I.Preface (Return to Table of Contents)

1. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1595 (2005), the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission ("UNIIIC" or "the Commission") submitted its report on 19 October 2005 (S/2005/662), reflecting the outcome of its work since it was declared operational on 16 June 2005.

2. In a letter dated 14 October 2005 (S/2005/651), the Prime Minister of Lebanon conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of the Commission until mid-December 2005. The purpose of the extension was to enable the Commission to further assist the Lebanese authorities to pursue the various lines of enquiry that had emerged in the course of the investigation in order to attain the main objective of the mission: to help identify the perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices in the terrorist attack which killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005, in Beirut.

3. Following the presentation of the Commission's report, and the briefing provided by the Commissioner to the Security Council on its content, on 25 October 2005, the Security Council, acting on the request submitted by the Government of Lebanon, and mindful of the Commission's recommendation that continued assistance should be provided to the Lebanese authorities, adopted on 31 October 2005, resolution 1636 (2005), whereby the Council welcomed the report of the Commission and the Secretary-General's decision to extend the mandate of the Commission until 15 December 2005.

4. Council resolution 1636 (2005), a follow-up to resolution 1595, extended the scope of the Commission's authority insofar as it gave the Commission, interalia, the same rights and authorities vis-à-vis the Syrian Arab Republic as it has been granted in Lebanon, and the authority to determine the location and modalities for interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the enquiry. It called upon the Syrian authorities to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the Commission and to detain any Syrian officials or nationals considered as suspects by the Commission.

5. In conformity with the two resolutions, the Commission continued its work on the same lines of enquiry it had adopted since its inception. The Commission, in close cooperation with the Lebanese judicial and security authorities, has pursued new leads, heard an additional number of witnesses (which today total more than 500), confirmed a list of 19 suspects, analyzed a voluminous bulk of materials with the help of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), and continued to exchange with the Office of the Prosecutor General of Lebanon all resultant information, material and evidence.

6. With regard to the Syrian track of the investigation, the Commission acted in conformity with Council resolution 1636 (2005), which endorsed the Commission's conclusion that it was incumbent upon the Syrian authorities to clarify a considerable part of the questions which remain unresolved. A window of opportunity was open for the Syrian authorities to carry out their own investigation into the assassination of Mr. Hariri and others insofar as Syrian involvement might be concerned.

7.By virtue of legislative Decree No. 96 (29 October 2005), a Syrian Judicial Commission was set up to carry out its own investigation into the Hariri case. While UNIIIC welcomes this initiative, it is of the view that the Syrian Judicial Commission's function is to focus on the internal investigation of the case to clarify a picture that UNIIIC has been trying hard to comprehend. The Syrian Commission cannot invalidate or substitute for UNIIIC's own work. The Commission, for its part, will continue its contacts with the Syrian authorities to move forward on the Syrian track.

8. By creating the Judicial Commission, the Syrian authorities were perceived as willing to share their part of the responsibility so as to shed more light on the circumstances of the assassination and to help establish the truth. Whether this measure was prompted by a genuine desire to cooperate in substance or whether it came as a result of the firm message conveyed by Council resolution 1636 (2005), it remains to be seem if a substantive law-enforcement investigation will be carried out to its full extent. Moreover, it is only the actual and continuous responsiveness of the Syrian authorities that will remove any doubts about Syrian substantive movement in the case.

9. Following the adoption of Council resolution 1636 (2005), the Commission immediately summoned six Syrian officials whom it considers as suspects. After arduous discussions and considerable delay due to procedural manoeuvring and sometimes contradictory feedback from the Syrian authorities, a location was determined for the questioning of five Syrian officials. The interview of the sixth suspect has been postponed. The Commission is also still awaiting the provision of other requested materials. At the same time, the Syrian Judicial Commission organized a press conference with a Syrian witness who gave journalists an opportunity to question him before the judicial Commission could do so, and who contradicted prior sworn evidence given to the Commission. The Syrian official statements that ensued, calling upon UNIIIC to reconsider past mistakes and to revise its report, was a clear indication that, while an official channel of communication was operating between the Commission and the Syrian authorities regarding cooperation, the Judicial Commission and the Syrian authorities were aiming to cast doubt on the content of UNIIIC's report. This was, at the least, an attempt to hinder the investigation internally and procedurally.

10. However, it is worth noting that, despite their reluctance and procrastination, the Syrian authorities did make available for questioning the five Syrian officials that the Commission had summoned. The extensive interviews took place outside Syria, according to conditions determined by the Commission. UNIIIC investigators were also able to interview a Syrian witness in Syria without interference. As this is the beginning of a long-awaiting process, it is up to the Syrian authorities to be more forthcoming in order to make headway in a process that will be most probably a long one if it is to be judged against the pace of progress to date.

11. To date, the Commission has made steady progress on the Lebanese track. It remains to be matched on the Syrian track. For that reason, it is the Commission's view that Syria should pursue its own investigation in an earnest and professional manner and respond to the Commission in a timely way, fully and unconditionally, before it is determined whether it is complying in full with provisions of resolution 1636 (2005).

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