the composition of the population. This means that principally Sunni, Christian and Shiite districts will chiefly be represented by candidates from their own communities. At present a Christian candidate, for example, can often only be elected with votes from a Muslim majority.

No word on disarmament

In the end Hezbollah has managed to hold off any discussion of disarmament. Negotiations achieved no more than a commitment from all parties not to resort to arms or violence to resolve political conflict.

The movement has therefore won on all fronts. But it could be a Pyrrhic victory. While Hezbollah may have won concessions from the government, it has also suffered serious political damage. In the first place, it has of course taken the blame for the deaths and injuries incurred during the crisis. But the greatest harm has been done to its relationship with the other religious groupings in Lebanon, in particular the Sunni community.

Tarnished image

Hezbollah has always presented itself not as a Shiite militia group but rather as a resistance movement for the whole of Lebanon, which successfully ended the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and which in the summer of 2006 stood up to the might of the Israeli army. And it has also always claimed that its arms were needed to fight Israel and would never be used against fellow Lebanese.

This image has been tarnished by the take-over in West Beirut. In the Sunni community it was seen as a major humiliation, and for Hezbollah this represents a considerable political problem.

However powerful it may be, Hezbollah knows that in a country like Lebanon with many religious communities, government is only possible through consensus. This is just as true for the opposition as it is for the government. What is more, Hezbollah is under heavy international pressure to lay down its arms. To counterbalance pressure from pro-Western Arab regimes such as those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the organization needs the support of Sunni Arab public opinion. But it risks losing the Sunni sympathy it enjoyed during the war with Israel in 2006 if it becomes seen too much as a purely Shiite movement. Hezbollah will only have really won if in future national dialogue it succeeds in rebuilding bridges with the Sunni community.

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