their vision is likely to be a black and white picture of the future awaiting the 10, 425-square kilometer republic. The Lebanese politicians, however, are aware that, while agreeing on a president will certainly not solve all the problems, it will save the country from chaos and pave the road towards resuming the national dialogue among the Lebanese parties.
This concern is largely reflected in the Lebanese media, whose columns are full of analytical articles which, though not without ideological bias, seek to cast light on the various aspects of the Lebanese crisis. The greatest attention, though, is focused on the principal question of the moment, which everyone is eager to know the answer to: what if Lebanon fails to elect a new president? The next session of the Lebanese parliament, as we know, will be held in three weeks time and is expected to be the last chance for the conflicting Lebanese parties to agree on a candidate trusted by both alliances. Most political analysts predict that the most probable scenario would be that the country will rapidly move towards chaos if the parliament fails to agree on a compromise regarding the future president, which raises serious concerns that this could threaten the foundation of the Lebanese state. A quick look at the present alternatives would confirm that the increasing sense of pessimism is not without reason.
The 14th of March Alliance has made it clear that it will elect a president by the half plus one parliamentary voting system should the two parties fail to reach a political compromise, a proposal completely rejected by the opposition on the grounds that such a move goes against the constitution which demands a two-thirds parliamentary vote. This explains why much of the current debate is focused on foreseeing the consequences of this step in light of the expected response of the opposition to it.
According to most Lebanese political analysts, the opposition has two cards to play in response to such a possible forced election. The first would be for the president to appoint a transition government headed by the army commander to run the country until the election of a new president. The major obstacle to such a move, however, would be the Lebanese Army commander's own position, given that he does not seem to be interested in leading a government which he knows very well would exacerbate the existing divisions. This begs the question: who would accept the leadership of such a government, knowing beforehand that it would lead to more divisions? Another potential problem it highlights is the army general's capability to preserve the unity of the army if things developed towards a worst-case scenario. The second possibility is that the opposition elects its own president, which would result in Lebanon's being simultaneously ruled by two presidents and consequently two governments and two parliaments, a situation which everybody realizes would lead the country towards more divisions.
Even compared with the past when Lebanon was embroiled in civil war, some believe that the present situation is more complicated because at least during the civil war, all legal institutions including the presidency continued to operate. A nightmare which many don't even wish to contemplate would be to repeat the bitter experience of the two government state, as happened during the last days of President Amin Al-Gemayel's term, when he appointed General Aoun to head a military government which conflicted with the government of Salim Al-Hoss. The battle of Nahr Al-Bared with the fundamentalists of Fatah Al-Islam and the seemingly increasing spread of fundamentalism in Lebanon and the region is yet another warning that should alert the Lebanese politicians to the fact that the chaos won’t be contained as in previous conflicts. It is noteworthy to emphasize that the continuation of the crisis is pushing the enlightened middle classes to leave the country and forcing more sectors of Lebanese society towards poverty and frustration in a region full of conflicts, where the militant religious discourse is in one of its stronger phases. All of this will, sooner or later, lead to the weakening of the already-scattered liberal and democratic forces, which will turn Lebanon into a perfect breeding ground for extremism and fanatics. If one draws a diagram to understand the socio-political conditions which provided the fundamental groups with the right atmosphere to grow, one will find that chaos, poverty and divisions are the best social carriers for the growth of this phenomenon.
This is obvious from Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia which, like Lebanon, contain various levels of tribal and religious conflicting powers and civil strife, fed and encouraged by the presence of the imperial power as in the Iraqi case, with this combination ultimately leading to these nations becoming strongholds of Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-like fundamentalism. This situation will be different to the past when the internal conflicts in Lebanon were fought within the Lebanese political fault lines, and so were ultimately capable of being controlled. The new situation could lead to instability that would inevitably make Lebanon a bastion for Al-Qaeda or for various forms of local Qaeda’s, which would make Lebanon the second major base for Al-Qaeda in the Middle East. If we add to this the impact of the current Iraqi culture of violence and also to the wider Middle East conflict, which is gradually changing from the shape of a national struggle against the apartheid state of Israel to a form of religious conflict, we will understand that this atmosphere would be an important factor in feeding religious extremism.
It seems, however, that there are still some signs of hope in Lebanon, one of which recently appeared in the form of Parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri's initiative towards a political compromise, a step welcomed by the influential Maronite patriarch, Cardinal Sfeir, and met with varying degrees of acceptance by the 14th of March Alliance. Even though the assassination of the MP Antoine Ghanem was a setback to the political efforts made following Berri's initiative, it seems that the more time passes, the more it is hoped that fear of the unknown will unite the Lebanese towards finding a solution before the country slides towards the heart of darkness, which would, in the view of many, mark the end of the Lebanese state as a formula of coexistence between various faiths. The question is: will the Lebanese politicians overcome their inter-party conflicts to realize that the very basis of the Lebanese state is under threat this time and understand that, if the 1975 civil conflict took 15 years to resolve, this conflict, if unresolved, will probably lead Lebanon to forms of Afghanization ,Iraqization and Somalization? It is difficult to answer this question, but it is certain that the wisdom and the political maturity of the Lebanese politicians are undergoing a major test right now.
*Dr. Salim Nazzal is a Palestinian-Norwegian historian in the Middle East, who has written extensively on social and political issues in the region.
Picture: War in Iraqi . If the Lebanese politicians do not overcome their inter-party conflicts this will probably lead Lebanon to forms of Afghanization ,Iraqization and Somalization and could become a stronghold of Al-Qaeda
Sources: amin.org
Tags: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, Gemayel, hoss, Iraq, Lebanon, Michel Aoun, Somalia