
Although cars smuggled into Iraq mostly end up for sale on the black market -- and are not specifically destined for use in suicide bombings -- Syria's failure to enforce effective border controls on stolen cars raises serious questions as to its ability, or willingness, to prevent other types of cross-border smuggling and infiltrations, including by suicide bombers. As such, the situation helps to undermine efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq.
Car theft is a well-organized criminal activity in Lebanon, and most of the stolen cars end up in Syria. During the period of Syria's military presence in Lebanon, some Syrian intelligence officers participated in the trafficking of stolen cars, charging criminal organizations approximately $1,000 per car for their help in getting the vehicles across the Lebanese-Syrian border. Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country in 2005, incidents of car theft have slowed down noticeably, which suggests the extent to which Syrian officials were involved.
The cars are stolen in Lebanese cities and then taken to chop shops in the northern Bekaa Valley near Baalbek, where Hezbollah maintains a strong presence. At these facilities, the vehicle identification number is erased from the engine block and other indications of the car's origins are removed. From there, they are taken along the rugged back roads through the Anti-Lebanon Mountains into Syria.
When the cars are ready to be smuggled out of Lebanon, Syrian intelligence officers enter the process. Under an arrangement with local officials, the Syrian facilitators turn a blind eye to the smuggling operation -- apparently as long as the smugglers are not caught by Syrian border patrols. In that case, the officials would prosecute the smugglers, though it is not clear whether they would go after the intelligence officers.
The stolen cars are then smuggled across the Syrian border into Iraq, entering the county at the al-Walid crossing near Al Qaim in Anbar province. The crossing is part of a centuries-old system of smuggling routes though the Syrian Desert, which includes the "Rat Line" used to bring foreign jihadist insurgents into Iraq. Although the Syrians claim to be serious about enforcing border security along the Iraqi border, the smugglers can easily avoid Syrian patrols, which operate on a fixed schedule.
Although it is possible that some of these cars end up being used in attacks and suicide bombings in Iraq, the vehicles more likely are destined for the black market. Since the fall of Hussein regime, the market for cars and spare parts has grown. In Baghdad alone, the number of registered cars reportedly has almost tripled, to more than 1 million, since Saddam Hussein's downfall. To satisfy this demand, secondhand cars are imported from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Jordan. In addition, stolen cars from all over the world -- including the United States -- have ended up in Iraq. It is virtually impossible to trace the origin of most of these vehicles, given the lack of adequate motor vehicle registration and record-keeping in Iraq's often chaotic environment.
Syrian ineffectiveness in plugging the holes in its border with Iraq, however, clearly is one reason for the flood of stolen vehicles. Moreover, the lack of border controls presents another obstacle to security and stability in Iraq because, if cars can be smuggled in, practically anything else can as well -- including suicide bombers.
Sources: stratfor.com
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