The state of Lebanon has never truly experienced political stability. When Greater Lebanon was initially created, through the addition of the Bekaa and the areas associated with Beirut, Tripoli, and Sidon to Mount Lebanon, this resulted in tensions that characterized the early independence era, namely increased sectarian diversity, and a tension between Western-oriented and Arabist elites. The delicate balance achieved as a solution to these overlapping tensions was based on the National Pact that assigned seats in Parliament and the Executive according to a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims, and a general agreement on the multicultural orientation of a Lebanon in the process of Arabization.

The delicate compromises that have become Lebanon’s defining trait can be traced to the lobbying of Maronite elites for an expansion of Mount Lebanon, the resistance of urban Sunnis and Orthodox Christians to such an expansion, and Shiite ambivalence to the emerging order. It is evident that elite families dominated politics during the emergence of the Lebanese state – it is these clans of elite Maronites, Sunnis, Druze, and Shiites that contributed to the failure of the Lebanese system; more importantly, it is this type of clan-based rule that survived the civil war while the legal institutions of power collapsed.

The dominant families of Lebanon were often land-based power brokers that represented a continuation of the Ottoman order – these families include the Maronite El-Khazen family, the Druze Jumblatt and Arslan families, and the Shihab clan (originally Druze, then Maronite). Emerging alongside these traditional families were several urban families that drew their power from financial strength acquired during the expansion of commerce in the Levant, especially in Beirut – these families include the Sunni Wazzan and Salam families alongside the Orthodox Christian Tueni family, among others.

The significance here is the preservation of these families during the first half-century of the Lebanese state – many of these families still cling to power in various forms. Alongside the families of Beirut and Mount Lebanon are the dominant clans of more localized significance, some of which have succeeded in extending influence beyond their original territories. Examples of these families are the Maronite Franjieh and Mouawad families of Zgharta, the Greek Catholic Skaff family of Zahle, the Sunni Karami family in Tripoli, and the Shiite Hamadas of the Bekaa and Haidars of southern Lebanon.

The development of political parties in Lebanon during the 1930s did little to change the political mechanism of Lebanon – the split between pro-Western and pro-Arab currents resulted in the creation of the National Bloc Party and the Constitutional Party. The former was a collection of pro-French Christian elites, while the latter was a largely Muslim coalition supported by Bishara El-Khoury and other Arab-leaning Christians. The Phalange Party, formed in 1936, created yet another dominant family – the Gemayels. Yet another example of family dominance was the leftist current represented by members of the Solh and Jumblatt (PSP) families.

The tragic reality of pre-war Lebanon was the closed-door mentality that dominated politics – issues like the sectarian divide, the Arab-Western tensions, national defense, and internal affairs were often resolved by elites with little involvement of national or local constituencies. Political ideologies and economic orientations were repeatedly manipulated by clan networks (families and their core support) to maintain power at the expense of stability and the national interest. In other words, centralized state authority in Lebanon catered to the interests of elites, as opposed to the converse, and a series of unfair and inflexible compromises affirmed that true power lay in the hands of these elites, whether or not these families were assimilated into state mechanisms through election or appointment – the result was a constant reaction to crisis rather than an anticipation of future problems that could have been achieved in a more meritocratic, transparent system.

The presence of a political elite is entirely normal, and maintaining family influence is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to Lebanon. Lebanese politics however, have often failed to reflect the development of a constitutionally based state. The domination of public life by clans is the norm here, as opposed to the exception – our government, our public services, our courts, and our private sector are all tainted by this clan system. Political and economic patronage denies the Lebanese population its right to transparent, accountable governance.

While the civil war ravaged Lebanese cities, stripped the government of its already declining power, and once again allowed the internal differences amongst the Lebanese to be exploited by outside powers, the clan mentality has prevailed. The Hariri and Hrawi families have joined the established Gemayels, Jumblatts, Karamis, Franjiehs, and Mouawads in controlling the mechanisms of government. Even the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbullah, although not family-based parties, represent a tragedy of Lebanese politics – constituents adhere to the “policy” decisions made by General Aoun or Sayed Nasrallah with little input and lack of foresight.

The families in question may have changed slightly over time, and the addition of FPM and Hezbullah to the infinite number of political fronts in Lebanon may have diluted the familial hold on power, but the fundamental weakness of the Lebanese state still plagues us despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops last year. Until the clan networks and patronage relations of the Lebanese state are weakened, and until our government adopts a more merit-based, policy-oriented approach, the Lebanese population will never be truly independent. It is important to realize that these clan leaders will never seek independence for the Lebanese people. We are all to blame – we have accepted such rule for far too long.

Now is the time to act – the masses must demand accountability, rather than sit on the sidelines and wait for it. Independence is not a right, but a privilege earned by the collective hard work of a nation.