Victory Claim n was related to Israel where, as a result of the "the first war that Israel has lost and failed to achieve its objectives", his "victory" in the July-August war "forced the Israeli army's chief of staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz to resign his post before facing a committee of investigation that would recommend he be fired".

Victory Claim n+1 was aimed at Lebanon, fittingly. It comes after the "peaceful demonstrations", when he and Aoun dragged us back to the dark days of the civil war with their " legal" roadblocks. Far from blinking first, Nasrallah magnanimously chose not to topple the government, another victory.

I would hate to see Victory Claim n+2

One thing is certain; we can ill afford any more "victories". They are not merely dragging us back to the civil ear, they are dragging us further back, to the "Black Arabism" Stone Age, back when Arabs were forced to gather round defeated and discredited Leaders.

Such a "conservative revolution" will ultimately fail, for three chief reasons, one local, one regional, and one historic.

The Limits of Sectarian Politics

Regardless of foreign support, all politics remain local. And for all its claim of world-wide revolution, Hezb is as local as it gets; sectarian party with sectarian appeal. It is paradoxically further limited by its own success, unable to expand beyond his core, since whatever appeals to them is anathema to others.

This was demonstrated by people's opposition to his thugs, not all of it orchestrated by "militias", as Hezb's own militia leader claims. Nasrallah is prisoner of his own little kingdom, and cannot grow it further to reach the Lebanese political centre

Any allies he may have gained from outside his own camp will themselves loose support from within their own communities. As push came to shove; Aoun's power base was undermined last week and Geagea emerged reinforced.

Incidentally, the same dynamics applies to "March 14th"; as it gathers to oppose Nasrallah's coup d'état, it risks turning into an increasingly sectarian, unstable, alliance whose self-perpetuation is its only real goal.

The Limits of Regional Hegemony

Similar limits apply regionally. Hezb's patrons in Iran have been increasingly assertive in the region, looking for hegemony in the Persian Gulf. While they strive to play great power politics, they may only now be waking up key players in their chess game; the Arabs.

Indeed, the Arabs may be moving assertively, attacking Iran's two Achilles heels; its ethnic makeup and its source of funds.

The first players they too easily dismiss are the Arabs. The Arabs can compensate for their apparent weakness by confronting Iran's "appeal" to the Shiites in their midst by their own appeal to the Arabs in Iran's Khuzistan, which produces 80% of Iran's oil. Those Arabs of "Iqlim el-Ahwaz ", while nominally part of Persia, have had a large autonomy and even a few decades of independence to be nostalgic about.

The Arabs are reinforced by their alliance with the United States, whose need for Persian Gulf oil pushes it to expand their military presence in the region in spite of the Iraqi quagmire. While the Carter doctrine provides for American military muscle into a Persian Gulf which must be defended "by any means necessary, including military force". It is no accident that the new CENTCOM boss is an admiral .

The Arabs may well be already confronting Iran on the economic front, that other one of Iran's Achilles' heel. Indeed, "Oil traders and others believe that the Saudi decision to let the price of oil tumble has more to do with Iran than economics", and that "the Saudis are not doing this alone, that the other Sunni-dominated oil producing countries and the U.S. are working together". And in Lebanon, the funds pledged to the government will more than offset Iran's "donations" to the victims of its wars on our soil, but they can only flourish under its full control.

The Limits of Conservatism

A final limit Nasrallah is facing is his own conservative goals. Conservatives, by definition, are opposed to change. A revolution, by definition, is meant to provoke such a change. Nasrallah's revolution is essentially a "conservative revolution", and therefore a historic oxymoron.

Nasrallah forgets that a revolution cannot go backwards; no one revolts to conserve a status quo, but to change it. And for all their fiery rhetoric, the syed, the general, and even many of their opponents are essentially members of an old order many long to uproot. Most understand that there is no going back to the days of Nasserism and Baathism, even the founders of Nasrallah's own movement.

Nasrallah is on yesterday's familiar territory, when Arab leaders claimed their defeats as victories, since it allowed them to "preserve the regime", in spite of "losing the land". Back then Kamal Joumblat was alone in raising his voice, hoping to have lost the regime but preserved the land.

The ground has shifted today, and while the current winds may not be in favour of greater democracy right now, Hezb's ship has yet to sail. Nasrallah and Aoun may think themselves great men, but they will be reminded in time that "ingratitude towards great men is the mark of a strong people".

The Way forward?

In this respect, the Israeli are showing signs of strength, with the dismissal of their chief of Staff, and even of their president.

While I fear the immediate future, I am more confident of our longer term prospects. We are an even stronger people, having survived what would have long destroyed other countries. I am confident the day will come when "Nasrallah's March 8th" will fade in the dark recesses of Arab's collective memory. What Prof. Mallat described as "a new 'White Arabism' [which] would help generate liberal societies" will ultimately come to pass.

Why? Because real Empires are not built on hollow victory claims. And because a republic rests on "a government of laws, and not of men".

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